Economic Growth And Social Conflicts Essay, Research Paper

This paper asks: how can economic development in Global South nations can be better managed, so as to reduce the potential for violent ethnic conflict? To answer this we must pose a prior question: why is economic development so often accompanied by violent ethnic conflict?

Viewing economic development and ethnic conflict as linked problems requires reassessment of two widely accepted schools of thought about the relationship between these phenomena. One school, prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s held that economic development would inevitably reduce the potential for violent conflict, since growth would be rapid and the resulting benefits diffused through all levels of society. Proponents included both mainstream and Marxist development scholars 3. The first decade or so of post colonial independence seemed to confirm this theory, but in the late 1960s, rising ethnic tensions in many new nations, and full-blown ethnic civil wars in some, raised doubts.

A second and more persistent school held that economic development policies and those relevant to “maintaining political stability” could be formulated in separate compartments. World Bank staff members were major proponents. Their views reflected graduate training in economics, plus a charter specifying governments as the Bank’s clients and proscribing “political” involvement. It was not until the 1980s that senior Bank officials began to take an increased interest in public administration — an area they attempted to de-politicize by labeling it “governance.” 4

Political changes from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s proved both views wrong. Even in developing nations that did well economically, economic benefits did not diffuse to all segments of society or all regions. This lead some ethnically diverse states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka to implement preferential policies that benefited some groups or regions disproportionately. Disagreements over the fruits of development made the accommodations necessary to sustain political order more difficult and contributed to outbreaks of violent conflict.

Increasingly, policy-makers are acknowledging that economic development and conflict management policies cannot be separated 5. A small but growing body of literature focuses on social and political side-effects of economic development programs 6. However conflict management, especially in ethnically diverse societies, has not yet assumed its proper role in development planning. For the scope of development planning to be broadened in this way, the causes of ethnic conflict and how some development strategies can exacerbate ethnic tensions leading to conflict must be better understood.

What Causes Ethnic Conflict?

Violent conflict between rival ethnic groups sometimes breaks out spontaneously, but “ethnic conflict” is mostly a struggle between rival organizations seeking to maintain or gain control of state power. To understand ethnic conflict, we must understand the role ethnicity plays in mobilizing, structuring, and managing such organizations 7. Further, we must understand how leaders use ethnically divisive strategies to mobilize political support.

Proximate causes of ethnic conflicts can be easily identified 8. In typical scenarios, leaders of a dominant ethnic group gain office and then use state institutions to distribute economic and political benefits preferentially to their ethnic brethren. Discrimination against subordinate group members, often portrayed as less deserving human beings, accompanies this preferential treatment. When force is needed to impose discriminatory practices and quell subordinate group resistance, it is exercised by police officers and soldiers recruited almost exclusively from the dominant group, who often view themselves as “ethnic soldiers” 9 In democratic societies, a dominant group that is a majority often uses its voting power to entrench discriminatory practices by legal or quasi legal means. When a dominant group is the minority, it typically imposes discriminatory policies by force although, as in South Africa, cosmetic democratic institutions may legitimize discrimination. Democracy alone cannot ensure ethnic harmony. Instead, it may allow freer expression of ethnic antagonisms and legalized persecution of minorities.

Subordinate group members may endure discrimination for an extended period of time; however a sense of shared deprivation strengthens identification with their group, providing a basis for political mobilization along ethnic lines. Before inter-group relations polarize, “moderate” subordinate group leaders often seek a modus vivendi with their dominant group counterparts. In some nations, notably Malaysia, leaders have been able to work out a relatively stable accommodation, involving trade offs between political and economic power. More typically pleas of subordinate group leaders for accommodation are ignored or judged to be “politically infeasible” by dominant group leaders. The more severe and inflexible the discrimination, the more probable that subordinate group members will become radicalized. As radicalization proceeds, subordinate group members shift support from moderate to militant leaders. Militant leaders form disciplined paramilitary organizations committed to violent force as the only feasible strategy for ending discrimination.

An escalating spiral of violent political conflict, ethnic polarization, social disintegration and economic decline is the most probable outcome. This scenario has been all too prevalent in developing nations and now in former Communist nations. Ethnic conflicts, once they become violent, are exceedingly difficult to resolve 10. Indeed, some observers argue that separating protagonists physically is the only practicable solution 11. Since members of dominant and subordinate groups are often economically interdependent and physically intermingled, however, this “solution” may be impossible or only slightly less tragic than protracted conflict.

