The Move From Aristocracy To Bureaucracy ? Discuss This View Of The Development Of States Within Thi Essay, Research Paper

This question assumes much about the nature of an

aristocracy in a Europe that saw countries such as Turkey where, until around

1570, the aristocracy was almost negligible to Russia, where the boyars of Ivan

IV are believed by some to have replaced the Tsar himself. In a continent of

such diversity, there is bound to be a different reasoning for each form of

aristocracy and the development of each state.?

The schism is particularly strong between Western and Eastern Europe.In the fifteenth century, the Papal schism, the

accession of such characters as Charles VI of France, the repeated minorities

in Scotland and the limited constitutional power of the Holy Roman Emperor lent

western rulers a dependence on their nobles who started the period as the best

educated large class of lay people reliable for use at court, but this would

soon change, aided by the growth of educational institutes, founded on the spur

of the Renaissance and the Reformation.?

The death of the feudal army or fyrd was vital in decreasing the

importance of the nobility.? Experienced

mercenaries were hired across Europe with their experienced veteran

captains.? Henry VIII hired ?Scots,

Spaniards, Gascons, Portuguese, Italians, Albanians, Greeks, Tatars, Germans,

Burgundians and Flemings? according to one contemporary whilst Michael Romanov

kept 17,400 mercenaries in his service.?

His son, Alexis, employed 60,000 by 1663.? Until the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, the French border along the

Spanish Road was guarded by 10,000 Swiss pikemen.? Removing the need to rely on the aristocracy as one?s source of

military power removed a vital part of the nobility?s hold on the monarchy and

took away all of their power to insist on political influence.? The destruction of nobility in battle, such

as that of the Scots at Flodden not only reinforced the need for professional

soldiers but reaffirmed the decline of the soldier-noble as a class, and set the

tone for an era of downsizing and demoting the old noblesse d?epee.? The

muzzling of the aristocracy and the power to patronise the lower nobility

increased the power of monarchies through this age . Bodin wrote that the only ?truly royal? states in

Early Modern Europe were England, Spain and France, and it is with these

category of states that we will start. France was a strongly monarchical state that, from

the reign of Francis I, openly held venal offices.? The growth of offices throughout the period and of the

office-holding class was more advanced in the French kingdom than elsewhere.

Between 1515 and 1665, the number of venal offices rose from 4,000 to 46,000

and the amount of revenue they produced was reckoned to be about 419 million

livres ? five times the annual royal budget.?

As a result of ennoblement through these channels, the noblesse de robe emerged to challenge

the three ancient estates (leading some historians to suggest, probably

mistakenly, that the gentry wished to form a fourth estate), and in line with

the increase in the sale of offices, they increased the power of their class.

Whereas Henri II and Francois I had courts filled with princes of the blood,

dukes, peers and great officers (reflecting the roots of the noblesse d??p?e), by the late sixteenth

century, the power of the old aristocrats even at the highest levels was being

eroded.? In 1594, the Constable

Montmorency-Damville sat on the Royal Financial Commission with three other

great nobles, but by 1598, with the exception of the Protestant Sully, the

King?s council was a representation of the noblesse

de robe. The accumulation of offices in France in some cases

did reinforce the aristocracy as they bought they way to influence, and in some

cases, wealthier aristocrats amassed such a number of offices of such influence

that they could become local sovereigns.?

This is paradoxical, given that a strong argument for the cultivation of

the culture of venality was as a means to counter the growing irritation of the

local Parlements and estates that

were enforcing forms of local independence.?

However, in general, this era saw a usurping of the great nobles by the

gentry. The growth of the influence of the gentry was not

just recognition of the growth of their numerical strength and improved status

as noblesse de robe, but as a result

of the faction and intrigue that pervaded France?s old nobility throughout the

Wars of Religion.? As a result, the

nobility tended only to return to favour as regards appointments during

exceptional cases of excellence or during times of royal weakness.? (For example, Gaston and Conde were recalled

to the royal chambers during the minority of Louis XIV.)? Louis XIV?s reign, starting in 1661,

typifies the trend: of his seventeen councillors, just two were from old

aristocratic houses.? Not only were the

old nobility racked with ancient grudges and prone to faction, but they almost

universally lacked the legal training necessary to maintain a seventeenth

century administrative position.? By the

advent of the seventeenth century, all that the nobility were fit for were

regional posts and army or ecclesiastical positions. Whilst the high nobility suffered, the robins (lawyers) gained a monopoly over

the sercretaryships in all of the sections of royal affairs requiring routine

administration and in the sovereign courts.?

