International Defects, 1919-39 Essay, Research Paper

What Were the Main Defects of the International System between 1919 and 1939?

The year of 1919 was one of massive importance to the system of international affairs, a year in which the people of the world were unanimous in their commitment to avoiding another war. It was hoped that the notion of the Great War of 1914 to 1918 being the war to end all wars, could be proven true and such a tragedy would never be repeated. So what happened in the years of 1919 to 1939, years which we now refer to as the inter-war years to reverse such a universal feeling among the nations of the world?

A common view that people assume is one that blames the breakdown of an international system on the presence of great villain s on one side and of great fools on the other. A view that fails to acknowledge Humanum est errare: it is in the nature of humans to make mistakes, and when mistake are made on great issues, they become great mistakes. Such a view also fails to acknowledge the underlining complexities of the international situation between these years and the influence of domestic politics on such a situation. The defects in the international system mainly hinge around issues of political fragility in the post war settlement, the economic weaknesses of the major European powers in the 1920 s and the emerging ideological divisions that generated strong political and social tensions within and between countries on a world wide scale. All of which is set against a backdrop of, as Arnold Toynbec stated, the drive for industrialisation and the drive for democracy .

Democracy putting state s policy at the mercy of ignorance and emotion of the multitudes. Industrial drives heightening the effect of war and the perception of the ability to win wars in the eyes of the aggressors, after all with so much power at their disposal the chances of failing appear to become ever smaller.

The Paris peace conference was the proposed method for putting to bed the horrors of war and moving forwards into a new era of peace. However, the conference was naturally given a bad start, as war is an excellent instrument for establishing long lasting international hatred. When the peace conference opened the Germans expected there to be a peace based on justice to the victors and the vanquished alike; self determination of nationalities, or frontiers drawn in accordance with the wishes of populations; the acceptance of a covenant abolishing war, and the institution of a league of nations for the settlement of international disputes. This was in accordance with the idealistic views of the U.S president Wilson in accordance with his 14 points.

Germany obviously were expecting these points to be a grounds for fair treatment of the German people, and a set of useful ideas that the Germans could use to extract useful arguments for their own advantage. This was not a view shared by the victorious powers, especially France who were firm in their conviction that the treaty should, as far as is possible, permanently cripple Germany forever securing Frances safety from central European attack. When presented with the outline for peace the allies had were only prepared to deal if, for great Britain, the second of Wilson s points should be reformed (one relating to the freedom of the seas), and that a further point should be added which firmly leaves responsibility for the war with Germany. This point would later become a very contentious point, as it states that as Germany is responsible for the war it is also responsible for paying the damages caused to the allies by the war, in the form of reparations. Through colonel house, the British and the French were able to get assurances that many of the other points could be reinterpreted to fit the needs of the respective countries. A point highlighted by the statement of Harold Nicolson (involved with the drawing up of many of the treaties) saying, the treaties were violated in subsequent agreements on no less than 19 of the 23 points, principles and particulars. All of which were never presented to the German government, a government not even allowed to take part in any discussions, a policy that had never before been adopted. It is perhaps possible to assume that if a German government were allowed into such discussions they would only to quickly have pointed out the paradox between these treaties and the 14 points. The German government was then excluded from the league, along with all of the other defeated states.

The results of the treaty with Germany, signed at Versailles on June 28 1919, were to greatly limit the military capability of the German army, navy and air force. The acceptance of the need for Germany to pay for the damage caused to the allies, through reparations, and the denial to Germany of the right of national self-determination. This was a price paid by all of the defeated powers (Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary) some paying substantially higher than Germany, but I shall focus on Germany due to its role in the collapse of the international system.

The city of Danzig was subsequently set up as a free state under the supervision of the League of Nations, the province of Alsace-lorraine was returned to France and there was a cession of areas with Polish populations- notably Pozn n, creating what became known as the Polish Corridor. This deal separated the main body of Germany from East Prussia. There were further territories lost through the use of plebiscites, mainly that of Upper Silesia (rich coal mines), and the relinquishment of all of its colonies, resulting in the loss of approximately 13% of its pre-war territories.

