Effects Of The P-51 In World War II Essay, Research Paper

Abstract

This paper deals with the contributions of the P-51 Mustang to

the eventual victory of the Allies in Europe during World War II. It

describes the war scene in Europe before the P-51 was introduced,

traces the development of the fighter, its advantages, and the

abilities it was able to contribute to the Allies’ arsenal. It

concludes with the effect that the P-51 had on German air superiority,

and how it led the destruction of the Luftwaffe. The thesis is that:

it was not until the advent of the North American P-51 Mustang

fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side effects

that it brought with it, that the Allies were able to achieve air

superiority over the Germans.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation

The Pre-P-51 Situation

The Allied Purpose in the Air War

The Battle at Schweinfurt

The Development of the P-51

The Installation of the Merlin Engines

Features, Advantages, and Benefits of the P-51

The P-51’s Battle Performance

The Change in Policy on Escort Fighter Function

P-51’s Disrupt Luftwaffe Fighter Tactics

P-51’s Give Bombers Better Support

Conclusion

Works Cited

Introduction

On September 1, 1939, the German military forces invaded Poland

to begin World War II. This invasion was very successful because of

its use of a new military strategic theory — blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg,

literally “lightning war,” involved the fast and deadly coordination

of two distinct forces, the Wermacht and the Luftwaffe. The Wermacht

advanced on the ground, while the Luftwaffe destroyed the enemy air

force, attacked enemy ground forces, and disrupted enemy communication

and transportation systems. This setup was responsible for the

successful invasions of Poland, Norway, Western Europe, the Balkans

and the initial success of the Russian invasion. For many years

after the first of September, the air war in Europe was dominated by

the Luftwaffe. No other nation involved in the war had the experience,

technology, or numbers to challenge the Luftwaffe’s superiority. It

was not until the United States joined the war effort that any great

harm was done to Germany and even then, German air superiority

remained unscathed. It was not until the advent of the North American

P-51 Mustang fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side

effects that it brought with it, that the Allies were able to achieve

air superiority over the Germans.

Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation

The continued domination of the European skies by the Luftwaffe

was caused by two factors, the first of which was the difference in

military theory between the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force. The

theories concerning the purpose and function of the Luftwaffe and RAF

were exactly opposite and were a result of their experiences in World

War I. During WW I, Germany attempted a strategic bombing effort

directed against England using Gothas (biplane bombers) and Zeppelins

(slow-moving hot-air balloons) which did not give much of a result.

This, plus the fact that German military theory at the beginning of WW

II was based much more on fast quick results (Blitzkrieg), meant that

Germany decided not to develop a strategic air force. The Luftwaffe

had experienced great success when they used tactical ground-attack

aircraft in Spain (i.e. at Guernica), and so they figured that their

air force should mainly consist of this kind of planes. So Germany

made the Luftwaffe a ground support force that was essentially an

extension of the army and functioned as a long- range, aerial

artillery. The RAF, on the other hand, had experimented with

ground-attack fighters during WW I, and had suffered grievous casualty

rates. This, combined with the fact that the British had been deeply

enraged and offended by the German Gotha and Zeppelin attacks on their

home soil, made them determined to develop a strategic air force that

would be capable of bombing German soil in the next war. Thus, at the

beginning of WW II, the RAF was mostly a strategic force that

consisted of heavy bombers and backup fighters, and lacked any

tactical dive- bombers or ground-attack fighters. (Boyne 21)

The Pre-P-51 Situation

Because of these fundamental differences, the situation that

resulted after the air war began was: bombers in enemy territory vs.

attack planes. The “in enemy territory” was the second reason for the

domination of the Luftwaffe. At the beginning of WW II, and for many

years afterward, the Allies had no long-range escort fighters, which

meant that the bombers were forced to fly most of their long journeys

alone. (Perret 104) Before the P-51 was brought into combat, the main

Allied fighters were the American P-47 Thunderbolt and the British

Spitfire, neither of which had a very long range. The rule-of-thumb

for fighter ranges was that they could go as far as Aachen, which was

about 250 miles from the Allied fighters’ home bases in England,

before they had to turn around. Unfortunately, most of the bombers’

targets were between 400 and 700 miles from England. (Bailey 2-3)

This meant that bombers could only be escorted into the Benelux

countries, northern France, and the very western fringe of Germany.