It must be realised that the old system of old families dominating the

court had neither stigma nor problem for Early Modern Europe.? It was the order in which things lay.? As such, the growth of legal and financial

noblesse de robe dynasties was a hallmark of this era.? The Phelypeaux family provided nine

secretaries of state without a break between 1610 and 1777 whilst the Nicolay

family provided the nine first presidents of the Chambre des Comptes of Paris

between 1506 and 1791. By 1521, Francois I was complaining that ?most of the

offices of the kingdom, of all types, are owned in expectancy?.? Paradoxically, given their nouveau riche

means, the old hereditary principle of office was actually reinforced by the

noblesse de robe, who having bought offices, saw them as bought property and as

a means of reinforcing their membership of the second estate. Although Francois insisted that one had to survive

the changeover of office by forty days in order to prevent the establishment of

new dynasties and to allow the reversion of offices back to the Crown for their

resale, the droit annuel was later

adopted in exchange for the forty days rule, as a means of extracting money

from the offices.? Time-shared offices

were opposed at every turn, and eventually the format for the retention of

offices was of offices that could be inherited, but which were taxed.? The price of offices was hit by inflation,

which although reflected by the tied-in droit annuel, made offices unobtainable

by the royalty, so the crown could not benefit from the rise in values. As

another consequence of the inflation, the Crown could not afford to buy any

offices and so could not reform them.?

The growth in offices occurred at all levels. Offices, such as the

businesses of urban fishmongers, were soon acquired by the government in an

attempt to raise more revenue, but they succeeded only in confusing the

convoluted societal structure further.?

With offices out of the price range of the government, reform of the

system was impossible.? Revenue was

raised by the sale of new offices, created by adding layers upon layers were

added to the state administrative system.?

The Parlements recorded feelings of being threatened by a new executive

justice across the kingdom. The French bureaucratic class grew massively,

though most of the posts were redundant (the old taille office found itself monitoring the activities of a new

office in charge of all taxes and levies) and so reduced the number of bureaucrats

without increasing the active power of the government.? However, it is important to remember that

with the bought offices, many of the supposed bureaucrats were almost of

amateur status, and can not really be judged to be bureaucrats in the spirit of

the question. The growth of venal government never extended as

high as the kings? Chief Ministers.? The

ministries were never purchasable offices and they relied on personal contact

with the King for their appointment.? At

this level, it is fair to say that a professional bureaucracy rose up, although

whether one can regard the attitude of Richelieu as being any different to his

predecessors is debatable.? Not a

?professional,? in the modern sense of the word, he did use the position for

personal financial gain (to the tune of three million livres per annum) as did

his predecessors. Indeed, the nature of the post might suggest that although

the post was meritocratic, it had always been so.? This was not modernisation on the part of the Renaissance kings,

so much as royal common sense? Louis

XIV?s decision to rule alone reflects that the king?s advisers needed to be

suitably meritorious and that they were just a help to pragmatic kings? (it is

hard to believe that the egocentric Sun King would have found anyone that he

trusted more than himself.)? Had there

ever been more than pragmatic realism to the post, then the ceremony-obsessed

Louis would probably have had one.??

Richelieu and de Mazarin were France?s two most illustrious Ministers

and royal friendship was their sole qualification. The importance of the royal ministries was the power

to appoint, sack and reform ministers and ministries.? Richelieu was able to clear the court of redundant offices (such

as Admiral and Constable) by 1627, reflecting the diminishing of the importance

of the old hierarchy in favour of a new system. The King?s Council was rapidly

becoming less noble, as typified by the afore-mentioned selection preferences

of Louis XIV, and ministers of state were therefore less subservient to the

Council.? The Council of State, formed

in 1643, met passing statutes in the presence of the king and decrees in his

absence. Ministers for individual areas emerged, and foreign affairs ministers,

financial ministers and military ministers were all mandated by the rise of

Louis XIV.? Vitally, this system not

only reserved the king the power of appointment taken away by the venal

offices, but also allowed a meritocracy to emerge at the highest levels of

government.? Although the French system was more open to

newcomers than its formality might suggest, it is important to remember that by

the eighteenth century, the noblesse de robe and the noblesse d?epee were

indistinguishable, and that although the later system was more competent,

excluding those lacking judicial training, it was by no means a

bureaucracy.? Indeed, it was with the

aim of joining the aristocracy that bureaucrats emerged.? Although the venality of the French system was very

extreme, it is a good example of the muzzling of the aristocracy and the rise

of the educated lower gentry and noblesse

de robe.? A pattern that occurs

elsewhere, although for different reasons. In Spain, similar diminuation of the great offices

was occurring although the extensive scale of venal offices was not so great.? As such, in 1520 the Constable and Admiral

were given joint regency with Adrian of Utrecht, a deviation from the normal

path of Spanish government made in order to win over the rapidly weakening

Castilian nobility.? Charles V had

stopped having a Secretary of State by 1530, and instead deferred such

responsibility to a pair of secretaries of state.? The movement from these secretaries to real ministries only came

under Olivares who set up a Junta de

Ejecucion to make a centralised policy to circumvent the twelve Cortes.?

The Juntas were sabotaged and abolished by 1643 and Spain once more

became a politically fragmented and regionalist country, closer to a monarquia than a monarchy. Olivares was attempting to cripple the Cortes system

and the regional assemblies because it was precisely counter to the

meritocratic system that had produced him.?

