Describe And Discuss Kehr?s Reasons For Believing That The Rejection Of An English Alliance Was Due Essay, Research Paper

Kehr?s essays

are united by the title ?Primat der Innenpolitik? since Kehr?s take on the

Wilhelmine and Birmarckian Reichs was that the Rankean ideal of a Primat der

Aussenpolitik based on the coordination and common goals of the nation state

was not just outdated, but simply a bourgeois illusion.? Kehr refers to the idea of ?objective? and

?autonomous? foreign policy as being absurd and that social stratification and

domestic politics were more important in foreign politics.? The zenith of this idea was the way in which

the possibility Anglo-German alliance was handled.? Claiming that Miquel?s Sammlungspolitik provided the bases

for German foreign policy, Kehr points out that the English failure to assess

the nature of the war without examining their own foreign policy was as grave a

sin as to look at German foreign policy without looking at German domestic

policy.? Foreign policy has adversaries

and allies to deal with, but does so in order to meet the needs of its

people.? As a part of

his thesis, Kehr says that the ?social conflicts of the nineties set foreign

policy on a course that encouraged expansion of the fleet and rejection of the

English alliance.?? The forces of

conservatism that traditionally used the national superstructure to maintain

the socio-economic status quo were striving to maintain a more backward state

than the type of state advocated by the Burgertum.? In Germany this had the effect if protecting the interests of

agrarian capitalism against the interests of industrial and commercial

capitalism.? Moreover, the need to

suppress the massively expanding proletariat, a child of such commerce, was

another objective of the forces conservatism. Kehr also saw bourgeois

nationalism, the being that constructed the ?Nation-State?, as using domestic

politics as a defence mechanism against more advanced and capable economic

rivals on behalf of the agrarian sector, and as being a means to cut out

competition for all of Germany?s exporters.?

It was this common purpose that created the Sammlungspolitik. The

Sammlungspolitik was a stateless collection that sought collaboration between

the wealthy classes, now including the Burgertum, that agreed to remain in the

state apparatus but never to seek to dominate it.? Their governing interest was subduing the proletariat and

maintaining their own status.? The

Junkers were not the hard-working farmers of the eighteenth century, but rather

high level aristocrats whose tastes needed supporting.? The social-insurance policy, the

Penitentiary Bill and the Subversion Bills were all important anti proletarian

domestic policies.? Not satisfied with

the Bismarckian style of use of foreign policy, whereby emergencies could be

generated to allow him to better control the situation, the Sammlungspolitik

bloc wished to use Weltpolitik to create a grandiose uncontinental foreign

policy to manipulate.? Weltpolitik, the

increased domestic power it would bring in the fledgling Rechtstaat and the

prestige it would bring to denigrate Germany?s socialists and democrats were

all issues that would provide the support of the uneasy alliance. Where

nationalism had been the antagonist of dynastic feudalism, that is to say, for

social development, nationalism came to be turned upon the proletariat as a

weapon for social reaction.?? Kehr does

however seem to forget the rather important issue of forced export to colonies

that these exporters might have considered a rather important point.In foreign

policy terms, Germany faced two blocs in the nineteenth century.? The bourgeois ?business as usual? British

with their industry and the autocratic Russia?s grain producing power were the

opposite sides of the coin and neither were acceptable to the alliance.? However, despite these two contrasting

examples, German agrarian? conservatives

still believed that a Machstaat could base itself economically on

agriculture and reject the British model.?

The inability to pay an army in an agrarian society never really seemed

to occur to these most determined proponents of the Machtstaat.? The German conservatives, according to

Kehr, were not provoking the Anglo-German antagonism in the name of

intellectual values, ?heroes against shopkeepers,? but were defending their

socio-economic position against a more potent economic power even though it

would damage the nation as a whole.?