When these unescorted, ungainly, slow, unmaneuverable bombers flew

over Germany, they were practically sitting ducks for the fast German

fighters. On the other hand, the bombers were equipped with several

machine guns and were able to consistently shoot down some of their

attackers. Because of this, “U.S. strategists were not yet convinced

of the need for long-range fighters; they continued to cling to the

belief that their big bomber formations could defend themselves over

Germany.” (Bailey 153)

The Allied Purpose in the Air War

The Allies knew that they had to drive German industry into the

ground in order to win the war. Since the factories, refineries,

assembly-lines, and other industry-related structures were all inland,

the only way to destroy them was by sending in bombers. The only way

that the bombers could achieve real success was by gaining air

superiority, which meant that nearly all of the bombers would be able

to drop their bombs without being harassed by fighters, and return

home to fight another day. The problem with this sequence was that the

Allies did not have this superiority, (Bailey 28) because their

bombers were consistently getting shot down in fairly large numbers,

by the German fighters that kept coming. The Allies soon realized

that in order to gain this superiority, they would have to destroy

more German fighters. In order to destroy the fighters, they would

have to be forced into the air in greater numbers. In order to get

more German fighters into the air, the more sensitive German

industries would have to be attacked with more aggression. Following

this logic, the Allies began a intensified bombing effort that

resulted in the famous bombings of Hamburg (July 24-28, 1943) and

Ploesti (August 1, 1943), among others. And, indeed, this did cause

more fighters to come up to meet and engage the bombers.

Unfortunately, the bombers were overwhelmed by the German opposition,

and their losses soon began to increase. (Copp 359) The Allied air

forces had, in effect, pushed a stick into a hornets’ nest, hoping to

kill the hornets when they came out, and been stung by the ferocity of

their response.

The Battle at Schweinfurt

The culminating point of this backfiring plan was the second

bombing raid on Schweinfurt, which occurred on October 14, 1943.

Schweinfurt was the location of huge ball-bearing factories that

supplied most of the ball-bearings for the entire German military. The

U.S. Eighth Air Force had staged a fairly successful raid on the same

city two months earlier, but the second time around, the Germans were

ready for them. The official report afterwards said that the Luftwaffe

“turned in a performance unprecedented in its magnitude, in the

cleverness with which it was planned, and in the severity with which

it was executed.” Of the 229 bombers that actually made it all the way

to Schweinfurt, 60 were shot down, and 17 more made it home, but were

damaged beyond repair. This was a 26.5% battle loss rate for the

Americans, while the Germans only lost 38 airplanes the whole day,

from all causes. (Boyne 327) This battle was one of the key battles of

the war, and undeniably proved to the Allies that the bomber offensive

could not continue without a long-range fighter escort. (Copp 444)

Even before October of ‘43, some had begun to realize the need

for this kind of fighter. In June, the Commanding General of the Army

Air Forces, General Hap Arnold, wrote a memo to his Chief of Staff,

Major General Barney Giles, which said:

This brings to my mind the absolute necessity for building a

fighter airplane that can go in and out with the bombers.

Moreover, this fighter has got to go into Germany. . . . Whether

you use an existing type or have to start from scratch is your

problem. Get to work on this right away because by January ‘44, I

want a fighter escort for all our bombers from the U.K. into

Germany. (Copp 413-414)

The Development of the P-51

In April of 1940, “Dutch” Kindleberger, president of North

American Aviation, visited Sir Henry Self, the head of the aircraft

division of the British Purchasing Commission, asking if Britain would

like to buy some of his B-25 bombers. Self was not interested in

buying any more bombers, but was interested in buying a good fighter.

He directed Kindleberger to the Curtiss company, who had a new fighter

design, but were too busy building P-40’s to do anything with it.