The royal council of Castile had been dominated by the great nobility

theoughout the fifteenth century and faction had overruled real political

questions.? As such, after 1480, the

nobles lost the right to vote on affairs of state.? Although the 1504-6 and 1516-22 crises demonstrated their

continued power, by the 1530s they were finally reduced to the position that

Olivares wanted them.? The replacement

of the Spanish aristocracy required the intake of large numbers of letrados (University trained jurists)

and they soon came to dominate the corregidores

? the posts of administration and justice.?

They brought about a rapid improvement in the general standard of justice

in Spain, but they were soon corrupted and by the seventeenth century they

represented the interests of local grandees.?

Murcia?s official in 1647 protected bandits and promoted smuggling out

of Portugal. The era saw the rise of the educated lesser nobility,

in accordance with the rise of education in Spain.? The two Castilian universities became twenty by 1620, making

Spain one of the best educated countries in Europe.? The thirteen Aragonite universities and twenty Castilian

institutions supplied all of the twenty-four judges in the Chancelleria of

Valladolid, and fifty of Philip IV?s hundred councillors were university

professors.? Most were from northern

Spanish families who had been ennobled within three generations.?? Philip IV?s council of Castile was entirely

run by letrados whilst the Audencias (Courts

of Appeal) were also effectively run by the letrados. Due to the improvement in the education of the

judges and magistrates, there was no real control of the lawyers by the

monarchy, which meant that, in Olivares? words justice fell into ?total

abandon?, as the justices went unmonitored.?

As such, hereditary posts developed and a venal culture developed.? Carlos II?s reign (1665) saw a commentator

observe that ?there are those who occupy their offices as though they bought

them? and that dignities were made into ?inheritances or sales?.? The Castilian crown started to sell offices

formally and raised 90 million ducats between 1619 and 1640.? Important positions for the localities

became semi-hereditary posts and cities were almost self-governing by the

1700s.? Although Charles V halted

further ennoblements through offices, this period saw the growth of the lower

aristocracy, replacing the grandees as the real power-base in Spain. ??????????? In England, a similar pattern occurs, but it is not due

to the growth of lay education so much as the faction of the English

aristocracy.? Within two generations of

the end of the War of the Roses, no Tudor was likely to allow the build up of

any more dynastic rivals, especially given their own inability to get

heirs.? Henry VIII?s reliance on

mercernaries over domestic troops was another aspect of his emasculation of the

nobility.? Equally, the need to exclude

the monasteries from the royal administration encouraged the growth of the

lower noble bureaucracy.? Although there

was no Eltonian ?New Monarchy? in this time, it is fair to say that we do see

an improved recognition for educated ordinary men in the English court.? Wolsey was the son of an Ipswich butcher,

and according to Elton, Cromwell was a ?Putney wide-boy.???? Although the era brings a new opportunity

for the advancements of ordinary people at the court, this was the result of

the development from chamber finance to exchequer economics and the subsequent

movement from arrogance about the rights of noble to a marginally more

egalitarian arrogance about the rights of the educated man. ??????????? In France and Spain, we see the growth of the lower

nobility and upper gentry into a class of administrators that in many cases

bought their way into the state structure, and then passed their position on,

so creating not a bureaucracy, but a new elite.? The old oligarchy that relied on the financial and military power

of nobles and used the church?s resources, especially after Martin V?s drive

for ecclesiastical administrative power following the schism to restore papal

prestige, was replaced by an oligarchy of lay clerks drawn from the bloated

?educated? class. ??????????? This is a pattern repeated in other western states.? In Germany, the rights and privileges of the

nobility were well recorded.? The

Imperial Knights (Ritterschaft) formed leagues and contested their position

with their local dukes and electors constantly throughout the period.? Their protests were in reference to the

growth of a new class that the Spanish and French would have recognised.? The educated lower castes being churned out

by the masses of newly formed universities (there were just five universities

in 1400, there were 18 by 1520) were taking posts in local governments previously

held by men of their calibre.? In ?The Order of Knights? by v. Guenzberg,

the author claims that ?any Tom, Dick and Harry, any drunks, clerks and

financiers? were running the Empire.?

Their protests continued until 1522-3 when the Knight?s War brought the

elector of Triers in to crush them.?

Their defeat did not diminish their importance and their Imperial rights

remained intact until the nineteenth century, but the trend of recruiting

educated men over noblemen continued. ??????????? Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, there is a very different

story.? In Russia, the lack of trained

personnel kept the nobility, with their military and economic power, firmly in

control.? Ivan IV?s government has been

criticised for the weakness of the throne, since the Duma was so aristocratic

and so powerful.? The provision of

ambassadors, generals and governors, as well as policies, administrative

structure and day to day government was left in the hands of the Duma, and the

Duma?s size reflected the size of the boyar class.? Vasili III left a group of boyars the regency after his

death.? Only 28 of the 62 families

represented in the pre-1645 council were left in the Duma in 1668 such was the

vulnerability of the boyars to autocratic rulers, as well as demography.? The Muscovites were effectively running a

medieval government throughout this period, and the strongly feudal structure,

the lack of educational establishments and the dominance of the boyars

prevented any social mobility whatsoever, and the system of Muscovite government

remained unaffected by the upheavals of education, society, religion and art

going on elsewhere. ??????????? In Poland, the nobility were technically all equal,

although the rights of the lesser nobility were sometimes compromised by the

stronger nobility.? Ladislas IV hoped to

weaken the large noble class by playing on these gradations and creating a

royal bloc in the gentry.? Culminating

in a scheme to build a chivalric order, he did not succeed, and the large noble

class remained as powerful as before.?

