Mussolini’s Seizure Of Power Essay, Research Paper

On the 23 March 1919 after a series of Communist

demonstrations, the almost forgotten Mussolini decided to attempt to

revive his Fasci movement. A meeting was held in a hall in a Milan and

was attended by some fifty malcontents. From this seemingly small and

insignificant event the Fascio di Combattimento’ (Combat Group) was

born. Initially, it would seem that the Fasci were destined for

failure with none of their candidates (including Mussolini) winning a

single seat in the 1919 elections. How was it that a party with no

clear programme, save a belief in action of some sort, became a ruling

dictatorship little more than ten years later? By the end of 1919,

Mussolini possessed hardly more than 2% of the vote in Milan, less

than 5000 votes against 170,000 for the Socialists. Was this a

complete disaster? At the time it seemed so; the Socialists were so

confident of their success that they staged a mock funeral in Milan

stopping outside Mussolini’s house to invite him to attend the burial

of his party. Incredibly, by 1921 the membership of this previously

tiny group was to rival the size of the Socialists. How was this

achieved? It was certainly by no easy means; Mussolini’s skill and

luck played a vital role, but he was also helped by the seemingly

blind incompetence of his opponents. Mussolini’s path towards the top

of Italian Government was hindered by many forms of opposition.

However, most of his opposition came from the Government and the rival

Socialist (PSI) party. Soon after the summer of 1920 the Fascists and

their opposition inevitably clashed. The fact that Gioletti’s

government was faced with ? million workers sitting in in factories

showed that Italy was a far from stable country in 1920. Did an

opportunity present itself for Mussolini to gain ground over the

Socialist opposition? If it did, Mussolini certainly did not take it.

He was still recovering from his party’s humiliating election defeat.

Eventually the union leaders, evidently surprised by this sudden,

spontaneous revolutionary outburst persuaded the workers to give in in

return for higher wages. Although initially it would seem that the

workers had won, the strikes had sown the seeds of fear amongst

Italy’s Socialist opposition. The overall effect of this was that

many of the opponents of Socialism joined Mussolini’s Fascist’ party.

The Socialist party by causing the strike had unwittingly played into

Mussolini’s hands; although this was due to their own incompetence and

not the skill of Mussolini. Interestingly, they were later to make

exactly the same mistake again. The fact that Mussolini’s party

benefitted greatly by offering action, showed that political gains

could be made from the weakness of the government and from the unrest

of the country. It was at this point in 1921 that Gioletti began

searching for allies against the Socialists. The Vatican had turned

against him; This was mainly due to the government’s proposal to tax

the bonds which were a main form of Church property at the time. As a

result Gioletti decided to use Fascist support against the Socialists.

Why did Gioletti decide to use the Fascist’s support to combat the

Socialists, when there were many other safer ways of doing so?

Principally, he believed that he could easily dominate Mussolini

and once in power again he would discard the tougher elements’ among

the Fascists. He made a grave mistake in believing this. In the winter

of 1920-21, Mussolini organized his men into squadre d’azione’ (squads

of action) headed by local leaders ( ras’) like Balbo in Ferrara and

Grandi in Bologna. Primarily, Mussolini’s clever planning was

demonstrated by his success: His initial campaign of violence against

the Socialists led to 200 dead and 800 wounded in the period between

December 1920 and May 1921. The government, in accordance with its

alliance with the Fascists, did little to prevent the violence, and

instead saw it as a cheap way of curbing the rise of socialism. Even

when in the spring of 1921 the clashes had reached riot proportions,

the government nonetheless decided that they had succeeded in their

aim of disrupting the progress of socialism. Later at the Socialist

party congress in January 1921 the PSI split into a revolutionary and

a reformist wing. This move was welcomed, if not actually forced by

the Fascists. With Socialist support diminishing rapidly, the Fascists

gained a vital foothold in Parliament. Primarily, this was achieved

through the election of 15 May 1921. Because his party offered action,

Mussolini gained from the weakness of the government and from the

unrest in the country. During the election the government used Fascist

support to unseat Socialist and Catholic deputies; this was mainly

done by beating up opponents. Mussolini met little opposition to his

actions; the police and prefects remained neutral or actively aided

the Fascists with transport and arms. The Fascists performed

particularly well in the elections as the figures below show:

—

Extreme Nationalists 10

Fascists 35 Government bloc (184)

National Bloc (Gioletti) 139

Radicals (Liberal Democrats) 68 Potential centrist

Popolari’ 107 opposition (175)

Reformists 29

Socialists 123 Left opposition (176)

Communists 15 Total seats (535)

National minorities 9

—

The Fascists were invited by Prime Minister Gioletti to form a

part of his right-wing electoral alliance, thereby promising them,

for the first time, some influence in the government as well as in the

streets. Gioletti had given the Fascists a chance to become an

accepted political force.