It is easy to see why subordinate group members who experience discrimination would use ethnicity as a basis for political mobilization and eventually turn to militant leaders who argue that “we have no choice” but violence. However, protracted ethnic conflict is, more often than not, a negative sum game in which both dominant and subordinate groups lose. Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia and the Punjab are just a few recent examples of conflicts where the long-term costs of discriminatory policies to almost all involved far outweighed any conceivable benefits 12. In view of this history, why do dominant group leaders choose to implement discriminatory practices in the first place. Also, why they so often underestimate the probability of a violent subordinate group response, and their capacity to deal with it. This paper contends that typical development policies and the process of development, as they unfold in many developing nations, contribute to such miscalculations.

A supportive climate for this cycle of discrimination and militant response is provided by long standing beliefs and attitudes, held by many ethnic group members in multi-ethnic nations. Most important among these are historical legacies of mistrust, a mentality of victimization, and feelings of shared deprivation. They make group members more receptive to simplistic appeals from extremist leaders and encourage leaders to make such appeals. A myopic view of rival groups and over-optimism about the efficacy of state power may create a “social trap” that, particularly in times of economic stress, tempts leaders to implement discriminatory policies without fully assessing the consequences 13. The role of long standing beliefs and attitudes in multi-ethnic societies and the role leaders play in exploiting them need to be examined more fully.

Historical Legacies of Mistrust

Some years ago, one of this paper’s authors (Richardson) spent an evening at the home of a colleague whom, for purposes of this recounting, we shall call “Amal”. Amal is a sophisticated, multilingual, manager who holds a high position in an international organization. In more than five years of an infrequent but close professional and personal friendship, we had hardly ever discussed his ethnicity. This unusually convivial evening was to be different. There was a fine meal, many glasses of wine, and several hours of conversation, lasting until near midnight. Amal’s wife had left us and we, too, began to think of retiring. As we were about to separate, Amal beckoned: “I want to show you something,” he said. He lead me to a small room in the rear of his house, entirely decorated in red. On one wall, was a map showing the “greater nation” of his ethnic group. Crimson splashes marked locations where, in the process of driving them from their “homeland” more than fifty years before, the armies of a rival group had massacred thousands of Amal’s ethnic brethren. With great emotion, he related the story of those massacres and subsequent diaspora of his family. “Every day I bring my [three year old] son to this room and show him this map,” Amal concluded in a choked voice,” so that he will never forget what they did to us.”

“Recollections” such as this are a part of every ethnic conflict. In the Middle East, ethnic differences are traced to biblical times and to the Christian crusades as well as to the Post World War II era. In Northern Ireland, historic clashes between Protestants and Catholics are relived in annual festivals that often become violent. Sri Lankan school children are told of the Buddha’s pledge that Lanka would be a special haven for Buddhism and reminded of the pivotal clash between Sinhalese Prince Dutugemunu and Tamil King Elaric that reestablished Buddhist-Sinhalese dominance on the island 14. For Serbians and Croatians, the incursions into Europe of Ottoman Sultans are a living reality, along with the ethnically divisive policies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and atrocities instigated by ethnic based regimes and in partisan conflicts during World War II 15.

These historical legacies of mistrust and hatred are not genetically transmitted from one generation to another. Rather, they become a vivid part of current reality through myth, socialization and education. Control of the media, educational institutions and religious instruction facilitates propagation of such legacies, but word of mouth propagation persists even in the face of oppression. While ethnic groups that control state power have a clear advantage in promoting their world view, rival groups fight to maintain control over the socialization of their members. The survival of ethnic nationalism in the face of Soviet repression illustrates the tenacity with which ethnic groups cling to their identities.

“Victim” Mentality

Members and leaders of contending ethnic groups, whether they are presently discriminating against a subordinate group or the object of discrimination, often portray themselves as victims. A “victim” mentality helps unite group members behind their leaders. and justifies present sacrifices. Moreover. members of a victimized group feel justified in victimizing others –being a victim in the past, real or imagined, thus does not ensure humane treatment of rival ethnic groups in the present. Ethnic leaders seek control of state power to ensure their group is never victimized again, to right past wrongs and to avenge past oppression. Two examples – South Africa and Sri Lanka – illustrate this.

In South Africa, white Afrikaners, who were descended from Dutch and French settlers, viewed themselves as victims of British colonialism, even while using Apartheid laws to oppress black South Africans. The Great Trek and the Boer War were potent historical symbols which fuelled this sense of victimization. Afrikaners were God’s chosen people, redeemed by suffering, and destined to rule over the inferior Blacks, Indians and Coloreds (mixed-race people) 16.

Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority also viewed themselves as victims. They resented the favorable treatment given to Tamils under colonial rule and by conservative post-independence governments. They felt discriminated against by government language policies that placed their language, Sinhala, in an inferior position and made it difficult for them to communicate with public officials. They feared the Tamils would make common cause with their ethnic brethren in South India’s populous Tamil Nadu State. Throughout Sri Lanka’s ancient history, Tamil invasions had been either a threat or a reality. In the words of historian K.M. de Silva, the Sinhalese were a “majority group with a minority complex” 17. This attitude fueled political support for Sinhalese nationalist leaders such as S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Sirimavo Bandaranaike and J.R. Jayewardene whose policies convinced many Tamils there was no alternative to secession 18.

Relative Deprivation

That their oppressors may have been victims in the past, does little to mitigate the resentment of ethnic group members who are currently being oppressed. In the jargon used by conflict theorist Ted R. Gurr, they are experiencing relative deprivation, a perception that the circumstances of their lives are not providing benefits to which they are justly entitled 19. Feelings of relative deprivation intensify, not only when benefits (including political, religious and language rights, as well as economic well being) decline, but also when expectations increase. When large numbers of an ethnic group experience relative deprivation simultaneously, the potential for spontaneous outbreaks of violence, directed at rival groups, intensifies. Historical legacies of mistrust and a victim mentality make it more likely that feelings of deprivation resulting from declining benefits or unrealized expectations will be interpreted as an ethnically motivated injustice.

Contributing to deprivation is the fact that reestablishing a more equitable social order, following a period of discrimination, is more often a zero sum rather than a positive sum game. Sri Lanka’s pro Sinhalese governments were committed to scaling down the disproportionate role played by Tamils in the nation’s government and economic life. Tamils viewed this as a loss of rights to which they were entitled. Leaders of the Punjab’s Akali Dal movement were committed to greater Sikh self-determination, within the framework of India’s federal system. Punjabi Hindus, who stood to be the losers, viewed this as going “too far” 20. The United Kingdom government would like to defuse the power of the Irish Republican Army by making concessions to Northern Ireland’s Catholic population. Those concessions are viewed as a loss of historically mandated rights by Protestant loyalists.

Leadership Roles

Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Clerk in South Africa have shown how courageous leadership can sometimes reduce ethnic tensions. More often, political and religious leaders play a divisive role, appealing to ethnic-nationalist sentiments and scape-goating rival groups in order to enhance personal political power and, in democratic societies, to win political office. “Ethnic-bashing,” as this leadership strategy is sometimes labeled, serves to reinforce in-group identity, by emphasizing

the common ties that bind group members to each other and by emphasizing the differences that distinguish the group as a whole and its individual members from other groups and their members. The sharpening social cleavages that result from such identifications and tactics based on these identifications lead to greater ethnic tension, as the “middle ground” between groups disappears.

In Sri Lanka, both S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike won democratic elections by appealing to Buddhist-Sinhalese nationalist sentiments and denigrating the ethnic Tamils. When out of office, many of their principal political opponents did the same. Indira Gandhi frequently courted support in India by appealing to the Muslim vote or, alternatively, the northern Hindu vote. For a time, Indira’s Congress party was even seen as the protector of Muslims 21. In the United States, appealing to white racist sentiments is a staple of political campaigning in racially divided Southern states. Similar tactics are also used by more authoritarian leaders to win support and retain power. Slobodan Milosevic, the former Communist Party Chief of Serbia and General Franjo Tudjman of Croatia won their presidencies by appealing to the most divisive aspects of Serbian and Croatian nationalism.

Political Mobilization and the Formation of Militant Groups

The factors that we have discussed so far – historical legacies, a victim mentality, feelings of deprivation and ethnic bashing leaders – all contribute to a climate that encourages political mobilization along ethnic lines. As ethnic differences begin to polarize a society, the formation of militant groups becomes more probable. Intolerance of compromise and commitment to attaining “ethnic rights” by using violent force distinguish such groups. Young men – and sometimes women – of military age comprise their core membership, often designated by terms such as “soldiers” or “freedom fighters.” Charismatic – even mythical – figures lead them and maintain group cohesion through rigorous, military-style discipline and propaganda that reinforces xenophobic ethnic stereotypes. Leaders of neighboring nations who sympathize with their cause or hope for political advantages may provide sanctuaries, training and arms. Funds may be raised from group members living overseas or from illicit activities such as selling illegal drugs. Examples of such groups include Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Palestine’s Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Northern Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA) and many others.

When militant groups become strong, the task of managing – let alone resolving – ethnic differences is greatly complicated. Redress of grievances that may have provoked political mobilization in the first place is no longer sufficient to move toward a non violent political order. Political polarization and destruction of any middle ground where compromise might be possible typifies militant group tactics for seeking absolute political dominance. For militant leaders, it is “victory or death;” there is no “political solution” other than the triumph of their cause.