Kindleberger went to Curtiss and bought their design for $56,000. He

promised Self to have the planes ready by September of 1941. The

prototype of the NA-73, as it was called, was ready to fly in October

of 1940 and proved to have an excellent design. The NA-73 had a

revolutionary wing design that allowed it to fly at high speeds

without adverse compression effects. In other planes, as they

approached a certain speed, usually around 450 mph, the air would be

flowing around the wing at nearly the speed of sound, putting huge

amounts of pressure on the wings, which were unable to deal with the

stress. The NA-73 did not have this problem, which meant it could fly

safely at much higher speeds. Another revolutionary idea in the plane

was the way heated air from the radiator was dealt with. The NA-73’s

engineers designed it to expel this air and boost the planes speed by

15 or 25 mph. The engineers also worked especially hard on making the

plane as aerodynamic as possible, and so they positioned the radiator

in a new place, made the fuselage as narrow as possible, and set the

cockpit low in the fuselage. (Perret 118-119) It was at this point

that an error was made that made the Mustang useless as a long-range

offensive fighter. When the NA-73 was mass produced as the P-51,

it was powered by a 1550 horsepower air-cooled Allison engine, which

did not have a supercharger and lost performance above 11,800 ft. At

high altitudes air pressure goes down, and so there is less oxygen in

a given amount of air, which means that engines do not burn as

cleanly, and so lose power. Superchargers compress air before it is

pumped into the engine cylinders so that there is enough oxygen for

the engine to function well. The early Allison-engined planes did not

have the supercharger, and so were limited to low-altitude operations.

Even without a high- altitude capability, the Mustang was an

impressive plane and was bought in quantity by the RAF. It flew its

first mission on May 10, 1942, against Berck-sur-Mer on the French

coast. (Grant 17-18)

The Installation of the Merlin Engines

So, for the next eighteen months, the P-51A’s continued to fly

with the RAF, doing their unexceptional jobs well. After the plane

began to go into combat, some people began looking into the idea of

fitting the Mustang with a more powerful engine. As the RAF said, it

was “a bloody good airplane, only it needs a bit more poke.” (Grant

22) One day, an RAF test pilot was flying a P-51A and the thought

occurred to him that the plane could be fitted with a Rolls-Royce

Merlin engine, which had about 300 more horsepower and included a

supercharger. He suggested it to Rolls-Royce’s Chief Aerodynamic

Engineer and “both men realized that the combination of this sort of

performance with the aerodynamically efficient airframe of the

Mustang would revolutionize its potential.” (Grant 22) This plan was

duly carried out and in November 1943, the first group of P-51B’s

arrived in England.

Features, Advantages, and Benefits of the P-51

This final Mustang design was superior to anything else that

flew at the time. The P-51B had a huge internal gasoline tank capacity

(around 425 gallons) and its engine was very economical, using about

half the gasoline of other American fighters. This meant its range was

1080 miles and could be extended to 2600 miles when extra drop-tanks

were attached to the wings. This made its range far more than any

Allied or German fighter’s. As far as performance went, it was

superior to all others as well. Neither of the other two main American

fighters could compete; the P-47 was too heavy and the P-38 had too

many technical problems. The British fighters, the Spitfire and the

Hurricane did not have the range, speed, or power. But most important

was its superiority over the German fighters, the most important of

which were the FW-190 and the Me-109. The Mustang was 50 mph faster

than the Germans up to 28,000 ft beyond which it was much faster than

the FW-190 and still substantially faster than the Me-109. The

Mustang had between 3000 and 4000 lbs more weight, and so was able to

outdive either German plane. The tightness of its turns was much

better than the Me-109 and slightly better than the FW-190. (Grant 31,

Boyne 389-390, Bailey 153) The result of all of this was that the

Allies now had a plane that could go with the bombers all the way to

and from their targets, fight and defeat the bombers’ German

attackers, and not run out of fuel.

The P-51’s Battle Performance

So, at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the new

American P-51B’s began arriving in England in force. (Dupuy 34) For

the first few months of the year, the Mustangs were settling in and

having their systems perfected. But by March, the Mustangs had

decisively taken control. The arrival and subsequent heavy use of the

P-51’s had several effects. The first effect that the Mustangs had was

in the running air battles over Europe. Before the beginning of 1944,

the bombers had been alone as they approached their faraway targets.

But the P-51 changed this, and quickly made an impression on all

concerned, enemy and ally alike. For example, on January 11, 1944, the

Eighth Air Force launched its first deep penetration of Germany with

P-51 coverage. The bombers’ targets were the cities of Oschersleben

and Halberstadt, where many German planes were being constructed. When

they arrived, there were 49 Mustangs covering a force of around 220

bombers. Even though the bombers suffered heavy casualties, they

were able to inflict substantial damage on their target factories. But

the most significant thing about the battle was the shining

performance of the P-51’s. Since the bombers were attacking two

different cities, the Mustang force had to divide into two groups, to

support the different attacks. Because of the sensitive nature of the

bombers’ targets, the Luftwaffe came out in force to defend their

factories. During the ensuing melee, the 49 P-51’s shot down 15 enemy

planes without suffering a single loss. Major Howard, the group’s

leader, was credited with four kills within minutes. (Bailey 155) In

the grand scheme of things, this battle was insignificant, but it goes

to show how much of advantage the P-51’s had over their German

counterparts. Considering that these were essentially first-time

pilots in the Mustangs’ first big battle, this is very impressive.

