Failure Of Chartism Essay, Research Paper

History Essay

Why, by 1846, were the Chartists unable to convince parliament for the need for reform whereas the Anti-Corn Law League were able to do so.

The failure of Chartism can largely be blamed on the lack of strength of the movement, inherent weaknesses, dependency on economic depression and poor leadership. Using the experiences of Chartism the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League were able to build a stronger movement, eradicating many of the problems that had hindered the Chartists.

One main advantage that was almost immediately bestowed upon the Anti-Corn Law League was the support of the government opposition. This clearly worried the government, with growing public support for the opposition providing a large problem with only one immediate solution. It was this growing pressure that encouraged (forced?) Peel (Prime Minister at the time) to revoke the Anti-Corn Laws. That is not to say that there wasn t large public support for the Chartist movement, however, the Anti-Corn Law League had parliamentary allies, whereas the chartists did not. With little parliamentary backing or solid middle-class support, the movement found itself either having to give up or opt for peaceful methods. This divided both the leadership and rank and file, creating dissension and a lack of tactical direction. The lack of tactical direction and unity of purpose is one of the key factors in the failure of the Chartists and the success of the Anti-Corn Law League. The aims of the Anti-Corn Law League were to abolish the law: to remove tariffs on foreign corn, a single aim as opposed to the multiple and sometimes individual aims of the Chartist movement.

The Anti-Corn Law League s continuous use of their parliamentary backing can also be seen as a key factor in their success. This was in contrast to Chartism, who were decimated psychologically by the authorities (widespread imprisonment and transportation of leaders rank and file, and the successful confrontation of mass demonstrations). The Anti-Corn Law League had the support of Villiers, a radical MP in the commons. They regularly challenged MP s to debates, and employed standard pressure group tactics such as missionary lecture talks, meetings and rallies; publication of sympathetic journals and parliamentary petitions; and the audacious but ultimately useful standings of supporters in local by-elections. It was the Anti-Corn Law League s single aim that enabled to co-ordinate their ideas and actions more effectively. With a lack of unity on the ranks of the Chartists, and a lack of a united frontal cause, the actions that the chartists employed could never be effective enough to win the support of parliament and the middle class, and therefore not enough to worry (or convince) the government enough to take action.

Lack of administrative experience and imagination was clearly a problem that hindered Chartism. However, the case was very different for the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League. The administrative talents of George Wilson, the president of the league, and the orating and directing qualities of Richard Cobden and John Bright, ensured a much more united and therefore stronger leadership than Lovett and O Brien (amongst others) had ever presented (the animosity between the different leaders, especially Lovett and O Brien is well documented)

Both movements had large economical basis, however, the Anti-Corn Law League had the distinct advantage of not having to rely on a fluctuating trade cycle. It can be clearly seen that the vibrant Chartism of 1838-40, 1842 and 1848 corresponded with downturn in the economy. Once the economy revived, support for the movement ebbed away and Chartist unity was seriously compromised.

The economic basis for the Anti-Corm law movement was far more stable. Agitation was present throughout the 1820s but it was when food prices rose in the 30s that opposition was more prominent. Manufacturers were made less competitive abroad by high labour costs, and workmen wanted higher wages to spend on food rather than manufactured goods. Foreigners were able to export less grain in Britain than they would have likes, they earned less and consequently had less to spend on imported British manufactured goods. This increased unemployment and bankruptcy.

The increased unemployment and bankruptcy was a key factor, especially as this was recognised by the government and was also supported by the middle-class etc who also did not want to suffer. The fact that Chartism really had no bearing on those in power meant that it would never gain sufficient influential support that it needed in order to convince parliament and bring about change.

The then devastating harvest of corn in 1846, which was preceded by the 1845-6 Irish Potato famine and left one million starving provided huge weight and support for the Anti-Corn Law League s demands. The chartist movement never experienced something so monumental and supportive to their cause, they were merely supported when times were bad, yet a crisis like this had to encourage the government to act in accordance with the public demand, or else they could have had something much worse than a well supported movement on their hands.

In conclusion the Anti-Corn Law League appeared to posses all the advantages of a pressure group which the Chartists lacked. It represented the interests of the urban middle class whose influence the Whigs had recognised in 1832; the Chartists represented those who had been deliberately excluded from the franchise. The league s campaigns, drawing on commercial wealth, did not lack finance; the Chartists lived hand to mouth. The League advocated in free trade an objective for which many MP s had considerable sympathy and one with an impeccable intellectual pedigree. Most importantly of all however its objective was precise and limited, where as Chartism had precise objectives but their implications were unconsidered and limitless. It was this united goal that enabled the Anti-Corn Law League to conduct their campaign with far greater strength and ascertain far greater support than the dis-unified, poorly led Chartist movement. This convincing unity, and the undoubted strength of their claim following the disasters of 1845-6, was far more than the chartist could ever lay claim to, and can therefore be said to be the main reason for the success of the Anti-Corn Law League, the changes parliament made, and the relative failure of the Chartist movement.

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