The king?s power came from his right to appoint the sixteen officers of

state.? These offices were ministries,

but due to the faction of the nobles had to be appointed within the noble

class, and due to the life-ministries that were conferred, turnover was

slow.? Grandee families could thus build

up power within the court easily simply by taking two or three of the key

posts.? The permeation of the nobility

from these posts right down through the judicial system and local government.? Magnates possessing large private armies and

massive financial power were easily in a position to threaten the crown if

reform was attempted and the elite nature of the nobles was protected by the

magnates.? As such, the king was stuck

with choosing and appointing within the noble pool. ??????????? Entrenched nobility was not prevalent just across the

?unroyal? states.? Sweden was run by an

aristocratic class with a monopoly on the important posts of state and the rad (council) was run by the same

families for generations.? Gustav Bonde

was called in 1727 to sit in the Royal Council, and sat as the twentieth

successive member of his family to serve in that role.? The Oxenstierna family and Bielke family had

a lawsuit that was abandoned for want of impartial jurors, simply thanks to the

power of the two families. Queen Christina made attempts to break the grip of

these families.? Selling off masses of

Crown land to anyone who could afford them, sextupling the number of counts and

doubling the number of noble families, Christina cynically tried to dilute the

old order.? The lower nobility protested

louder than the conceited grandees, and appointments were soon constitutionally

bound to be on grounds of merit as opposed to rewards for service in war (the

pretext for Chrsitina?s sell-off).?

However, the new nobility had expanded to take in a great number of new

families and until the 1650s, the government ran many venal posts.? The new nobility was thus able to buy posts

in the government with their new titles.?

Like Muscovy and Poland, there was a lack of trained personnel, and the

nobles, despite their lack of education and Christina?s best efforts, continued

to dominate Swedish government. ??????????? In Ottoman Turkey, there is an inverse situation to

Western Europe.? Whereas the Westerners

moved from an uneducated class of noblemen running the country, the devshirme (child tribute system) of

Turkey maintained the prowess of the Turkish civil service throughout.? The Sultan?s council of muftis ensured the religious purity of royal actions and could

demand tyrannicide, and this was performed once during the fourteenth

century.? The devotion of the Empire to

Islam protected it from tyrants who were debauched at the Empire?s

expense.? Although Suleiman wore silks

and committed other infringements, the muftis were never discontented enough

with him to demand tyrannicide, as the Sultan knew that should he cross the

line dividing service of the Empire from service of one?s service, then the

professional muftis would order his death.?

The throwing of a previous from a tower by a Janissary guardsman was

warning enough for anyone.? However, the

weakening old Sultan?s long reign saw decay in the Empire.? Without a young king to monitor all of its

affairs, the masterful Grand Vizier Sokollu started to sell offices for his own

personal profit, and when the inept Selim II came to power, the Empire had

already begun to sell itself away.?

Although key roles were never for sale, he set a precedent followed by

Selim?s drinking partner and doctor, who succeeded him.? When preparing to aid the Morisco?s revolt,

Sokollu was redirected to take Cyprus, a great source of wine, for the drunkard

Sultan.? The absolute naval defeat

following the conquest at Lepanto required massive rebuilding that would bankrupt

a previous plentiful treasury.? In order

to raise funds, the devshirme stopped supplying candidates for certain posts,

and Moslem boys were admitted to the devshirme.? By the 1630s, the Civil Service was actually less well educated

than previously, and an aristocracy had developed.? Admiralties and Vizierships were held in families for

generations, despite there not being an official principle of hereditary

ownership outside the House of Osman in the Empire. To conclude, in the west, this era saw the growth of

professionals as an elite class.? Both

warfare and administration reached levels of complication at which it was

necessary to have specific training and experience in order to function. Fed by

the new universities, a new elite sprung up and established itself in positions

once held by the old families, in some cases with a greater degree of

entrenchment.? Despite this new

egalitarianism, this was no social revolution and was certainly the start of no

?New Monarchy? as Elton claimed. This era merely saw the aristocracy augmented

by a new class of professional administrators.?