The Change in Policy on Escort Fighter Function

Another thing happened at the same time as the arrival of the

P-51 that greatly aided the Allies and fully utilized the great

capabilities of the Mustang. Before the beginning of 1944, the bomber

escort’s primary function was to fly alongside the bombers, repel any

attacks made on the bombers, and generally make sure the bombers

stayed safe. Indeed, the motto of the Eighth Air Force Fighter Command

was “Our Mission is to Bring the Bombers Back Alive.” One day at the

beginning of the year, Jimmy Doolittle, who was the commander of the

Eighth Air Force, saw a plaque on the wall with this motto on it and

said, “That’s not so. Your mission is to destroy the German Air Force.

. .Take that damned thing down.” (Copp 456) And just days before, in

his New Year’s Day address to the Eighth Air Force command, General

Arnold had said, “My personal message to you-this is a MUST- is

to destroy the enemy air force wherever you find them, in the air, on

the ground and in the factories.” (Copp 456) What this meant was that

the escort fighters were not tied to the bombers anymore, and were

free to roam over the countryside and through the towns and cities,

destroying at will. The sweeping Mustangs were released to ravage

German convoys, trains, antiaircraft gun emplacements, warehouses,

airfields, factories, radar installations, and other important things

that would be impractical to be attacked by bombers. The fighters were

also able to attack German fighters when they were least prepared for

it, like when they were taking off or forming up in the air. What made

this possible was the increase in the number of American planes

present in Europe. This increase in the number of Allied planes

compared to the number of German planes continued to the point that,

on D-Day, the Allies used 12,873 aircraft while the Germans were only

able to muster a mere 300. (Overy 77) By using this overwhelming

numerical advantage, the Allied fighters were able to swamp their

opponents in an unstoppable flood of planes.

P-51’s Disrupt Luftwaffe Fighter Tactics

This increase in the number of fighters plus the change in

fighter philosophy allowed the escorts to cover the bombers while

simultaneously ranging far from the bomber stream and destroying all

that they could find. This caused the disruption of several effective

German fighter tactics that had been used successfully in the past.

One of these tactics was the deployment of slow, ungainly German

planes that would fly around the bomber formations, out of gun range,

and report back on where the bombers were and where their weak spots

were. The free-ranging P-51’s soon wiped out these planes. Another

popular tactic was to mount rocket launchers on the wings of some of

these slower craft, have them linger just out of range of the bombers’

guns, and send rockets flying into the bomber formations. These rocket

attacks were terrifying to the bomber crews, and often broke up

formations, sending some planes to the ground. Obviously, these

attacks also came to a halt. Most importantly, the fast German

fighters had to change their attack tactics. Beforehand, they would

fly alongside the formations and wait for the right moment to swoop in

and attack a bomber. Now, they were forced to group together several

miles away from the bombers, and then turn and made a mad rush at the

bombers, hoping to inflict sufficient damage on one pass to shoot down

some number of enemy bombers. They could not afford to stay with the

bombers for very long for fear of being attacked by the Mustangs.

(Perret 293) Indeed, soon after the P-51’s entered onto the scene,

Hermann Goering, the commander of the Luftwaffe, recommended that the

German defensive fighters avoid combat with the P-51, and only attack

bomber formations when there were no fighters around. The result of

all of this is that the American fighters, led by the P-51’s, soon

began to gain air superiority. Not long after Goering’s

recommendation, a sarcastic Luftwaffe officer commented that the

safest flying in the world was to be an American fighter over Germany.

(Dupuy 35-36) It is obvious that the P-51, once it was supplied to the

Eighth Air Force in great quantities, and unleashed by Doolittle and

Arnold’s new fighter policies, soon took a heavy toll on German air

superiority.