To understand why militant demands become more extreme – even millenarian – as a conflict progresses, one needs to view long-lived militant groups as viable social organizations whose survival depends upon delivering tangible benefits to members. Like businesses, government bureaus, research institutes and organized crime “families,” they provide identity, personal fulfillment and a vocation. Since the “business” of militant groups is violent conflict, it is not surprising that group leaders and their followers may be reluctant to abandon that vocation for the more mundane business of day-to-day political leadership. Political leadership, even in authoritarian regimes, involves striving toward complex and ill-defined goals. It involves marshalling support and adjudicating conflicting interests through negotiation and compromise. Political leaders must collect taxes, maintain public order, keep highways repaired, provide education, and see that trash is collected. Small wonder that the simplicity of unquestioning commitment to a militant cause may seem more appealing 22.

Why Does Economic Development Often Intensify Ethnic Cleavages?

Economic development inevitably produces social tensions, even in ethnically homogenous societies under the most favorable conditions. Understanding why this happens owes much to Emile Durkheim’s theories of collective action. Durkheim argued that in times of rapid change, people become alienated from an increasingly turbulent and fragmented society. He labeled this sense of alienation, anomie, and argued that extreme levels of anomie can lead to social tensions resulting in violence. Contemporary scholars have noted that social alienation heightens ethnic consciousness and receptivity to ethnic nationalist appeals 23.

Development is often uneven across sectors and regions, with agriculture generally being the most neglected sector 24. Cities and regions closer to the capital tend to be favored above rural areas, and more distant regions 25. In Spain, we see the neglect of provinces such as the Asturias and the Basque region, both geographically and culturally distant from Madrid, the old Castilian capital. Likewise, Wales, Scotland, and northern Ireland are claimed to suffer “internal colonization” by nationalists in those regions which are far from London. The Cabeza de Goliat (giant’s head) phenomenon of a dominant capital city, has been noted in many Latin American nations. Archipelago nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines, neglect their outer islands. Similar neglect has been the chief complaint of separatist or regional movements in India.

Other inevitable stresses and strains in the development process were first identified in writings on the industrial revolution in Europe: the novels of Charles Dickens, Karl Marx’s political tracts and Karl Polanyi’s writings on political economy. The problems these authors identified sound familiar: the decay of rural infrastructure and institutions, unplanned urbanization, the emergence of new elites and social movements pressing for broader political representation. Polanyi describes the struggles of politicians and reformers to enact policies that would minimize the effects of social disruption (such as the Poor Laws) without fully understanding the causes of disruption 26.

Today, as in the 19th century, it is widely assumed that rapid industrialization is the key to economic growth and that benefits from economic growth will be broadly diffused with resultant improvements in human welfare. Most contemporary economic development models incorporate this view 27. However policies based on these models often produce the problems about which critics of the industrial revolution wrote. Industrialization and urbanization cause tremendous socioeconomic upheavals. As workers move to the cities, they strain existing resources and are better placed to make demands on regional and national governments. A highly urbanized population is usually more literate and better organized. Newly urbanized young men from rural areas who move to the city with unrealistically high expectations may be particularly hostile to some cultural aspects of modernization, and therefore ripe for radicalization 28. Many urban migrants tend to be men; women and children are of-ten left behind in rural areas, reducing the stabilizing influence of family ties. Unattached males provide a pool of supporters for ethnic or rel-gious organizations and they look to those groups for help in finding jobs, medical care, entertainment and a sense of belonging.

Global South governments are rarely equipped to meet either the psychic or physical needs of their burgeoning urban populations. Those left behind in rural areas are often exploited and ignored by politicians who are preoccupied with maintaining a semblance of order in the cities. Even under the best of economic circumstances, both urban and rural populations may be ripe for recruitment to political movements that offer a group identity and the promise of a better life. Moreover, the chronic volatility of most Global South economies results in precarious job security and high unemployment plus the uncertainties associated with high inflation. All of these factors increase alienation and the attractiveness of ethnic nationalist movements.

Job security and unemployment problems are further exacerbated by educational systems that fail to produce the right mix of graduates for available jobs. Universities and secondary schools in developing nations have typically adopted practices of former colonial rulers as models, particularly those of England, France and Spain. Curricula have been heavily oriented toward the humanities and social sciences. Continental traditions of academic autonomy have reinforced natural inclinations of faculty to resist change. In many institutions, proposals to shift curricula in directions that would prepare graduates for employment in an industrializing economy have been the most resisted. The result has been secondary school systems that create aspirations for a better life without providing the skills to fulfill them. University education has been more effective at breeding revolutionaries than graduates who could provide the skills and leadership needed for economic development.