In effect, a new educated element was allowed accession to the

aristocracy.? Social mobility was

marginally increased, but there was no real bureaucracy anywhere.? The idea of professional civil services was

some way off. In the east, stagnation occurred, and countries

failing to keep up with the modernisation of government soon fell behind.? Sweden and Turkey in particular would have a

hard time repeating the successes of Osman, Suleiman and Gustavus Adophus

unless they reformed quickly. This question assumes much about the nature of an

aristocracy in a Europe that saw countries such as Turkey where, until around

1570, the aristocracy was almost negligible to Russia, where the boyars of Ivan

IV are believed by some to have replaced the Tsar himself. In a continent of

such diversity, there is bound to be a different reasoning for each form of

aristocracy and the development of each state.?

The schism is particularly strong between Western and Eastern Europe.In the fifteenth century, the Papal schism, the

accession of such characters as Charles VI of France, the repeated minorities

in Scotland and the limited constitutional power of the Holy Roman Emperor lent

western rulers a dependence on their nobles who started the period as the best

educated large class of lay people reliable for use at court, but this would

soon change, aided by the growth of educational institutes, founded on the spur

of the Renaissance and the Reformation.?

The death of the feudal army or fyrd was vital in decreasing the

importance of the nobility.? Experienced

mercenaries were hired across Europe with their experienced veteran

captains.? Henry VIII hired ?Scots,

Spaniards, Gascons, Portuguese, Italians, Albanians, Greeks, Tatars, Germans,

Burgundians and Flemings? according to one contemporary whilst Michael Romanov

kept 17,400 mercenaries in his service.?

His son, Alexis, employed 60,000 by 1663.? Until the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, the French border along the

Spanish Road was guarded by 10,000 Swiss pikemen.? Removing the need to rely on the aristocracy as one?s source of

military power removed a vital part of the nobility?s hold on the monarchy and

took away all of their power to insist on political influence.? The destruction of nobility in battle, such

as that of the Scots at Flodden not only reinforced the need for professional

soldiers but reaffirmed the decline of the soldier-noble as a class, and set the

tone for an era of downsizing and demoting the old noblesse d?epee.? The

muzzling of the aristocracy and the power to patronise the lower nobility

increased the power of monarchies through this age . Bodin wrote that the only ?truly royal? states in

Early Modern Europe were England, Spain and France, and it is with these

category of states that we will start. France was a strongly monarchical state that, from

the reign of Francis I, openly held venal offices.? The growth of offices throughout the period and of the

office-holding class was more advanced in the French kingdom than elsewhere.

Between 1515 and 1665, the number of venal offices rose from 4,000 to 46,000

and the amount of revenue they produced was reckoned to be about 419 million

livres ? five times the annual royal budget.?

As a result of ennoblement through these channels, the noblesse de robe emerged to challenge

the three ancient estates (leading some historians to suggest, probably

mistakenly, that the gentry wished to form a fourth estate), and in line with

the increase in the sale of offices, they increased the power of their class.

Whereas Henri II and Francois I had courts filled with princes of the blood,

dukes, peers and great officers (reflecting the roots of the noblesse d??p?e), by the late sixteenth

century, the power of the old aristocrats even at the highest levels was being

eroded.? In 1594, the Constable

Montmorency-Damville sat on the Royal Financial Commission with three other

great nobles, but by 1598, with the exception of the Protestant Sully, the

King?s council was a representation of the noblesse

de robe. The accumulation of offices in France in some cases

did reinforce the aristocracy as they bought they way to influence, and in some

cases, wealthier aristocrats amassed such a number of offices of such influence

that they could become local sovereigns.?

This is paradoxical, given that a strong argument for the cultivation of

the culture of venality was as a means to counter the growing irritation of the

local Parlements and estates that

were enforcing forms of local independence.?

However, in general, this era saw a usurping of the great nobles by the

gentry. The growth of the influence of the gentry was not

just recognition of the growth of their numerical strength and improved status

as noblesse de robe, but as a result

of the faction and intrigue that pervaded France?s old nobility throughout the

Wars of Religion.? As a result, the

nobility tended only to return to favour as regards appointments during

exceptional cases of excellence or during times of royal weakness.? (For example, Gaston and Conde were recalled

to the royal chambers during the minority of Louis XIV.)? Louis XIV?s reign, starting in 1661,

typifies the trend: of his seventeen councillors, just two were from old

aristocratic houses.? Not only were the

old nobility racked with ancient grudges and prone to faction, but they almost

universally lacked the legal training necessary to maintain a seventeenth

century administrative position.? By the

advent of the seventeenth century, all that the nobility were fit for were

regional posts and army or ecclesiastical positions. Whilst the high nobility suffered, the robins (lawyers) gained a monopoly over

the sercretaryships in all of the sections of royal affairs requiring routine

administration and in the sovereign courts.?

