Is The Senate A Safeguard Or A Handbrake On Democracy? (Australia) Essay, Research Paper

The ability to dismiss, alter and permit a set of laws that will ultimately change the lives of millions is always going to be a complex and difficult task. By allowing control over the decision-making process to be shared between the governing party and the senate, the Australian Washminister system can be said to be more democratic than most governing systems. This essay determines whether the Australian Senate acts as a safeguard or a handbrake on democracy. It looks at the history of the senate, the voting systems used and the problems they caused, and questions the distribution of power within the senate. In particular it focuses on the reasons why critics have called for reform of the senate, and the possible ways in which it can be modernized. Central to this argument is the senate s capacity to dismiss, pass or amend bills. One of the more controversial cases here is that the opposition may reject proposals in a bid to stifle the government and not because of the impracticality of the bill. The constitution makers sought to limit the power of the government by providing a Senate with the capacity to reject, amend or pass legislation. With the ability to limit the supply of money bills to the governing body, the senate provided a way to halt the government. If the government was denied money, it could not govern (Rodney Smith, 1993). The senate should not act as a second government; it should exercise its powers while at the same time recognising that the government was elected to do precisely that, to govern.

The constitution requires that all states have equal representation in the senate. The present proportional representation system introduced in 1948 after the failure of the previous two voting systems, challenges the one vote, one value notion. It produces the current situation, for example, where 12 senators represent 330,000 electors in Tasmania and the same number represent more than four million electors in NSW (John Faulkner, pg.120). While accurately reflecting the strengths of parties within state boundaries, it misrepresents the one vote, one value principle. This is one of the main areas of criticism; New South Wales, with nearly 34 per cent of the population receives the same 15.8 per cent of Senate seats, as does Tasmania, with only 2.6 per cent of the population. (Helen Coonan, pg.23). The structure of the Senate is the main area that should be reformed, and probably the most realistic to happen in the near future. Senators should be elected in proportion to the size of population in each of the states. This would eliminate the smaller states from wielding the same amount of sway as the larger states. Suggested reforms to the voting system seem to follow three main approaches: replacement of proportional representation by preferential voting, alteration of electorates, or imposition of electoral thresholds. (Current Issues Brief 10 1998-99)

Preferential Voting The introduction of this method would make it harder for minority parties to win seats because of the higher quota of votes needed to win (50 per cent + 1 vote), particularly as the electorates in each mainland State would be larger than they are in House of Representatives elections. The

Alteration of Electorates Senator Helen Coonan suggests the establishment of three state electorates (Helen Coonan, pg. 24), each represented by four Senators, two of who would retire every three years. A lower quota than the preferential system, 33 per cent for one seat, would mean that the seats would be shared between the major parties. Using this system means that it is still unlikely that either major party would win a Senate majority.

The reduction in the proportion of votes needed to gain an allocation in the election has led to the problem that the major parties win roughly the same number of Senate seats at each election. By reducing the size of the Senate back to ten senators per state, and therefore increasing the quota necessary for a vote to 16.7 per cent, would in effect reduce the chances of minor parties holding the balance of power.

An example showing the distortion between votes won and seats eventually collected being the surprising result of the One Nation party, winning approximately 9 per cent of the votes cast, giving it the highest national vote after the major parties. (Helen Coonan, Source B) In the end, due to the flow of preferences, One Nation won only one Senate place in Queensland. By contrast, the Australian Democrats, after their primary votes fell from 10.8 per cent in 1996 to 8.5 per cent in 1998, won two more Senate seats and will now hold the balance of power in the new Senate. (Helen Coonan, Source B) Minor parties elected by primary votes will hold the balance of power, making it almost impossible for the governing party to hold a majority in the Senate. While this stops the government having too much control, it can also lead to an abuse of the Senate s powers; Given the frequent absence of a government majority in the Senate, it would be open to the major defeated party in the Senate to simply exploit the surrogate mandate of a minor party . (Hugh Emy, Source B) By ensuring that neither of the major parties holds a majority, it means that decisions will be made at best by compromise, and in the event of a deadlock, a delayed response to what might be a matter of national and international importance. Another way of reforming the Senate would be to amend the constitution to alter parliamentary terms. If all senators were elected at the same time, as occurs in Western Australian Legislative Council elections (Current Issues Brief 10 1998-99), it would increase the chance of one party gaining control after the election. This method would ensure that only senators currently voted in time with the general election would be in place, rather than having senators leftover from the last elections, hopefully eliminating any previous biases.

The basic dilemma facing the constitution writers in trying to decide the relationship between the upper and lower houses is perfectly illustrated by the French politician Abbe Sieyes two hundred years ago; if a second chamber dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees with it, it is superfluous (Current Issues Brief 10 1998-99) this is the dilemma facing governments in trying to establish a balance of power in the Senate. In trying to improve upon the British Westminster system, where the upper house has little more than a delaying power, the single most contentious issue for the Australian founders was the design of the Senate and its accommodation with responsible government (Helen Coonan, Source B). Recently there has been a trend for the Labor Party to challenge and block major legislation and budgets with a view to obstructing the government. Kim Beazley s blocking tactics have pushed senators such as Helen Coonan to call for Senate reform as the only way out of this stalemate. (Transcript No.99/15, Peter Costello) There is argument that the constitution protects tactics like this, using the Senate to further a single party s goals. There is a need for the minor parties to have an influence in the Senate, not just to keep the balance of power but to represent as wide a spectrum of voters as possible. But there is still the question as to whether proposals put forth by a democratically elected government need to be so thoroughly examined by another body with the power to reject anything that is put forth to them. Surely a democratically elected government is elected on the basis and trust that they will carry out their job successfully, questions remain as to whether having such a powerful Senate will hinder or be a watchdog for democracy. The solution lies in laying down a fair and effective voting system, accurately representing the people of Australia. The Australian Senate is a far more powerful upper house than compared to other countries operating systems of parliamentary governments (Scott Bennett Politics Group website), with the exception of the US Senate, leaving it open to much criticism from the media for playing too large a role, interfering too much with government duties . By not holding a majority in the Senate, the government is open to confrontation by opposing parties seeking to bring down a government. But at the same it provides a way for governments decisions to be scrutinised and analysed, making sure that no one party has too much control. The idea of a separate body examining decisions made by the government is a valid and democratic one, although steps should be taken to ensure that there is at least a chance of the government in power obtaining a majority in the Senate.

The Senate itself is not the handbrake on democracy; rather it is the vulnerability of the Senate to be manipulated into voting against a government for no other reason than to cause irritation.

Bibliography

Politics in Australia , 2nd edition, edited by Rodney Smith, Allen & Unwin Pty, 1993.

A Labor Perspective on Senate Reform in M. Sawer & S. Miskin (eds.)

Representation and Institutional Change , Papers on Parliament No. 34, Department of the Senate, Canberra, 1999.

Safeguard or Handbrake on Democracy? in B. Costar ed., Deadlock or Democracy: The Future of the Senate, UNSW Press, Marrickville, NSW, 2000.

Parliament , by Rodney Smith, in J. Brett, J. Gillespie and M. Goots eds., Developments in Australian Politics, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1994.

The Senate and Good Government , by C. Sharman, Papers on Parliament No.33, Department of the Senate, Canberra, 1999.

Current Issues Brief 10 1998-99, Scott Bennett Politics and Public Administration Group, 20 April 1999. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1998-99/99cib10.htm

Transcript No. 99/15 Doorstep Interview with Peter Costello Parliament House.

http://www.treasurer.gov.au/treasurer/Transcripts/1999/tsr015.asp