Why do Political Leaders Opt for Diversive and Discriminatory Policies?

Citizens of Global South nations look to their political leaders to provide psychic fulfillment, physical security, economic benefits and the promise of a better life. In many nations, fulfilling these demands would exceed the political and management skills of even an exceptionally talented leader. Politicians face four classes of problems that complicate the task of leadership. We label these external problems, ignorance about development, basic scarcities and demographic problems.

External problems are changes in the global economic and political environment that adversely impact a developing nation but are not accessible to control by its political leaders. Fluctuations in the commodity markets for goods such as tea, rubber and petroleum can have devastating affects on export dependent economies. The decisions of Central Bankers in the United States and Europe can dramatically increase debt service costs, as debtor nations discovered in the late 1970s. Multinational corporations may dominate a small nation’s economy and also engage in political meddling. International lending programs such as structural adjustment are increasingly encroaching on national sovereignty. Although the Cold war has ended, regional hegemons, including the United States, Russia, India, China and France are quick to apply both economic and political pressure on smaller nations when it serves their interests.

Ignorance about development refers to the uncertainty that exists, both among politicians and “outside experts,” about which development policies will work best in given circumstances. This problem was described brilliantly in Peter Berger’s development classic, Pyramids of Sacrifice (1988). Berger argued that implementation of development policies should be guided by the “postulate of ignorance.” He offered numerous examples of failed planning to support his view that caution and incrementalism should be the watchwords of any development program. One example of a failed policy that was widely supported by conventional wisdom was import substitution industrialization 29. Now, development experts and international donors are pushing export lead growth and structural adjustment strategies on Global South nations. Evidence from Africa and Latin America indicates that this approach can produce beneficial results in some nations, but is no panacea.

Basic scarcities are a third class of problems not readily accessible to political remedies. Many Global South nations lack endowments of natural resources, agricultural land, productive capital and technical skills necessary to meet even the short run needs of their burgeoning populations. Declarations of sovereignty and admission to the United Nations had no prerequisite of economic viability. Technological optimists such as Julian Simon point to Holland and Japan as affluent nations that support high population densities 30. However, even the optimists have yet to propose a clear path for resource poor nations in sub Saharan Africa and Asia to follow through the intermediate stages of the demographic transition.

Finally, there are demographic problems that are not easily solved by politicians, especially in nations with strong pro-natalist religious or cultural traditions. Many African and some Latin American nations have crude birth rates in the range of 2.5 to 3.5 per-cent per year or even higher. Many also experienced negative growth rates in GNP per-capita during the 1980s. Under the most optimistic scenarios, these nations will experience at least one doubling of their populations before they stabilize. Few believe that these optimistic scenarios are probable. Moreover, it is not only the size of these populations but their age structure, heavily skewed toward the young, that are cause for concern. While a young population can be a source of energy and inventiveness for a nation, it also places heavy demands on educational resources and is likely to be characterized by high unemployment. A young, unemployed population is a politically volatile population with high ideals, an attraction to simplis-tic solutions for complex problems and a predisposition to violence.

Even though the goals they are expected to attain may be unattainable and the problems they are expected to solve may be unsolvable, political leaders are still held accountable. They are blamed for failures in areas where they may have had little control and in nations with free elections, they are likely to be summarily turned from office when things go badly. Even in authoritarian systems their tenure may be precarious, because a degree of support from at least some factions is necessary to remain in power. It might follow that there would be few aspirants for such an apparently unrewarding profession, but this is not the case. The opportunity to exercise political power attracts many able men and women for complex motivations that may include commitment to service, personal financial gain and the intrinsic appeal of power itself. Having gained power, few leaders relinquish their positions voluntarily 31.

Because political power is attractive, but limited in its ability to solve complex social and economic problems, few politicians are able to resist opting for strategies with short-term payoffs but adverse long-term consequences. When seeking office, the temptation is to promise more than can be delivered, thus creating popular aspirations that cannot be fulfilled. Use of ideological and nationalist appeals is also a probable strategy. “Flag waving” evocations of nationalist sentiments have contributed to the success of many leaders. In ethnically diverse societies we have seen that appealing to an ethnic group’s sense of victimization, offering special privileges to its members, and promising to right past wrongs are particularly effective ways of mobilizing support.

As a leader’s time in office lengthens, popular support is likely to diminish, even among ethnic compatriots. Unfulfilled promises, the intract-ability of complex social and economic problems and adverse external circumstances may all contribute to this loss of support. Inexperience, corruption, the choice of an unsuitable economic model and, in competitive political systems, the attacks of rivals, may also threaten the leader’s job security. Facing loss of support and possible loss of power, a political leader is more likely to engage in nationalist appeals and to seek scape-goats, both internal and external, for policy failures and unfulfilled promises. In ethnically diverse societies, rival ethnic groups are a natural target for these attacks, especially if those rival groups serve as an opponent’s power base. If ethnic majority support is needed to remain in power as, for example, in India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Croatia, and Russia, contending political leaders may stake out more and more extreme positions on ethnic issues as a way of proving their bona fides.