It must be realised that the old system of old families dominating the

court had neither stigma nor problem for Early Modern Europe.? It was the order in which things lay.? As such, the growth of legal and financial

noblesse de robe dynasties was a hallmark of this era.? The Phelypeaux family provided nine

secretaries of state without a break between 1610 and 1777 whilst the Nicolay

family provided the nine first presidents of the Chambre des Comptes of Paris

between 1506 and 1791. By 1521, Francois I was complaining that ?most of the

offices of the kingdom, of all types, are owned in expectancy?.? Paradoxically, given their nouveau riche

means, the old hereditary principle of office was actually reinforced by the

noblesse de robe, who having bought offices, saw them as bought property and as

a means of reinforcing their membership of the second estate. Although Francois insisted that one had to survive

the changeover of office by forty days in order to prevent the establishment of

new dynasties and to allow the reversion of offices back to the Crown for their

resale, the droit annuel was later

adopted in exchange for the forty days rule, as a means of extracting money

from the offices.? Time-shared offices

were opposed at every turn, and eventually the format for the retention of

offices was of offices that could be inherited, but which were taxed.? The price of offices was hit by inflation,

which although reflected by the tied-in droit annuel, made offices unobtainable

by the royalty, so the crown could not benefit from the rise in values. As

another consequence of the inflation, the Crown could not afford to buy any

offices and so could not reform them.?

The growth in offices occurred at all levels. Offices, such as the

businesses of urban fishmongers, were soon acquired by the government in an

attempt to raise more revenue, but they succeeded only in confusing the

convoluted societal structure further.?

With offices out of the price range of the government, reform of the

system was impossible.? Revenue was

raised by the sale of new offices, created by adding layers upon layers were

added to the state administrative system.?

The Parlements recorded feelings of being threatened by a new executive

justice across the kingdom. The French bureaucratic class grew massively,

though most of the posts were redundant (the old taille office found itself monitoring the activities of a new

office in charge of all taxes and levies) and so reduced the number of bureaucrats

without increasing the active power of the government.? However, it is important to remember that

with the bought offices, many of the supposed bureaucrats were almost of

amateur status, and can not really be judged to be bureaucrats in the spirit of

the question. The growth of venal government never extended as

high as the kings? Chief Ministers.? The

ministries were never purchasable offices and they relied on personal contact

with the King for their appointment.? At

this level, it is fair to say that a professional bureaucracy rose up, although

whether one can regard the attitude of Richelieu as being any different to his

predecessors is debatable.? Not a

?professional,? in the modern sense of the word, he did use the position for

personal financial gain (to the tune of three million livres per annum) as did

his predecessors. Indeed, the nature of the post might suggest that although

the post was meritocratic, it had always been so.? This was not modernisation on the part of the Renaissance kings,

so much as royal common sense? Louis

XIV?s decision to rule alone reflects that the king?s advisers needed to be

suitably meritorious and that they were just a help to pragmatic kings? (it is

hard to believe that the egocentric Sun King would have found anyone that he

trusted more than himself.)? Had there

ever been more than pragmatic realism to the post, then the ceremony-obsessed

Louis would probably have had one.??

Richelieu and de Mazarin were France?s two most illustrious Ministers

and royal friendship was their sole qualification. The importance of the royal ministries was the power

to appoint, sack and reform ministers and ministries.? Richelieu was able to clear the court of redundant offices (such

as Admiral and Constable) by 1627, reflecting the diminishing of the importance

of the old hierarchy in favour of a new system. The King?s Council was rapidly

becoming less noble, as typified by the afore-mentioned selection preferences

of Louis XIV, and ministers of state were therefore less subservient to the

Council.? The Council of State, formed

in 1643, met passing statutes in the presence of the king and decrees in his

absence. Ministers for individual areas emerged, and foreign affairs ministers,

financial ministers and military ministers were all mandated by the rise of

Louis XIV.? Vitally, this system not

only reserved the king the power of appointment taken away by the venal

offices, but also allowed a meritocracy to emerge at the highest levels of

government.? Although the French system was more open to

newcomers than its formality might suggest, it is important to remember that by

the eighteenth century, the noblesse de robe and the noblesse d?epee were

indistinguishable, and that although the later system was more competent,

excluding those lacking judicial training, it was by no means a

bureaucracy.? Indeed, it was with the

aim of joining the aristocracy that bureaucrats emerged.? Although the venality of the French system was very

extreme, it is a good example of the muzzling of the aristocracy and the rise

of the educated lower gentry and noblesse

de robe.? A pattern that occurs

elsewhere, although for different reasons. In Spain, similar diminuation of the great offices

was occurring although the extensive scale of venal offices was not so great.? As such, in 1520 the Constable and Admiral

were given joint regency with Adrian of Utrecht, a deviation from the normal

path of Spanish government made in order to win over the rapidly weakening

Castilian nobility.? Charles V had

stopped having a Secretary of State by 1530, and instead deferred such

responsibility to a pair of secretaries of state.? The movement from these secretaries to real ministries only came

under Olivares who set up a Junta de

Ejecucion to make a centralised policy to circumvent the twelve Cortes.?

The Juntas were sabotaged and abolished by 1643 and Spain once more

became a politically fragmented and regionalist country, closer to a monarquia than a monarchy. Olivares was attempting to cripple the Cortes system

and the regional assemblies because it was precisely counter to the

meritocratic system that had produced him.?