Once again, the Sammlungspolitik placed self-interest before the national

interest.? Hostility and anxiety regarding

the British were multiplied by the defeat of the Boers at Kimberley and the

Modder River ? a defeat for the agrarians apparently as big as Koeniggratz for

Napoleon to the mindset of the agrarians, who came to realise the power of the

British industrial machine. To compare Koeniggratz with these events is

something of an exaggeration by the revisionist. Taking action against the

potential of the British to race across the East Elbian grainfields, as their

industrial might apparently had in South Africa, the agrarians stopped opposing

the building of a fleet, the ultimate expression of fear of a naval island

nation off one?s seaboard. The fleet was backed by industry as a means of

beating off its English commercial rival: the fleet was a sustainable contract

for them even if war broke out.? This

was another piece of Sammlungspolitik. The fleet?s building required the

agrarians to drop their patriarchal outlook and anti-capitalist attacks on such

institutions as the stock exchange. It is highly

unlikely that the Transvaal, Sino-Japanese or Spanish-American wars were seen

as a portent to an age of conflict as claimed so much as a pretext for

preparing for war for class reasons.?

Given the Anglo-Russian conflicts in the Far East, Germany was in an era

of little threat and so the tariffs and the fleet policy can be viewed as they

should be ? as symptoms of domestic political struggles.? The Navy Laws

brought the only apparent foreign concern of the agrarians to bear.? Their realisation of the primacy of the

world economy, with its Russian Grain Mountains and American grain prairies ?

an economy unfavourable to the ramshackle inefficient East Elbian estates ? led

to attempts to shut off the national economy (which they could dominate) from

the outside.? This shows a subordination

of the national state to their interests, in that the economic effects of the

tariffs would be beneficial to them alone. Moreover, the proposed Tariff

legislation of 1902 was an expression of the Sammlungspolitik?s collaboration;

the tariffs were a trade-off for agrarian support in passing the Navy Laws. The industrial

bourgeoisie had no choice but to put up with the grain tariff, a supposed

preparation for the potential blockade during a period of no foreign policy

concerns, so indicating the power of these ruling classes over the indignant

ruled classes.? Despite a marked

decrease in living standards due to the tariffs, the public sentiment had no

outlet.. No matter

their dislike of the state, the conservatives needed to keep the English at

arm?s length.? Foreign policy, the fleet

and Weltpolitik were all means of preserving the Junker class.? On the other hand, the Baghdad Railway

scheme was a manifestation of an anti-Russian sentiment and so long as the

conservatives remained entrenched, there could be no choosing between either

the agrarian Russians or the dark, satanic mills of England, so forcing the two

parties to join forces.? The

Sammlungspolitik created a situation where the alliance of industry and

agriculture seconded all other classes of interest.? It was in the interests of ?iron and rye? that Kehr sees the

rejection of English attempts at conciliation and alliance, the building of the

fleet and the grain tolls.? These

personal interests governing foreign policy were social and economic, but never

once international. This is exemplified by the

German voluntary support of Britain?s blockade of Russia just after the

collapse of the talks between England and Germany.? The conflict of a state entirely reliant on its liberal industrialists,

yet run by its agrarians forced such an inconsistent action.? The blockade on Russian grain was

inconsistent with competition with England, yet it was followed through without

hesitation to protect the ruling classes.?

The protective tariff proposal, the Penitentiary Bill and the second

Naval Law were all policies, as valid, ethical and moderate as the Anglophobic

and Anti-Russian sentiments of the Sammlungspolitik. I would

generally agree with Kehr?s sentiment, but with the proviso that Kehr in his

revisionism is occasionally too radical.?

Although I would agree, in AJP Taylor?s words that ?patriotism is a

luxury that only those without private interests can afford?,? attributing too much significance to the

Sammlungspolitik and perhaps forgetting the crime listed in his essay Englandhass.? In his haste to condemn the diplomatic

historians, Kehr forgets them altogether.?

Moreover, in his haste to condemn the right, he forgets the

corroborative influence of the left.?

More surpringly, however, he forgets the importance of such blocs as the

Reichstag and the Imperial Court. Wilhelm II?s

appointment as Bismarck?s successor, Caprivi, actively sought alliance with

England, a policy favoured by the Social Democrats and, in his attempts to

further expand the army, he sought war on Russia. War seemed likely as part of

a liberal bloc with England, a war conducted with French cooperation.? The increase of military power was thus

welcomed by the left throughout the period as a means to destroying the Russian

autocracy.? Engels wrote ?Rise,

therefore, if Russia begins a war ? Rise against Russia and her allies, whoever

they may be!?? Bebel, the SPD leader,

said in the Reichstag in 1892 ?Present-day Social Democracy is a sort of

preparatory school of militarism.? The transfer

of influence to Caprivi?s marshalship saw tremendous skill in his handling of

the Centre Party (a pair of words one seldom sees used in Kehr?s work),but

through his wrangling, Prussian influence began shrinking in the Reichstag. The

populist Caprivi?s democratic leanings started to show through but he was

unable ?to satisfy Germany without displeasing the Emperor? as Eulenberg would

describe the trick of good Chancellorship, and his successor in 1894, Hohenlowe

took it upon himself to be a new Bismarck.?

