Реферат на тему Dieppe The Valour And The Horror Essay
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Dieppe: The Valour And The Horror Essay, Research Paper
When examined closely, the Dieppe raid can be seen for what it truly was- a politically
motivated disaster which, due to poor planning and over zealous British leadership,
sacrificed needlessly the lives of Canadians for no practical reason at all. In reality, the
Canadians who died at Dieppe had no real chance at victory and the British high command
knew it, but preferred to martyr the men, rather than look bad in the eyes of their Russian
and American allies. As such, Dieppe should not be seen as a dress rehearsal for D-Day,
but rather as a tragic comedy of errors which led to the annihilation of over 900 Canadian
soldiers.
The raid itself was primarily a British venture. In 1942 things were still going
poorly for the allies. The British were retreating in Africa and Burma, and the Americans
were trying to stop the advance of the Japanese in the Pacific. At this time, the Germans
were also pushing the Russians back to Moscow and Stalingrad (Steubing, 2). As such,
the high commands of the Russians and Americans believed that something needed to be
done, and soon. Molotov, the Russian foreign minister had visited Britain before the
original planning for the Dieppe raid, and had suggested that if a second front were not
opened, Russia may be forced to surrender. This would have been a disaster for the
British, as it would have freed up the entire German, Romanian, Italian, Bulgarian, and
Hungarian armies to fight in Africa and even the Middle East and India, and would have
allowed the Germans to put more attention into an invasion of Britain (Steubing, 3).
There was also pressure from the Americans to make the raid. The Americans had
originally planned for a second front to be created by the British, which would then be
supported by newly created American divisions. The British knew that with their army
fighting in Africa and Burma they had nowhere near the strength to create a new front, but
wanted to satisfy their new ally, so they agreed to the raid (Whitaker, 33).
The last British factor for launching the raid was Lord Louis Mountbatten, who
created the original plans. His ambition in the raid was to create a name for himself, and
earn the respect of the high command (Steubing, 33).
The reasons for the Canadians wanting to participate in the raid were not as
complex. The three major reasons the Canadians were eager to go along with any plan
were: The bulk of the Canadian army had been in Britain since the beginning of the war
without having seen action and were getting restless; Canadian leaders wanted the
Canadians to see action before the Americans did, and Canadian General Roberts wanted
to earn the respect of his British superiors (Canada: The War Years 1939-1945, 1). In the
end, the final two factors would ensure that, even as the plan deteriorated before them, the
Canadians would remain in favour of the attack, even if it meant total destruction.
When the events leading up to the raid, and the deterioration of the plan are
reviewed, it becomes quite evident that the plan should never have been allowed to go
ahead. The original battle plan contained 6 safeguards to ensure success. These were that
Heavy bombers would devastate the town and demoralize the defenders; there would be
support fire from Naval guns, especially on the main beach; tanks would shepherd in the
assault troops on the main beach; British commandos would have taken out the heavy
coastal gun positions before the landings occurred; the assault would take the Germans by
surprise, and that the German defenses at Dieppe were weak.
On June 5th, the aerial bombing which was to take place was scrapped for mainly
political reasons. Churchill did not want to bomb any French towns out of fear of losing
French support, but the official reason was that the bombings would have been too weak
to have any effect, which is simply not true (Whitaker, 40). The 150 planned sorties
would have done incredible damage to the coastal defenses, as well as forced the German
defenders to take cover, making them unable to man their defenses (Botting, 23).
Shortly afterwards the naval support for the main beach was cancelled, as High
command believed that it would put the battleships and destroyers in danger (Whitaker,
45). The 8 Hunt class destroyers left to provide support were weak at best, and had
official orders that they ?may? have to provide naval support (Whitaker, 45). Most
members of the Royal navy were surprised that the canceling of the bombings did not
increase the Naval support. According to Admiral Baillie-Grohman, ?The decision to
cancel the bombing did not lead to a demand to increase correspondingly the naval
support gunfire.?