Primarily, Prime Minister Gioletti must be held responsible as

one of the main reasons for Mussolini gaining another chance to fight

for power. As Mussolini’s Fascist Party grew, so seemingly did the

incompetence of Gioletti. He became increasingly dependent upon the

Fascists to take direct and often brutal action against the unions and

peasant leagues. His unorthodox methods were careless, unparliamentary

and were to be extremely self-destructive. It seemed that Gioletti and

his government had lost the will to govern the country and its people.

>From May to July 1921 Gioletti was to govern on the basis of this

coalition. However, within a year there were to be thirteen different

groups in Parliament. Since the parliament fell into three

approximately equal groupings, the Fascist’s thirty-five seats were

crucial to the stability of the government. If the Fascists defected

to the opposition, government would have been very difficult. The

knowledge that the Fascists had become a powerful force in government

took Mussolini by surprise. His immediate reaction to this situation

was to become a respectable participant in government. In doing this,

he signed a peace treaty’, and a pact of pacification’ with the

Socialists to end their mutual violence. However, his lieutenants in

the provinces disliked and disagreed with his curb on their power. In

actual fact Mussolini resigned as leader for a brief period of time;

however in November he accepted their demands for continued hostility

and tore up the pact. The economic conditions of the 1920’s did much

to encourage support for extremist parties; both the Fascists and the

Socialists benefitted greatly. This was mainly due to Italy’s war

debts and problems of reconstruction, as well as the devaluation of

the lire. The working-class voter’s wage remained at pre-war levels

while prices increased everywhere. This resulted in increasing support

for the left-wing parties who, the working-class voters hoped, would

press for wage claims. In some cases, they took action on their own

behalf by striking or occupying factories. It was to be Mussolini’s

skill that was to gain him support from these actions. The strikes had

raised the spectre of revolution, and this in turn, increased the

attraction of the Fascists to the middle-class population and those

who feared socialism. It was Mussolini’s policies of firm action to

prevent revolution that many Italians saw as the only alternative to

Bolshevism. The period from December 1921 to November 1922 was to see

the overall demise of the Socialist and government opposition to

Mussolini. During this period, Fascist thuggery became ever more

efficient, claiming 3000 lives of the Socialist supporters, with only

300 Fascist fatalities. Finally, on 26 June 1921 Gioletti’s

incompetence caught up with him; he was forced to resign due to

Fascist opposition in Parliament. A combination of Mussolini’s

opportunism and skill, and Gioletti’s inadequacy to govern Italy had

resulted in Gioletti’s resignation. His successor was to be Ivanoe

Bonomi, who was a reformist Socialist, and formed a government with

Radical and Popolari’ support. His choice of parties was rather

dangerous to his political position as one was clerical and the other

anti-clerical. He did not last long, and within four weeks the King

had asked Luigi Facta to head the new Italian government. A famous

historian, Denis Mack Smith, has described him as follows … a timid,

ignorant provincial lawyer who had risen in politics by seniority

alone. His appointment was at first taken almost as a joke…’.

Deserted by the Popolari’ in the summer of 1922, he lost his

Prime-ministerial position; however, he soon became Prime Minister

again on 1 August when no other could be found. Fortunately for

Mussolini, Facta did not provide any form of powerful opposition

towards him or his party’s actions. The very day that Facta formed his

new ministry in government, the unions began a general strike. The

strike was called in an effort to force the government to halt the

Fascist violence; in particular it was a protest against Balbo’s

actions in Romagna. Unfortunately for the Socialists, they played into

Mussolini’s hands, for yet again the problem of a socialist revolution

was raised. Mussolini cleverly showed the public that he was the man

to restore order while in the background he made use of his disorderly

supporters. The strike collapsed after one day, and Mussolini and his

Fascists gained increasing support. The once strong socialist

opposition had disintegrated into a weak, disorganized group of

individuals; Mussolini had succeeded in removing an important part of

the opposition. There were still a number of potential obstacles to

Mussolini. The most obvious were the King and the army (who were

controlled by the government). By October 1922 the government had

virtually broken down, and much of Italy was in political disarray.