Whereas Caprivi had believed in the importance of universal suffrage ?

the junior partner in Bismarck?s reign to the infuence private parties ? the

old order tried, without great success to reassert itself. The Reich wished to

return to its old ways, manipulating parties, states and the smaller states,

but the days of the Iron Chancellor were passed, especially after Caprivi?s

meddling.? Hohenlowe did this by copying

old Bismarckian tricks and policies.? No

more demagogy, no more encouragement of German Austrians and the bolstering of

authoritarian (even anti-German) aristocracy in Austria-Hungary.? There was no more support for the Habsburgs

in the Balkans, nor sympathy for the Poles.?

There was an end to conciliation with England.? Colonial ambitions resumed, and in 1895, the Kruger Telegram, a

poor imitation of the 1870 Ems Telegram, provoked open conflict with

England.? Weltpolitik was not

just an industrialist demand that would require Tirpitz?s fleet, nor just a

search for markets, but was also apparently important for the journalists,

writers and university professors who wanted to taste the successes of Sadowa

and Sedan.? The Prussian bureaucracy who

were still trying to reign Germany back to within Bismarckian limits was the

only brake on the new incautious nature of the government, swept along on a

tide of ambition.? According to AJP

Taylor, the timidity of the German middle class would inflict the punishment of

German ambition on the whole world. Wilhelm?s

assertion that Germany?s policy was one of ?Full steam ahead!? was a lie in so

many ways.? Not only were they intending

to return to Bismarckian politics, as opposed to pressing forwards, but they

were moving at great speed with no real direction. When he told Buelow to be

?his Bismarck,? the intention was to ?sell? the old order to the German

masses.? Buelow slipped and slithered

through, and became known as the ?Eel,? he himself joking that he was like hair

grease.? The result was Weltpolitik on

the cheap, led by the Chancellor, a figure almost forgotten by Kehr, and

encouraged by the Emperor, another cameo role in Kehr?s vision. It seems to me

that whilst Kehr lists valid reasons for supporting the Weltpolitik, and

explains why support for the Weltpolitik came from certain quarters, the

importance of the Reich?s leadership cannot be forgotten.? Miquel bought the Junkers for the Reich with

inflated grain prices.? The support of

the Junkers was thus tied to the Reich, and they were once more within the

Reich.? The Junkers did not demand the

higher prices, they were pre-empted and bought off with them.? Miquel?s financial policy, culminating in

the tariffs of 1902 remelded the old right and the Reich, whilst Tirpitz?s

building programme equally bought off the navy.? The navy, entirely useless either for defending colonies (as

their cruising range was sufficient only for use in the North Sea) or blockade

breaking, was purely a weapon of offence that could only be trained on Britain,

and so although I would accept that agrarian protection and a great navy were

two sides of a single bargain, in their inherent economic benefits and social

boons (such as the transformation of Marxist revolutionaries into modern trade

unions by the simple property of affluence). Kehr, whose suggestion for his own

epitaph was ?Yes, he was a Red, but he was a Man too?, forgets the role of the

new, moderate SPD in the growing anxiety in Europe.? The SPD?s doctrine of striking in the event of war led many to

believe that Germany would not be allowed to start a war of aggression and so

the only war that could be prepare for would be a war of self defence against

the unsocialist nations of Europe.?

Thus, Germany which was ?practically a Socialist country? had to strive

to win any victories possible in order to successfully export Socialism

abroad.? I believe that

A.J. P. Taylor?s assertion that Germany was too ?intoxicated? by their own

power to accept alliances to be too vague and I would not accept Kehr?s

argument of class interest, but instead look to England to discover? a marked lack of interest.? Salisbury certainly never showed any great

interest in any alliances with Germany and, so we must question whether the

English overtures to Germany were never intended to do more than to allow

England to seize any moral high ground.