The main problem with the canceling of the bombings and the lack of naval
support was that without them, German defenses would be allowed to remain intact and
ready for the attack (Whitaker, 50). The canceling of the bombings also made surprise
absolutely vital to the plan. Despite the dire need for surprise, high command knew that
none could be achieved. A combined Operation internal memo read, ?…we must expect
all points on the [French] coast to be alert, particularly after dawn. Tactical surprise will
be most difficult to achieve? (Whitaker, 155).
The British high command realized that because of the good landing and weather
conditions the German defenses would be put on high alert, just as theirs had been when
the threat of a German invasion had been at its highest. The Canadians about to attack
Dieppe, such as Lieutenant J.S. Edmondson of the South Saskatchewan regiment, also
realized that surprise would be hard to achieve. ?When the tide was right and the
moonlight was right, we doubled the sentries, we doubled the alert, we doubled
everything. The Germans are just as smart as we are. If the tide is right and the moon is
right and everything is right for us to go, they?re going to double theirs. Now how do you
think we can gain surprise?? (Whitaker, 161).
John Campbell also identified the slim chance of surprise being achieved at Dieppe.
?If the good soldier Haase (Commander of the German forces at Dieppe), guarding a
sensitive stretch of the channel not long after the commando raid on St. Nazaire wasn?t
thinking in terms of an imminent British landing then he surely should have been?
(Whitaker, 155).
The plan itself practically guaranteed that the forces on the main beach would not
have any chance of achieving surprise as well. The plan called for the flanks to attack first
and knock out the German artillery and coastal guns. However, by having the flanks
attack first, the Germans defending the main beach would have had lots of time to prepare
for the attack, and since there was no bombardment or naval support previous to the
landing, the Germans on the main beach had all the time in the world to dig in and prepare
(Whitaker, 140). Not all of the British leaders were blind to this fact however, including
Admiral Roskill of the Royal Navy. ?Even if the flank attacks catch the enemy
unprepared, the town?s defenders were bound to be fully alerted before the main assault
was launched? (Whitaker, 140).
While the British were remaining oblivious to the fact that surprise could never be
achieved, military observers from other countries,including American commander,
lieutenant Colonel Charles Shreiner Jr. had identified the problems. ?Why, after the
bombing was cancelled, was the timing of the landings never changed to ensure surprise
for the main assault? It was scheduled to take place 30 minutes after the initial commando
attack- plenty of time for the Germans to come to full alert? (Whitaker, 141).
To make matters worse in respect to surprise, German commander Haase had put
his troops on a special state of readiness during the period between June 25th and July 10
(Whitaker, 150). All evidence seemed to point to the fact that Haase was ready for an
attack. Admiral Roskill added more compelling evidence to support this claim when he
said, ?On the 25th/26th of June the artillery in the Dieppe area remained limbered up all
night… The Germans had put 2 and 2 together? (Whitaker, 155).
As a result of all these problems, surprise was simply not possible, and while high
command was well aware of it, they chose to push on anyway.
The next safeguard to fall was the hopes that the German defenses at Dieppe were
weak. In reality, the defenses at Dieppe were 4 times stronger than High command
believed (Disaster at Dieppe, 1). To make matters worse, High Command was aware of
the presence of newly arrived reinforcements and a panzer division from Russia only 40
Km?s outside of Dieppe (Whitaker, 161). All this meant that the Canadians were going to
attack a force of similar size, backed by artillery and well dug in. This meant certain
disaster, but High Command still pushed on.
The last safeguard, the knowledge that the troops on the main beach would have
tank support, was not as secure as High Command believed. Due to a lack of planning,
high command didn?t realize that the beach at Dieppe consisted of a unique pebble sand
known as ?chert?. Chert was created by particles of lime which had worn off of the
overhanging cliffs on the beach, and was unstable at best. With conditions such as these,
the tanks were almost guaranteed to sink into the sand (Whitaker, 151). High Command
had based the beaches compatibility to handle tanks on postcards and rough photographs,
and beach conditions found on the Isle of Wight in the English Channel (Whitaker, 152).