The royal council of Castile had been dominated by the great nobility

theoughout the fifteenth century and faction had overruled real political

questions.? As such, after 1480, the

nobles lost the right to vote on affairs of state.? Although the 1504-6 and 1516-22 crises demonstrated their

continued power, by the 1530s they were finally reduced to the position that

Olivares wanted them.? The replacement

of the Spanish aristocracy required the intake of large numbers of letrados (University trained jurists)

and they soon came to dominate the corregidores

? the posts of administration and justice.?

They brought about a rapid improvement in the general standard of justice

in Spain, but they were soon corrupted and by the seventeenth century they

represented the interests of local grandees.?

Murcia?s official in 1647 protected bandits and promoted smuggling out

of Portugal. The era saw the rise of the educated lesser nobility,

in accordance with the rise of education in Spain.? The two Castilian universities became twenty by 1620, making

Spain one of the best educated countries in Europe.? The thirteen Aragonite universities and twenty Castilian

institutions supplied all of the twenty-four judges in the Chancelleria of

Valladolid, and fifty of Philip IV?s hundred councillors were university

professors.? Most were from northern

Spanish families who had been ennobled within three generations.?? Philip IV?s council of Castile was entirely

run by letrados whilst the Audencias (Courts

of Appeal) were also effectively run by the letrados. Due to the improvement in the education of the

judges and magistrates, there was no real control of the lawyers by the

monarchy, which meant that, in Olivares? words justice fell into ?total

abandon?, as the justices went unmonitored.?

As such, hereditary posts developed and a venal culture developed.? Carlos II?s reign (1665) saw a commentator

observe that ?there are those who occupy their offices as though they bought

them? and that dignities were made into ?inheritances or sales?.? The Castilian crown started to sell offices

formally and raised 90 million ducats between 1619 and 1640.? Important positions for the localities

became semi-hereditary posts and cities were almost self-governing by the

1700s.? Although Charles V halted

further ennoblements through offices, this period saw the growth of the lower

aristocracy, replacing the grandees as the real power-base in Spain. ??????????? In England, a similar pattern occurs, but it is not due

to the growth of lay education so much as the faction of the English

aristocracy.? Within two generations of

the end of the War of the Roses, no Tudor was likely to allow the build up of

any more dynastic rivals, especially given their own inability to get

heirs.? Henry VIII?s reliance on

mercernaries over domestic troops was another aspect of his emasculation of the

nobility.? Equally, the need to exclude

the monasteries from the royal administration encouraged the growth of the

lower noble bureaucracy.? Although there

was no Eltonian ?New Monarchy? in this time, it is fair to say that we do see

an improved recognition for educated ordinary men in the English court.? Wolsey was the son of an Ipswich butcher,

and according to Elton, Cromwell was a ?Putney wide-boy.???? Although the era brings a new opportunity

for the advancements of ordinary people at the court, this was the result of

the development from chamber finance to exchequer economics and the subsequent

movement from arrogance about the rights of noble to a marginally more

egalitarian arrogance about the rights of the educated man. ??????????? In France and Spain, we see the growth of the lower

nobility and upper gentry into a class of administrators that in many cases

bought their way into the state structure, and then passed their position on,

so creating not a bureaucracy, but a new elite.? The old oligarchy that relied on the financial and military power

of nobles and used the church?s resources, especially after Martin V?s drive

for ecclesiastical administrative power following the schism to restore papal

prestige, was replaced by an oligarchy of lay clerks drawn from the bloated

?educated? class. ??????????? This is a pattern repeated in other western states.? In Germany, the rights and privileges of the

nobility were well recorded.? The

Imperial Knights (Ritterschaft) formed leagues and contested their position

with their local dukes and electors constantly throughout the period.? Their protests were in reference to the

growth of a new class that the Spanish and French would have recognised.? The educated lower castes being churned out

by the masses of newly formed universities (there were just five universities

in 1400, there were 18 by 1520) were taking posts in local governments previously

held by men of their calibre.? In ?The Order of Knights? by v. Guenzberg,

the author claims that ?any Tom, Dick and Harry, any drunks, clerks and

financiers? were running the Empire.?

Their protests continued until 1522-3 when the Knight?s War brought the

elector of Triers in to crush them.?

Their defeat did not diminish their importance and their Imperial rights

remained intact until the nineteenth century, but the trend of recruiting

educated men over noblemen continued. ??????????? Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, there is a very different

story.? In Russia, the lack of trained

personnel kept the nobility, with their military and economic power, firmly in

control.? Ivan IV?s government has been

criticised for the weakness of the throne, since the Duma was so aristocratic

and so powerful.? The provision of

ambassadors, generals and governors, as well as policies, administrative

structure and day to day government was left in the hands of the Duma, and the

Duma?s size reflected the size of the boyar class.? Vasili III left a group of boyars the regency after his

death.? Only 28 of the 62 families

represented in the pre-1645 council were left in the Duma in 1668 such was the

vulnerability of the boyars to autocratic rulers, as well as demography.? The Muscovites were effectively running a

medieval government throughout this period, and the strongly feudal structure,

the lack of educational establishments and the dominance of the boyars

prevented any social mobility whatsoever, and the system of Muscovite government

remained unaffected by the upheavals of education, society, religion and art

going on elsewhere. ??????????? In Poland, the nobility were technically all equal,

although the rights of the lesser nobility were sometimes compromised by the

stronger nobility.? Ladislas IV hoped to

weaken the large noble class by playing on these gradations and creating a

royal bloc in the gentry.? Culminating

in a scheme to build a chivalric order, he did not succeed, and the large noble

class remained as powerful as before.?

