Tet Offensive Essay, Research Paper

TET-OFFENSIVE

The Tet-Offensive, which occurred on January 31, 1968, proved to be a political and a psychological victory for the Vietnamese communists. And, although it only lasted for about one month, it was one of America?s most notable battles that taught the Americans and the Vietnamese valuable lessons about life and war. The background of the Tet-Offensive is a very interesting one hidden within the conflict of the Vietnam War. While the offensive was being planned, there were anti-war demonstrations taking place in the U.S. against the Vietnam War. Lyndon B. Johnson, in a close election, won the primary over McCarthy who happened to be against the war, and then went on to running the country with few problems. In Vietnam, General Vo Nguyen Giap of North Vietnam told his political members that the opportunity for a general offensive or uprising was within reach. The offensive began in August of 1967, when following Hanoi?s decision to proceed with Giap?s ?uprising,? Giap began a massive buildup of troops, equipment, and supplies in South Vietnam. First, thousands of guns and munitions were brought southward along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was the vital Vietcong (also known as the South Vietnamese) supply line that twisted through the jungles of North Vietnam in a southward direction. This trail also served as a transportation route for food and medical supplies being brought to the south part of Vietnam. Tens of thousands of troops poured down from the North, infiltrated the countryside, and wearing civilian clothes, easily blended with the local people. By mid-January, 1968, about 84,000 of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and the Vietcong troops were in South Vietnam. And, two weeks before the actual attack would even take place; Giap?s troops were positioned and ready for an attack. The U.S. began to have suspicions about some sort of uprising taking place. So the offense did, in fact, not take Americans by surprise. American intelligence sources had started uncovering evidence that indicated a shift in enemy strategy in the late summer/early fall of 1967. The 101st Airborne Division, on November 19, seized an attack order telling that the offensive was near, and some slightly detailed plans of what was going to happen and how it was going to happen. The U.S. intelligence officers took this evidence as propaganda and disregarded it completely. The found attack order was then published on January 5, but still attracted very little attention. As 1968 approached, the U.S. appeared to be winning the war, but in Washington, on December 18, General Earle G. Wheeler, joint chief of staffs, cautioned that ?it is entirely possible that there may be a Communist thrust similar to the desperate effort of the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge in World War II.? (Rice 16). The suspicions that the U.S. was having about there possibly being an uprising became stronger as the Tet-Offensive grew closer. In Saigon, on December 20, General William C. Westmoreland of the U.S. Army cabled Washington that he expected the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong to ?undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort over a relatively short period.? (16). On the same day, December 20, the President warned, ?we face dark days ahead? (17). These events began to foreshadow the Vietnamese?s coming psychological victory. In January of 1968, American forces captured a pair of NVA operations orders calling for an attack on Pleiku before the Tet, and targeting Ban Me Thuot for assault. Two days prior to the Tet, agents of the South Vietnamese Military Security Service arrested eleven Vietcong leaders caught holding a secret meeting. The eleven had two tapes that had messages about the liberation of Saigon, Hue, and other cities. Too many warnings of the offensive were ignored. One U.S. intelligence official stated ?If we?d gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn?t have been believed. It wouldn?t have been credible to us.? (17). Intelligence analysts refused to believe that the Vietcong and the NVA were capable of executing such a large scale coordinated attack, but they were not sure if the Vietcong and NVA were, or if they were not. The U.S.?s suspicions on the upcoming offensive were starting to be confirmed. By mid-January, Westmoreland was almost sure that the offensive would be starting just before or just after the Tet. The U.S. and its officials had strongly doubted that the Vietcong and NVA would strike during the holiday. The Tet is a very important and religious holiday in the Chinese and Vietnamese cultures that?s another reason why the Vietnamese?s victory was psychological. Some smaller battles started to break out in Vietnam before the actual Tet-Offensive did. In the fall of 1967, Vietcong and NVA units suffered heavy losses during several bouts with the U.S. and the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) forces. Starting on October 27, and continuing for 22 days, the American and South Vietnamese troops killed over 1,600 more enemy soldiers, almost destroying the 4 NVA regiments. (19) When the unavoidable Tet-Offensive came, somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 troops launched an all-out attack on the marines at Khe Sanh on January 21, 1968. The question started to be asked by American troops and its citizens: ?Is this the offensive or not?? (19). The answer to that question was yes, the battle ended up being called ?the most important battle of the world.?(20). The first attack was not the Tet-Offensive. This larger battle was composed of many smaller battles. On January 21, 1968, at 12:30 a.m., the North Vietnamese 325 division launched an assault against Hill 861, a marine outpost northwest of the main combat base. Following that battle, there were many, until mid/late February. An end to the Tet-Offensive finally came into view. On February 20, there were 47 marines killed, 240 badly wounded, and 60 wounded but still fighting. The Americans had actually killed more than four times the number of dead on their side. They started fighting the communists for control of the Citadel in Hue. Sergeant James Munroe led the 2nd Platoon task force, which included a sniper team. They had two buildings to secure before they could take over the tower. Amazingly, there was no resistance in the two buildings or the tower itself. On February 21, the northeast wall of the Citadel fell to Major Thompson?s 1st Battalion marines. The marines then hoisted an American flag over the liberated South Vietnamese soil (more specifically, the Citadel). The Tet-Offensive finally came to an end. The Black Panther Company of the 1st ARVN Division?s 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, secured the main flagpole at the Midday Gate of the Imperial Palace. At 5:00 a.m., they hauled down the NLF (National Liberation Front) flag, ran up the yellow and red standard of the Republic of Vietnam. Although the battle was then officially over, there were still many losses. There were 5,113 NVA/VC dead in Hue, and 89 captured. The ARVN had 384 casualties, and 1,830 wounded. Among the civilians of Hue, there were 5,800 listed as dead or missing, most of whom had been killed by communist death squads and buried in mass graves in the inner city. The U.S. army had 74 dead and 507 seriously wounded. And, the Marine Corps had 147 dead, and 857 seriously wounded. (67) Throughout the Tet-Offensive, the Americans learned to never underestimate the abilities or even potential abilities of their enemies. In this battle, each side proved something to the other: The Vietnamese Communists proved that they were able to pull of a large-scale uprising and hold up a pretty good fight. The Americans proved that they too could hold up their side of the fight, but we also learned that sometimes there are no true winners in a battle. Each side had its casualties and failures.