When a regime is authoritarian or democratic institutions are weak, the leader may try to mute dissent by repressing opponents, censoring the media or embarking on a foreign military adventure. Postponing elections and declaring a “state of emergency” are other common tactics that may be justified as necessary to cope with an ethnic “enemy.” As the “enemy” turns to violence to express its resistance to discriminatory measures, the need for extraordinary measures to maintain civil order may become real. None of these tactics necessarily help solve the problems that precipitated loss of public support in the first place. They are more likely to precipitate the destructive cycle of violent ethnic conflict described earlier in this paper.

Diffusing the Tensions of Development in Ethnically Diverse Societies

It is not clear that there is a receptive audience for recommendations intended to diffuse ethnic tensions, either among the national political leaders or leaders of international donor organizations. We are skeptical because so much is known about the styles of leadership and development policies that intensify ethnic cleavages and provoke ethnic conflict. Yet both politicians and planners continue to deny responsibility or plead ignorance when conflict breaks out. “We had no choice” is the plaintive cry of leaders on both sides who have become embroiled in destructive and seemingly intractable ethnic strife. “We didn’t know” or “we weren’t responsible” are typical excuses given by planners who have either actively promoted ethnically divisive development strategies or at least passively supported their implementation. What this paper makes clear is that we do know, at least in general terms, what causes ethnic conflict. More important, there are choices between more and less ethnically divisive development strategies and leadership styles. In this concluding section, we detail some of these choices.

Making Ethnic Conflict Management an Economic Policy Goal

Economic development strategies must acknowledge the realities of ethnic diversity and the economically disruptive potential of violent ethnic conflict. Thus minimizing ethnic tensions may be as important contributor to economic growth as diversifying a nation’s industrial base or promoting exports. Economic development and conflict management strategies must be balanced to provide reasonable economic benefits, with a reasonable degree of equity across ethnic groups. Unfortunately, while most large donor organizations have now recognized the importance of governance, they have failed to acknowledge ethnic and regional cleavages within recipient countries. Perhaps one cause of this problem is the gulf that exists between the academic disciplines of economics and political science. While political scientists are increasingly studying national economies (if not econom-ics), economists rarely study the politics or society of specific nations or regions.

There are no simple formulas for designing policies that will balance economic performance and inter-ethnic equity, but there are some common-sense strategies. One is to reduce or avoid sharp disparities in regional investment allocations, especially where a nation comprises ethnically homogeneous regions. Economically deprived regions on a nation’s periphery often provide fertile soil for militancy. Countries which have avoided sharp disparities in regional investment include Tanzania, Malaysia, and Singapore. Malaysia is working to reduce regional disparities, especially now that its pro-Malay policies have succeeded in building up a pool of educated and qualified Malays who can provide leadership in region-al development.

There should also be ethnic pluralism in economic policy-making so that dominant group leaders are sensitized to subordinate group concerns before, rather than after, violence breaks out. Employment and promotion practices in both the public and private sectors should provide opportunities for the “best and the brightest” among subordinate group members to become participants in the system rather than turning them into alienated revolutionary leaders. Few states have succeeded in this respect; most have succumbed instead to the temptations of preferential politics. Interestingly, Sri Lanka has continued to appoint Tamils to some high political offices (though not to high positions in the security forces), despite more than a decade of ethnic civil war between the predominantly Sinhalese government and militant Tamil separatists.

Cooptation of Subordinate Group Leaders

Co-opting ethnic subordinate group leaders, by granting them a significant economic role, while limiting their political role, is a strategy that has been tried in Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia. While the benefits are obvious, such a strategy is often accompanied by increased centralization of political power and elite corruption. There are also two additional problems. First, minority group members may not be satisfied with this bargain made at the elite level and may begin to demand political rights that match their economic role. In Taiwan, ethnic Taiwanese have been given more political rights, but rights of Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia are more limited. Second, such a bargain will not entirely eliminate ethnic tensions within a population, since the rank-and-file of a dominant ethnic group often resent minorities who play a privileged and highly visible economic role. Ironically, ethnic stereotypes can thus be reinforced by a few successful and visible minority leaders.

