Battle Of Vella Gulf Essay, Research Paper

On the night of 6 August 1943 between the islands of Valle Lavella and Kolombangara, six Navy destroyers the DUNLAP (DD 394), CRAVEN (DD 392), MAURY (DD 401), LANG (DD 399), STERTT (DD 407), and STACK (DD 406) changed the tactical role of destroyers forever. These ship, in the battle of Vella Gulf, were the first destroyers allowed to operate independent during a campaign.

?He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces,? says Sun Tuz (1). The victory at Vella Gulf proved this theory that, an inferior force with innovative leaders, high technique weapon, and the element of surprise can make a difference in a battle.

Vella Gulf was important because for the first time, American destroyers demonstrated they could do more than just scouting and carrying passengers or cargo. The destroyers were able to employ innovative maneuvers and firing tactics.

On the 5th of August, the Commander of the Third Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, received reports of a Tokyo Express movement. With the bulk of his cruisers damage, he was short a ready unit. The only available force was a pure destroyer strike force. Wilkinson assigned Commodore Moosbrugger six destroyers with the go ahead to disregard use this unit as he saw fit (2).

Mossbrugger plan was to strike first using his primary weapon the torpedoes, and then with 40mm guns. Mossbrugger, who served under Commodore Burke, used his ?T? doctrine tactic. He figured that since destroyers can operate in two groups, they could catch the enemy in crossfire. This doctrine required each ship to know what the other would do in any given circumstance.

?Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are? not expected??(1). The Mossbrugger had the unit?s maneuver behind the black backdrop of Kolombangara islands to help hide their ships. The torpedoes were armed with a powerful warhead and shields were employed to hide the telltale flash when the torpedoes were discharged. The executive officer, of the MAURY believed that the torpedoes were running too deep, requested all eight torpedoes be set to run at five feet. By the time Japanese column spotted the Americans the torpedoes were about a minute away from their targets.

?Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple there the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.? (1). The victory at Vella Gulf was surely assisted by having a plan and a doctrine. But other factors were equally important. The Navy had placed the best men like Moosbrugger in positions of leadership. Mossbrugger allowed his officers, like Executive Officer of the MURRY, who had seen enough war to sense the flaws in their weapons and ways to offset these flaws. Faulty torpedo detonators were out, flashless powder, flash hiders, and more powerful warheads were in. The Navy used the element of surprise by hiding in the dark shores and cornering the Japanese with torpedo?s and gunfire. I wonder if the Japanese lookouts had seen the Americans even a minute earlier, would the results have been the same? There are no guarantees in war, but Navy had everything in their favor and thus gaining the greatest victory of the campaign. They finally taught the Japanese to respect American torpedoes.

Bibliography

(1) Sun Tzu, ed., The Art of War. Dell Publishing : New

York, New York 1983.

(2) O?Hara Vincent P., ?Battle of Vella Gulf?

Accessed 20 April, 2000. Available from http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/vella_gulf.htm