Political Control Of Civil Service Essay, Research Paper

The principle mechanism of political control of the Civil Service is the convention of individual ministerial responsibility. The convention relies heavily on the notion that the minister is responsible to Parliament for the actions of his department and is expected to give accounts to Parliament of matters relating to his department. The convention is designed to create accountability of ministers to Parliament and to safeguard Civil Servants from blame. In practice some parts of this convention have become diluted and politicized, where ministers are reluctant to take full responsibility for policy errors. An example of this is the Derek Lewis affair and Norman Lamont who presided over the collapse of Britain´s ERM policy in 1992 and had to be sacked by John Major. The development of the ‘next step agencies´ led to a diminishing of responsibility between, ministers who are responsible for strategic planning and chief executive who have responsibility for operational matters, for example Derek Lewis and prison agencies It is obvious that Ministers cannot have in depth knowledge of the running of their department and may not have the specialist knowledge required to address issues on a detailed basis. It has been stated that Ministers have knowledge of just over 1% of all administration decision and tend to only get involved in major policy decisions. It is therefore difficult to know how they can be logically held responsible and yet the public perspective is that they are accountable for not only all decisions which arise from their departments, but also for the processes involved in implementing decisions. Circumstances make a difference on how the individual reacts. A minister who should resign might be protected by his cabinet colleagues, not to de-stabalise government but in other circumstances. EG – Norman Lamont – when forced out of ERM should have resigned but didn´t for two reasons. Number 1, he didn´t want to and 2, his cabinet didn´t want him to, as they wanted to try and portray a unity, a stronger Prime Minster would have forced him out. At other times government might make a political gesture and find a scapegoat as Leon Britton over the Westland affair Permanence and expertise gives the civil servants a source of influence over the minister. Ministers are in a department on average far less a time period than their civil servants. The BBC documentary on the DSS under Peter Lilley in 1997 showed how dependent Peter Lilley was on his top civil servants, and both Tony Benn and Richard Crossman in their biographies, criticized the civil servants for obstructionist attitudes based on ‘we know best’. When Thatcher came to power she was aware that there would be a reluctance from the Civil Servants to implement radical policy – she was anxious to exert political control over the Civil Service. This mirrored the leadership style that had carried her though government. Before the 1997 election, the question was raised of Labour being able to work with the civil servants after 18 years of Conservative control; this was because almost all of the top positions had been filled by Mrs Thatcher. This is not to say they were politically biased, but it was felt that they had become so used to the way of thinking of the former administration. Mrs Thatcher is said to have a preference for ‘can do´ people in top civil service jobs and is reputed to have asked the cabinet secretary when approving top appointments if the candidate was ‘one of us´. The premature dismissal of cabinet secretary Ian Bancroft soon after she came into power questioned the notion on neutrality. Opponents argue he didn´t support her policies enough and so she felt she could not rely on him. The relationship between ministers and civil servants between the period of 1990 and 1997 was not a relationship between equals, as ministers were perceived to be in charge. Political commentators saw the Civil Service as being weak and of lacking impartiality. However ministers were not all powerful as they did not have the time or specialist knowledge to know all the details. It was really civil servants who did all the work under the minimal guidance of the minister. Civil servants were then able to exercise some control over the policy making process. Tony Blair has increased his control over the civil service and the Whitehall system through a number of developments. He issued greater powers to the Number 10 press office. Most press officers in individual departments were moved to other posts and replaced by those considered better at handling the media. Ministerial releases now have to be cleared by the number 10 press office. Blair has introduced more political appointments. It has been suggested that he has established a ‘command premiership´ at the heart of the government, controlling policy making and strategy across Whitehall departments at the expense of cabinet. Peter Mandelson was given the job of coordinating policy developments and this role has been taken over by Jack Cunningham. Alistair Campbell and Jonathon Powell were given the unofficial portfolio for eliminating bottlenecks in information and decision making. Blair has also decided to introduce outsiders to ministerial posts and government task forces to review policy ‘task forces´. The increased number of political advisors brought in from outside, dilutes the relationship between ministers and Parliament as they are not accountable to Parliament. Recently Tony Blair has suggested that he wants the civil service to be more pro-active in policy making, but the general position of his government has been to downgrade further their role in that area. It can be argued that political control of the Civil Service has fluctuated over the last thirty years. Before 1979, many commentators complained that the civil service had its own policy goals and were able to manipulate ministers into taking a certain direction. By 1997, however, the relationship between ministers and civil servants had changed, and is continuing to change.