In some circumstances, the lesser evil may be for dominant group leaders to buy off ethnoregional elites with limited autonomy. Use of this strategy guarantees these elites a quota of positions in state institutions along with access to the benefits those positions provide. The benefits may or may not be shared with the minority elite’s followers. Co-optation brings potential revolutionaries into the system, but invites corruption and the resulting rise of new and more radical elites. If they cannot be bought off, as is the case with Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria and Egypt 32, or the state runs short of resources to buy them off, as is the case with indigenous Indian groups in Mexico, the outbreak of ethnic conflict has merely been delayed.

Devolution of Power

Limited autonomy for ethnically homogeneous regions (sometimes called “devolution of power”) is another strategy. The United States’ successful experiment with federalism has been offered as a model, although federalism did not avert a civil war over slavery in the mid-nineteenth century. However there are pitfalls that have made political leaders reluctant to voluntarily embrace federalism 33. Governing elites of newly independent states have been protective of their power and fearful that ethnically homogeneous federal regions might seek full independence. This is what happened in Nigeria’s Eastern Region, where the “solution” was to break up the few large states into many smaller states, thus diluting the power of major groups. The fear of secession was one factor in the Sudanese leadership’s ill considered decision to reimpose centralized control over the mostly Christian and animist southern Sudan, leading to a revival of civil war. When Sri Lanka’s S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike proposed limited autonomy for Tamils in the mid 1950s, opposition Sinhalese politicians labeled the proposal a “betrayal,” eventually forcing the Prime Minister to break his promise to Tamil leaders 34.

India’s leaders opted for a form of federalism as a way of responding to ethnic regionalism and have created a number of ethnolinguistic territo-rial units. The Indian experience provides useful lessons in both the benefits and pitfalls of federalism. By and large, major ethnic groups seem to have been satisfied with their own states within India and state leaders have been circumspect about seeking additional autonomy. Prob-lems have included meddling by central government leaders in state governments and demands by ethnic groups not included in the initial dispensations for their own states (in effect, demanding the right to secede from existing states within India). Some groups, such as the Assamese, went as far as demanding the right to conduct their own “foreign relations” as if they were independent. Other minorities, notably the Muslim Kashmiris and the Punjabi-speaking Sikhs, see themselves threatened culturally and religiously by the vastly dominant Hindus and have supported violent separatist movements. Thus, federalism in India has reduced ethnic tensions but has not been a panacea.

Adopting more conciliatory leadership styles

We have seen that political leaders often play a key role in sharpening ethnic divisions and placing their nations on a path that leads to violent ethnic conflict. Because the pressures in this direction are so great, we do not underestimate the need for courage and risks associated with the alternative path being proposed here. First, leaders must educate their publics about the realities of economic development and avoid promises that raise unrealistic expectations. Second, when inevitable disruptions and dislo-cations occur, they must resist the temptation to blame rival ethnic groups.

Responsible leaders can educate their publics about the pitfalls of development but this does not insure that publics will abandon unrealistic expectations, much less that they will patiently endure hardships. Moreover, there will always be irresponsible leaders who are willing to promise unattainable benefits in return for political support. So far South Africa is offering a useful model of what may be possible. President Nelson Mandela has warned his supporters that changes will be slow, and so far there have been few protests. On the other hand Mandela is a leader of unusual stature and the South African experiment is new; most countries run into difficulties after the initial post independence “honeymoon period.” Poland’s first post indepen-dence government made herculean efforts to educate the public about free market economics, but this did not prevent many voters from supporting former Communists when unemployment increased and prices began to outpace wages. Reform leaders in other former Communist countries are facing similar problems.

It is even more important for political leaders to avoid ethnic bashing. Again, South Africa provides a useful model, so far, but not the only model. Nelson Mandela has defended the rights of the white minority and insisted that his followers sing the Afrikaaner National Anthem at symbolically significant public gatherings. F.W. de Clerk has emphasized the importance of making concessions to his Afrikaaner supporters. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamid, while supporting preferential policies for ethnic Malays, has strongly opposed ethnically divisive political rhetoric. Another South Asian leader who made this commitment was Sri Lanka’s late President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who used his unimpeach-able credentials as a Buddhist-Sinhalese Nationalist to make peace overtures and some highly visible symbolic concessions to the minority Tamils. Sri Lanka’s newly elected leader Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, has also chosen to risk her presidency by making concessions, in the hope of resolving her nation’s ethnic conflict. It appears, then, that a leader with strong popular support can choose not to play “the ethnic card”, especially when there is some public recognition of the economic and social costs that protracted ethnic conflict imposes on a society.