In fact, the only available means to judge the slope of the beach for pre landing
preparations was a photo of a family picnicking at the breakwater (Whitaker, 152).
The few tanks which made it up the beach were doomed for failure. The main
mission of the tanks was to knock out the German airfield, which required them to pass
under a narrow archway, and through streets which would have been too narrow for a
Churchill tank to navigate easily (Whitaker, 153). This meant that any tanks which made
it into the town would either have been trapped in the streets, or trapped once the archway
was destroyed (Whitaker, 153).
Even the odds that the tanks could have ever gotten into Dieppe were slim at best.
A German anti-tank sea wall stood in the way of the tanks. The original plan called for
Sappers to either blow breaches in the wall or build timber staircases over it so that the
tanks could pass (Whitaker, 153). However, this required the men to carry over 60
pounds of explosives as well as 6 X 6 planks of timber across the open beach (Whitaker,
153). Without the aerial bombardment or supporting fire, the Germans were able to make
short work of these weighted down men, and the tanks were trapped (Whitaker, 153).
In either case, the tanks were destined to never see England again, just as so many
men were.
Goronwy Rees perhaps best summed up the desperate situation now facing the
Canadians, ?I believe that the operation would have proceeded even if the troops had been
asked to land with no better weapons than their bare hands? (Whitaker26).
On top of the raid being poorly planned, the leadership displayed by the main
planners was abhorred.
Lord Mountbatten, who devised the plan, was not respected by his fellow officers,
and had only gotten his position because he was related to royalty (Whitaker, 25).
Mountbatten was known for a lack of foresight, and an egotistical brashness, which came
out in the plans he devised before the Dieppe plan (Whitaker, 25). Mountbatten?s
arrogance, mixed with Churchill?s thirst for battle and desire to appease his allies spelled
disaster. General Jacobs expressed the concerns that he, along with other British
commanders had in regards to Churchill?s eagerness to engage in battle. ?Winston wanted
action everywhere at all times. He felt that the right thing to do was to take a thousand or
ten thousand men, make an awful mess and come away. As if it were easy? (Whitaker,
27)
Since Churchill so desired battle, he would often allow for impractical elements of
Mountbatten?s plans to go ahead. In General Jacobs words, ?Dickies (Mountbatten)
visits (to chequers, a getaway for high ranking military officials) were always dangerous
moments and there was no knowing what discussions he (Churchill) might be led into or
what he might let us in for? (Whitaker, 26). Due to the friendly relationship that
Mountbatten had with Churchill, Churchill would often foolishly go along with many of
the changes Mountbatten wished to implement in the raid, without consulting with other
high ranking officials beforehand.
The lack of leadership unfortunately was not just limited to the British. Canadian
generals failed to show any leadership at all. Even as the Canadian leader, General
Roberts, watched the plan get picked apart and become impractical, he failed to object to
any of the changes out of fear that he would lose his job (Whitaker, 15). Even as the air
support which Roberts had defined as the most important component of the attack was
taken away, he failed to object. Colonel Charles Stacey reported that, ?The minutes of
the meeting of 5 June make no reference to General Roberts views on the air
bombardment? (Whitaker, 16).
Overall, the leadership was unorganized, and everyone was, for the most part,
unsure of what their role was. General Montgomery, the supreme commander of all the
British forces, was almost completely uninterested in the raid, even though he identified
the glaring problems in the planning (Whitaker, 161). Geronwy Rees also noted
Mongomery?s lack of interest when he wrote, ?I am surprised that the army commander
should be so little perturbed about the risks of the operation. It was, he implied, an
operation which had been decided upon by the Chiefs of Staff, for reasons which he was
not concerned? (Whitaker, 157).
Even Mountbatten did not have complete control over the situation. Admiral
Baillie-Grohman commented that, ?Mountbatten told me he had not wanted the frontal
attack plan either. He said he had been keen on going in on the flanks and had fought hard
for it. But the army had insisted on the frontal attack and they had had their way because,
after all, it was a military matter? (Whitaker, 147).