P-51’s Give Bombers Better Support

Another profound effect that the increased fighter coverage had

was on the most important people, the bombers. After the entrance of

the P-51, and the virtual elimination of the German fighter threat,

the bombers were in much less danger from German fighters. The result

of the decreased danger to the bombers is subtle, but obvious when

thought about. Imagine a bomber crew sitting in their cramped plane,

unable to move around or evade attack during their bombing run while

numerous German fighters speed past their plane firing at them. Second

lieutenant William Brick, the bombardier of a B-17 bomber, tells about

the day he flew to Linz, Austria on a bombing run:

. . . The remainder of the run must be perfectly straight and

level, without the slightest deviation, or our five-

thousand-pound bomb load will fall wide of the target. No evasive

action is possible. . . Then comes the sickening rattle of

machine-gun bullets and cannon fire hitting our ship; ignoring

the flak from the antiaircraft batteries, German fighter planes

zoom in so close that it seems they will ram us. . . Even at the

sub-zero temperatures of this altitude, salty sweat pours down my

face and burns my eyeballs. Cursing and praying, I am gripped by

the same brand of helpless fear that fliers experience during

every bomb run. I feel the terror in my hands, in my stomach,

even in my feet. Long after returning from the mission, its

effects will remain etched indelibly on my face. . . . (Brick 61)

This kind of terror experienced by the entire crew of the bombers was

sure to affect their concentration and their carefulness. Indeed, “it

is an undeniable, if unquantifiable, fact that it is easier to bomb

precisely when you know you will probably not be shot out of the sky.”

(Boyne 341)

Conclusion

In the end, the way that the Allied air forces gained air

superiority was by destroying its opposition. The ways in which the

fighters were able to destroy German fighters were diverse. The

fighters utilized their high speed and maneuverability to fly

low-level strafing missions that ranged over large expanses of

territory and destroyed many Luftwaffe craft on the ground. This

tactic was responsible for the destruction of many dozens of fighters

that were unable to go on and fight in the air. Another way that the

Allied fighters destroyed their opposition, and the most important

way, was by luring them into the air. Going back to the hornets’ nest

analogy, the Allies stopped pushing the stick and decided to bide

their time until the moment was right. When they did start pushing the

stick into the nest again, they were armed with a metaphoric

insecticide. In real life, this “insecticide” was the P-51.

Beforehand, the Allies had nothing that could stop the “hornets” and

so were helpless to stop their attack. But after they had developed an

“insecticide” capable of killing the “hornets,” they proceeded to lure

the hornets into the open where they could be destroyed. In real life,

the bombers were the lure that brought the Luftwaffe into the air.

Using the long-range Mustangs, the Allies were able to make their

bombing raids more effective and more deadly to Germany. The

approaching end of the Third Reich was enough to get the German

fighters into the air to try to stop the bombers from wrecking their

war effort. “Air superiority had been won not by bombing the enemy’s

factories into oblivion; instead, it was won by the long-range

fighter, using the bomber formations as bait to entice the Luftwaffe

to fight.” (Boyne 338) With the advent of great numbers of the highly

superior P-51 Mustang, the German fighters that came up to attack the

bombers quickly met their match and were easily repelled by the

Mustangs.

—

Works Cited

Bailey, Ronald H. The Air War in Europe. Alexandria, Virginia:

Time-Life Books, 1979. A simple, straight-forward book that includes

much background on the development of military aviation, and includes

many pictures that chronicle the air war.

Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air. New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1994. A very informative and user- friendly book

that dealt with the air aspect of all fronts and theaters of WWII. It

includes much data on numerous planes in its appendices.

Brick, William. “Bombardier.” American History, April 1995, pp. 60-65.

A short magazine article following the story of how a U.S. airman was

shot down over Austria, and his subsequent imprisonment by the Nazis.

Copp, DeWitt S. Forged in Fire: Strategy and Decisions in the Airwar

over Europe, 1940-1945. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company,

1982. A book dealing mostly with the U.S. involvement in the War, with

particular emphasis on the politics of the military officials, and how

the major strategic decisions were made.

Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. The Air War in the West: June 1941 to April

1945. New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963. A short, very basic book

that did not go into depth, but did cover its material well.

Grant, William Newby. P-51 Mustang. London: Bison Books Limited, 1980.

A relatively short book, but one that dealt solely with the P-51, and

went into considerable depth concerning its construction and use

during WWII and in later conflicts.

Overy, R.J. The Air War: 1939-1945. New York: Stein and Day

Publishers, 1980. A fairly dry book that dealt mostly with the

economics and generalities of the air war, without dealing too much

with the actual fighting.

Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II.

New York: Random House, 1993. A good book that covered its topic well,

although in-depth discussion of the contributions of the other allies’

forces is not dealt with.