What we are proposing will not sound appealing to leaders of a dominant ethnic group who are seeking to gain and maintain power on the basis of ethnic nationalist appeals. However, recognition that ethnic conflict is a costly negative sum game for a nation is becoming more apparent to many. Violent ethnic conflict slows economic growth by destroying physical infrastructure, motivating talented individuals to migrate and frightening away foreign investments. It will destroy a lucrative tourist trade if there is one. It forces already unstable governments to build military and paramilitary forces at the expense of other sectors. Strong military forces may then threaten civil society and democratic institutions.

Realistically assessing the causes and costs of protracted ethnic conflict may begin to convince development planners that programs which significantly increase the risks of violent ethnic conflict are not economically justifiable. Such an assessment may alert present and aspiring national leaders to a harsh reality: the short term benefits from ethnically divisive political strategies do not justify the long term social economic and political costs.

References

Azar, Edward, 1987. “Management of Protracted Social Conflict in the Third World.” Ethnic

Studies Report.

Azar, Edward, 1990. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases.

Hampshire: Dartmouth.

Berger, Peter, 1974. Pyramids of Sacrifice. New York: Basic Books.

Bookman, Milia Zarkovic, 1991. The Political Economy of Discontinuous Development. New

York: Praeger.

Brautigam, Deborah, 1992. “Governance, Economy and Foreign Aid.” Studies in Comparative

International Development, Vol. 27: 3 (October).

Brautigam, Deborah, 1991. Governance and Economy: A Review. World Bank Policy Research

Paper. December.

Coughlin, Reed and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, 1991. Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict.

London: Pinter Publishers.

de Silva, K.M., 1986. Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985.

Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

de Silva, K.M. and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, 1993. Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict.

London: Pinter Publishers.

de Silva, K.M. and Howard Wriggins, 1994. J.R. Jaywewardene of Sri Lanka: A Political

Biography, Vol. 2. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Djordjevic, Dmitrije, 1991. “The Yugoslav Phenomenon” in The Columbia History of Eastern

Europe. New York: Columbia University Press.

Durkheim, Emile, 1984. The Division of Labor in Society. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire,

England: MacMillan.

Durkheim, Emile, 1964. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London, Allen and Unwin.

Enloe, Cynthia, 1980. Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies. Athens: University of

Georgia Press.

Francis, Joyce, 1993. War as a Social Trap: The Case of Tanzania. Unpublished doctoral

dissertation, School of International Service, The American University.

Gill, Sucha Singh, 1993. “The Punjab Accord and its Failure.” In de Silva and Samarasinghe

(1993), pp. 99-111.

Gurr, Ted R., 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Gurr, Ted R. and Barbara Harff, 1994. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gurr, Ted R., Minorities at Risk. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993.

Horowitz, Donald, 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of

California Press.

Hout, Wil, 1993. Capitalism, and the Third World: Development, Dependence and the World

System. Hants, Aldershot, England: E. Elgar.

Kerbo, Harold R., “Movements of `Crisis’ and Movements of `Affluence’: A Critique of

Deprivation and Resource Mobilization Theories.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24:4

(1982).

Klitgard, Robert, 1991. Adjusting to Reality: Beyond “State Versus Market” in Economic

Development. San Francisco, California: International Center for Economic Growth.

Kuznets, Simon, 1971. Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure.

Cambridge, Mass.: Belkap Press of Harvard University Press.

Mellor, John W., 1976. The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing

World. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press.

Mellor, John W., and Raisudden Ahmed, 1988. Agricultural Price Policy for Developing

Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Nelson, Joan M., ed., 1989. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. New

Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.

Nelson, Joan M., 1990. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the

Third World. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Packenham, Robert A., 1992. The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in

Development Studies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Parsons, Talcott and Neil J. Smelser, 1965. Economy and Society. New York: Free Press.

Panda, K.K., 1993. “The Punjab Imbroglio: the Prelude to the Accord of 1985.” In de Silva and

Samarasinghe (1993), pp. 83-98.

Polanyi, Karl, 1957, The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.

Richardson, John M. Jr., 1987. “Violence and Repression: Neglected Factors in Development

Planning.” Futures, 19:6 (December).

Richardson John M. Jr., and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, 1991. Economic Dimensions of Ethnic

Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka. In Samarasinghe and Coughlin (1991).

Rostow, Walt W., 1971. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non Communist Manifesto.

Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Sachs, Jeffrey, 1989. Developing Country Debt and the World Economy. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

Simon, Julian, 1981. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Simon, Julian and Herman Kahn, eds., 1984. The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global 2000.

New York: Basil Blackwell.

Thomson, Leonard M., 1985. The Political Mythology of Apartheid. New Haven: Yale University

Press.

Tilly, Charles 1978, From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

The World Bank, 1991. Managing Development: The Governance Dimension. Discussion Paper.

The World Bank, 1989. Sub Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.

350