The king?s power came from his right to appoint the sixteen officers of

state.? These offices were ministries,

but due to the faction of the nobles had to be appointed within the noble

class, and due to the life-ministries that were conferred, turnover was

slow.? Grandee families could thus build

up power within the court easily simply by taking two or three of the key

posts.? The permeation of the nobility

from these posts right down through the judicial system and local government.? Magnates possessing large private armies and

massive financial power were easily in a position to threaten the crown if

reform was attempted and the elite nature of the nobles was protected by the

magnates.? As such, the king was stuck

with choosing and appointing within the noble pool. ??????????? Entrenched nobility was not prevalent just across the

?unroyal? states.? Sweden was run by an

aristocratic class with a monopoly on the important posts of state and the rad (council) was run by the same

families for generations.? Gustav Bonde

was called in 1727 to sit in the Royal Council, and sat as the twentieth

successive member of his family to serve in that role.? The Oxenstierna family and Bielke family had

a lawsuit that was abandoned for want of impartial jurors, simply thanks to the

power of the two families. Queen Christina made attempts to break the grip of

these families.? Selling off masses of

Crown land to anyone who could afford them, sextupling the number of counts and

doubling the number of noble families, Christina cynically tried to dilute the

old order.? The lower nobility protested

louder than the conceited grandees, and appointments were soon constitutionally

bound to be on grounds of merit as opposed to rewards for service in war (the

pretext for Chrsitina?s sell-off).?

However, the new nobility had expanded to take in a great number of new

families and until the 1650s, the government ran many venal posts.? The new nobility was thus able to buy posts

in the government with their new titles.?

Like Muscovy and Poland, there was a lack of trained personnel, and the

nobles, despite their lack of education and Christina?s best efforts, continued

to dominate Swedish government. ??????????? In Ottoman Turkey, there is an inverse situation to

Western Europe.? Whereas the Westerners

moved from an uneducated class of noblemen running the country, the devshirme (child tribute system) of

Turkey maintained the prowess of the Turkish civil service throughout.? The Sultan?s council of muftis ensured the religious purity of royal actions and could

demand tyrannicide, and this was performed once during the fourteenth

century.? The devotion of the Empire to

Islam protected it from tyrants who were debauched at the Empire?s

expense.? Although Suleiman wore silks

and committed other infringements, the muftis were never discontented enough

with him to demand tyrannicide, as the Sultan knew that should he cross the

line dividing service of the Empire from service of one?s service, then the

professional muftis would order his death.?

The throwing of a previous from a tower by a Janissary guardsman was

warning enough for anyone.? However, the

weakening old Sultan?s long reign saw decay in the Empire.? Without a young king to monitor all of its

affairs, the masterful Grand Vizier Sokollu started to sell offices for his own

personal profit, and when the inept Selim II came to power, the Empire had

already begun to sell itself away.?

Although key roles were never for sale, he set a precedent followed by

Selim?s drinking partner and doctor, who succeeded him.? When preparing to aid the Morisco?s revolt,

Sokollu was redirected to take Cyprus, a great source of wine, for the drunkard

Sultan.? The absolute naval defeat

following the conquest at Lepanto required massive rebuilding that would bankrupt

a previous plentiful treasury.? In order

to raise funds, the devshirme stopped supplying candidates for certain posts,

and Moslem boys were admitted to the devshirme.? By the 1630s, the Civil Service was actually less well educated

than previously, and an aristocracy had developed.? Admiralties and Vizierships were held in families for

generations, despite there not being an official principle of hereditary

ownership outside the House of Osman in the Empire. To conclude, in the west, this era saw the growth of

professionals as an elite class.? Both

warfare and administration reached levels of complication at which it was

necessary to have specific training and experience in order to function. Fed by

the new universities, a new elite sprung up and established itself in positions

once held by the old families, in some cases with a greater degree of

entrenchment.? Despite this new

egalitarianism, this was no social revolution and was certainly the start of no

?New Monarchy? as Elton claimed. This era merely saw the aristocracy augmented

by a new class of professional administrators.?

In effect, a new educated element was allowed accession to the

aristocracy.? Social mobility was

marginally increased, but there was no real bureaucracy anywhere.? The idea of professional civil services was

some way off. In the east, stagnation occurred, and countries

failing to keep up with the modernisation of government soon fell behind.? Sweden and Turkey in particular would have a

hard time repeating the successes of Osman, Suleiman and Gustavus Adophus

unless they reformed quickly.