It can be seen that the leadership was loose at best. No one was truly sure who
was in charge, and no one was willing to take charge. As such, nobody was there to stand
up and cancel the operation.
If the planning of the operation was not bad enough, the implementation of the
plan was worse. On route to Dieppe the landing craft were spotted by a German convoy,
which should have made the L.c.?s turn around and head back to England. However,
despite the warnings, the attack pressed ahead (Botting, 25). The main attacks also came
late, so that the troops ended up landing in broad daylight, making them easy targets for
dug in German machine guns (Botting, 26). To make matters worse for the men who
landed on the main beach, the tanks which were to escort them landed 15 minutes late,
which left them open to the guns (Botting, 26). Even when the tanks landed they were
caught in the sand and quickly taken out of the battle (Botting, 27). The final nail in the
coffin for the men on the main beach was that the commando?s had only been able to
knock out one of the coastal batteries (Botting, 27). As a result of everything that had
gone wrong, the force on the main beach was quickly pinned down and defeated.
After the battle, the British quickly declared the battle as having been a ?practice
for the real thing? (Botting, 33). Despite this cover, almost all British officials failed to
accept any blame for themselves. Mountbatten refused to believe that there had not been
an element of surprise as well. This can be seen in the proceeding conversation between
Captain Denis Whitaker of the Royal Hamilton light infantry and Lord Mountbatten at the
Combined Operations debriefing in Montagu house.
?Right Whitaker. Now we have already established that secrecy and tactical
surprise were maintained in the Dieppe raid. The fact that the lights were on at the
lighthouse, the slow entry of the luftwaffe into the battle, the success of the commandos
on the right flank: These are all convincing evidence of this
?Sir, I landed on the main beach. When I interrogated a German prisoner at the
casino he boasted ?We have been waiting for you for a week?
Sit down, Captain Whitaker. I do not believe the enemy was forewarned. I want
constructive criticism- not excuses? (Whitaker, XIV prologue).
Admiral Hughes-Hallet also denied having ever received warnings about the
German convoy, but was quickly proven wrong. After he had been proven wrong CCO
quickly stated ?that convoy was a different one and had nothing to do with the German
vessels met at 0350 hours? (Whitaker, 18).
In total only 2500 of the 6100 men returned to England, 1000 of which had never
landed at all (Botting, 33). 900 Canadians gave their lives in this futile action, with an
additional 1000 wounded and 2000 taken prisoner (Botting, 33). On top of all the losses,
not a single target had been knocked out during the entire operation.
In retrospect, the entire Dieppe operation was doomed from the start. Poor
planning, and a lack of leadership sent over 900 Canadians to an early grave. The official
excuse for the operation was that it was a dress rehearsal for D-Day. But how can that be
a proper justification? All evidence points to the fact that Dieppe was merely a political
move, made to appease our Russian and American allies. The High command knew the
attack would not work, but went ahead with it anyway despite the carnage they knew the
attack would inflict. The ?lessons? learned at Dieppe were known long before that attack
ever took place. As such, it is obvious to see that the ?lessons learned? theory is just an
excuse to justify the worst military operation of the war. Geronwy Rees eerily summed up
the situation when he stating that, ?No one drew the logical idea that Rutter was no
longer feasible as a serious operation of war. Henceforward it could only be an expensive
and murderous laboratory experiment? (Whitaker, 247).
Even if lessons were learned, at what price were they learned at? More than 900
Canadians died on the beaches of Dieppe, not because they believed that they being used
as guinea pigs, but because they believed that their actions could start the process of
bringing an end to the worst war the earth has ever seen. Due to the ineptness of the
planning, those 900 men would never again see the faces of their loved ones, or enjoy the
simples pleasures of life we take for granted everyday. Perhaps that is the saddest aspect
of the entire battle, for even as we debate whether or not Dieppe was a futile action, those
900 men lie in France, paying a silent tribute to the horrors of war.
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