Facta suggested that the entire cabinet should resign, but when his

idea was turned down, he started to plan a coalition with the

Fascists. It is interesting to note that the troops were still loyal

to the King; there can be little doubt that a firm government could

have crushed any armed attempt against the regime. Mussolini was well

aware of this, and concentrated his efforts on political manoeuvre. He

demonstrated his perceptiveness of the political situation when he

realised that the Facta government was helpless and thinking in terms

of a coalition. Taking advantage of the situation, Mussolini met with

the leaders of the various Fascist groups. Action was planned for 28

October on lines that had been worked out earlier. Three concentration

points were selected which the groups were to reach by any means of

transport and so avoid the chance of an early clash with the army.

Such a clash was to be avoided at all costs and army units were to be

treated with courtesy and friendliness. Again this was clever

decision-making by Mussolini, who realised the potential threat

presente by the army. After a series of parades and speech-making to

gather support, Mussolini presented his demands to the government. In

essence they were simple; there was to be a new cabinet with at least

six Fascist ministers in important posts. On the 25 October Mussolini

left for Milan while the Party Congress continued to distract the

government’s attention. In reply to Mussolini’s demands, the Facta

cabinet responded surprisingly slowly; they were convinced that they

had plenty of time in hand. Eventually, they decided that the answer

would be in the form of a new coalition which would include a number

of Fascists. However, confusion and disorganisation reigned as members

of the cabinet continued to scheme. With this in mind, Facta decided

to resign, though his cabinet still ran the government until a new

leader could be chosen. It is difficult to find sound reasoning behind

Facta’s resignation; his resignation can be described as little more

than a blunder. It did nothing but highlight the weakness of the

cabinet and the instability of the government. Initially, it seemed to

succeed; in view of his resignation, the Fascist leaders hesitated as

to whether or not their plans should go ahead for 28 October. However,

unfortunately for the government, the Fascist party machine could not

be halted and local units began to requisition trains and borrow arms

from friendly military units. Eventually, Facta was persuaded to

return and to declare a state of siege in Rome. Facta, now becoming

increasingly worried about the fascist threat, was reluctant to take

such action. Instead, he went to the King to ask for a proclamation

declaring a state of emergency. This would have enabled the army to

have been called out against the Fascist columns. However, the King

rightly feared civil war, and doubted Facta’s ability to control the

situation. He was approached twice, but both times he refused to sign

a proclamation. Facta’s reputation had been damaged so much, that

even the King had little trust left for him. Mussolini having realised

that there would be an armed clash, increased his demands. Again, this

turned out to be a well considered and successful plan. On 29 October

Rachele Mussolini received a telephone message from Rome, requesting

the presence of Mussolini at the palace. At noon, Mussolini received a

telegram; Mussolini was to form a government. It was not long before

Mussolini had formed a moderate cabinet containing only four Fascist

ministers. He was secure in the knowledge that he had the nations

support for a government which was prepared to act. In addition, he

knew that he had virtually no opposition, and had the support of the

King, the army, and the industrialists as well as the loyalty of his

Fascist followers. In conclusion, then, to what extent can we

attribute Mussolini’s seizure of power to his own skill or the

incompetence of his opponents? In view of his own skill, Mussolini’s

career has been presented as one of blunder and bluff’. However, the

1920’s was a period in which bluff’ was more suited to success. It is

also true to say that undoubtedly Mussolini helped the Fascist party

into power through his own skill. Although initially, the Fascist

party had widespread but unorganised support, Mussolini brought a

certain national structure and identity to the party. His first

contribution was the organisation of the party, making it a movement

as well as a party, and therefore making it a viable choice in an

election. Secondly, Mussolini brought home the importance of

opportunism and action as opposed to inactivity and fixed ideologies.

As S. Lee argues, Mussolini was strongly inclined to intuitive

behaviour and projected himself as a flexible pragmatist. This allowed

him to make full use of the chaotic conditions in Italy, and

considerably increased the Fascist party’s fortunes. However, we

must also consider that to a certain extent, the opposition’s

continued failures and misjudgments almost pushed Mussolini into

power. We must also take account of the fact that Mussolini certainly

had his fair share of luck – a prime example is the King’s refusal to

declare a state of emergency, which would have allowed the army to

attack the Fascists. However, it was his ability to act out the role

of the Italian people’s dream leader that gave him the most success.

He played upon the post-war crisis, and made it appear that Fascism

was the only way in which socialism would be smashed, and Italy’s

society and status would be rebuilt. To the Italian people, Mussolini

was the great leader they had been desperately searching for – the

leader who was going to make Italy a great power, and a respected

force in the world.