There are two schools of thought on the problem of dealing with Germany through the treaties, the main view of the predominantly English speaking contingent of the allies was that the treaty was to harsh on the Germans. A view fiercely opposed to that of Clemenceau and France, who felt that the treaty didn t go far enough in hurting Germany who pointed out the enforcement of sanctions already imposed were not happening. Although full enforcement would involve the occupation of Germany and in effect resuming war, going against the fundamental principles of the League.

Thus it can be said that the treaty of Versailles inflicted too much insult and too little injury on Germany.

Why were such discrepancies in the treaties accepted, especially by Wilson? One answer may lie in the fact that Wilson may have excepted that these treaties were bound to be bad. However, if the League of Nations could be established as laid out in the 14 points, it would act as a vehicle for the future renegotiations of the treaties flaws, and so sacrificed many of the principles that formed the bases of the peace talks for the formation of the league. The League of Nations was a change in the international system compared to previous balance of power tactics of keeping a stable world order. It was a worldwide scheme, hoping to bring security though collective power on a worldwide scale. The project was headed by Wilson, who had given a moral justification for the allies during the war by stating that they were fighting for the establishment of a New World order. The league was fatally floored from its start as during the conception of the league Wilson was limited by domestic politics, in particular the senate. He limited the league to only a lose framework, writing in March 1918, the administrative constitution of the league must grow and not be made. We must begin with solemn covenants, covering mutual guaranties of political interdependence and territorial integrity K. Any attempt to begin by putting executive authority into the hands of a group of powers would be to sow a harvest of jealousy and mistrust, which would spring up and choke the whole thing. The United States Senate would never ratify such a treaty. The people of the United States and more importantly the Senate could not be sold on the idea of the league, and on its formation it did not include as one of its members, the United States. This was a major blow to the League as the U.S was the most powerful country in the world and in the view of Europe, the most impartial. The League also failed to include the ex enemy states, including Germany, and the new Bolshevik government of Russia who were natural enemies of such an organisation.

The reasons for the failure of the league can not be simply attributed to the non-participation of many of the most important states, but also on the failure in the design of the covenant, which made it impossible. The method applied in the covenant made it impossible to take action without a unanimous decision by all of the members (except an offending member) and such unanimity was seldom achieved. This is perhaps a reflection of the political ideas of the time, with every state firmly committed to their own interests, unwilling to give up any measure of sovereignty.

The new settlements were plagued by the German disgust at the situation. The German people remained unwilling to uphold any of the sanctions imposed, as they saw the treaties as unfair and illegitimate. The Social democratic party, who shouldered the responsibility for the settlement or peace diktat, made some attempts to for fill Germans obligations and as a result lost electoral support. The right wing of the German political system then came into power for the remainder of the 1920 s and made no secret of their aim to overturn the Versailles treaty. The army was busy making deals with the Bolsheviks to retain as much of their military hardware as possible, and the industrialists of the Ruhr refused to hand France the required quotas of coal and coke. Although Streseman did go some way to for fill some of the parts of the treaty, its was done as a conscious effort to try to secure a more rapid reversal of the terms of the treaty. This was a time in which the nationalistic tendencies of the Germans were growing, and the government had to incorporate this growth to keep electoral support.

The German problem loomed large in the minds of the French, who were not prepared to see her sacrifices to have been for nothing, and looked for a way to contain the Germans from within the Versailles treaty. The French received no support from the increasingly isolationist U.S. The Italians were experiencing large-scale social and industrial changes, and giving birth to the fascist revolution headed by Mussolini. They were also angry about the minor rewards given to them at the peace conference.

The Japanese were in a far to remote position in relation to European issues, and also preoccupied with its own expansion in China. Russia was economically weak and politically unstable after revolution, with large ideological differences to Europe and no boarders with Germany. They also shared a vested interest with Germany with regards to Eastern Europe and consolidated their relationship with the treaty of Rapallo (1922) and a further treaty in 1926. The newly formed states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia contained massive political and territorial differences preventing them from forming a strong and coherent political unit or bloc, and so would be totally unable to offer resistance against any German, or Russian resurgence. This was a fact that left the French understandably very uneasy. France then looked to Britain,