Role Of The Emperor In Meiji Japan Essay, Research Paper

Role of The Emperor in Meiji Japan

Japan is a society whose culture is steeped in the traditions

and symbols of the past: Mt. Fuji, the tea ceremony, and the sacred

objects of nature revered in Shintoism. Two of the most important

traditions and symbols in Japan; the Emperor and Confucianism have

endured through Shogunates, restorations of imperial rule, and up to

present day. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration used these

traditions to gain control over Japan and further their goals of

modernization. The Meiji leaders used the symbolism of the Emperor to

add legitimacy to their government, by claiming that they were ruling

under the “Imperial Will.” They also used Confucianism to maintain

order and force the Japanese people to passively accept their rule.

Japanese rulers historically have used the symbolism of the

Imperial Institution to justify their rule. The symbolism of the

Japanese Emperor is very powerful and is wrapped up in a mix of

religion (Shintoism) and myths. According to Shintoism the current

Emperor is the direct descendent of the Sun Goddess who formed the

islands of Japan out of the Ocean in ancient times.Footnote1 According

to these myths the Japanese Emperor unlike a King is a living

descendent of the Gods and even today he is thought of as the High

Priest of Shinto. Despite the powerful myths surrounding Japan’s

imperial institution the Emperor has enjoyed only figure head status

from 1176 on. At some points during this time the Emperor was reduced

to selling calligraphy on the streets of Kyoto to support the imperial

household, but usually the Emperor received money based on the

kindness of the Shogunate.Footnote2 But despite this obvious power

imbalance even the Tokugawa Shogun was at least symbolically below the

Emperor in status and he claimed to rule so he could carry out the

Imperial rule.Footnote3

Within this historical context the Meiji leaders realized

that they needed to harness the concept of the Imperial Will in

order to govern effectively. In the years leading up to 1868 members

of the Satsuma and Choshu clans were part of the imperialist

opposition. This opposition claimed that the only way that Japan could

survive the encroachment of the foreigners was to rally around the

Emperor.Footnote4 The Imperialists, claimed that the Tokugawa

Shogunate had lost its imperial mandate to carry out the Imperial Will

because it had capitulated to Western powers by allowing them to open

up Japan to trade. During this time the ideas of the imperialists

gained increasing support among Japanese citizens and intellectuals

who taught at newly established schools and wrote revisionist history

books that claimed that historically the Emperor had been the

ruler of Japan.Footnote5 The fact that the Tokugawa’s policy of

opening up Japan to the western world ran counter to the beliefs of

the Emperor and was unpopular with the public made the Tokugawa

vulnerable to attack from the imperialists. The imperialists pressed

their attack both militarily and from within the Court of Kyoto. The

great military regime of Edo which until recently had been all

powerful was floundering not because of military weakness, or because

the machinery of government had broken but instead because the

Japanese public and the Shoguns supporters felt they had lost the

Imperial Will.Footnote6

The end of the Tokugawa regime shows the power of the

symbolism and myths surrounding the imperial institution. The

head of the Tokugawa clan died in 1867 and was replaced by the son of

a lord who was a champion of Japanese historical studies and who

agreed with the imperialists claims about restoring the Emperor.

Footnote7 So in 1868 the new shogun handed over all his power to the

Emperor in Kyoto. Shortly after handing over power to the Emperor, the

Emperor Komeo died and was replaced by his son who became the Meiji

Emperor.Footnote8 Because the Meiji Emperor was only 15 all the power

of the new restored Emperor fell not in his hands but instead in the

hands of his close advisors. These advisers such as Prince

Saionji, Prince Konroe, and members of the Satsuma and Choshu clans

who had been members of the imperialist movement eventually wound up

involving into the Meiji Bureaucracy and Genro of the Meiji

Era.Footnote9 Once in control of the government the Meiji Leaders and

advisors to the Emperor reversed their policy of hostility to

Foreigners.Footnote10 They did this because after Emperor Komeo (who

was strongly opposed to contact with the west) died in 1867 the Meiji

Emperor’s advisors were no longer bound by his Imperial Will. Being

anti-western also no longer served the purposes of the Meiji advisors.

Originally it was a tool of the imperialist movement that was used to

show that the Shogun was not acting out the Imperial Will. Now that

the Shogun and Komeo Emperor were dead there was no longer a reason to

take on anti-foreign policies.

The choice of the imperial thrown by the imperialists as a

point for Japan to rally around could not have been more wise.

Although the imperial institution had no real power it had universal

appeal to the Japanese public. It was both a mythic and religious idea

in their minds.Footnote11 It provided the Japanese in this time of

chaos after coming in contact with foreigners a belief in stability

(according to Japanese myth the imperial line is a unbroken lineage

handed down since time immortal), and it provided a belief in the

natural superiority of Japanese culture.Footnote12 The symbolism of

the Emperor helped ensure the success of the restorationists because

it undercut the legitimacy of the Shogunate’s rule, and it

strengthened the Meiji rulers who claimed to act for the Emperor.

What is a great paradox about the Imperialist’s claims to

restore the power of the Emperor is that the Meiji rulers did not

restore the Emperor to power except symbolically because he was both

too young and his advisors to power hungry.Footnote13 By 1869 the

relationship between the Emperor and his Meiji bureaucracy and the

Emperor and the Tokugawa Shogun before the restoration were very

similar. Both the Meiji Bureaucrats and the Shogun ruled under the

authority of the Emperor but did not let the Emperor make any

decisions. In Japan the Emperor reigned but did not rule. This

was useful for the new Meiji bureaucrats, it kept the Emperor a mythic

and powerful symbol.Footnote14

The traditions and symbols of Confucianism and the Imperial

Institution were already deeply ingrained in the psyche of

the Japanese but the new Meiji rulers through both an education

system, and the structure of the Japanese government were able to

effectively inculcate these traditions into a new generation of

Japanese. The education system the Meiji Oligarchy founded transformed

itself into a system that indoctrinated students in the ideas of

Confucianism and reverence for the Emperor.Footnote15 After the death

of Okubo in 1878; Ito, Okuma, and Iwakura emerged as the three most

powerful figures among the young bureaucrats that were running the

government in the name of the Meiji Emperor. Iwakura one of the only

figures in the ancient nobility to gain prominence among the Meiji

oligarchy allied with Ito who feared Okuma’s progressive ideas would

destroy Japan’s culture.Footnote16 Iwakura it is thought was able

manipulate the young Emperor to grow concerned about the need to

strengthen traditional morals. Thus in 1882 the Emperor issued the

Yogaku Koyo, the forerunner of the Imperial Rescript on

Education.Footnote17 This document put the emphasis of the Japanese

education system on a moral education from 1882 onward.

Previous to 1880 the Japanese education system was modeled on

that of the French education system. After 1880 the Japanese briefly

modeled their education system on the American system.Footnote18

However, starting with the Yogaku Koyo in 1882 and ending with the

1885 reorganization of the department of Education along Prussian

lines the American model was abolished. The new education minister

Mori Arinori after returning from Europe in 1885 with Ito was

convinced that the Japanese education system had to have a spiritual

foundation to it.Footnote19 In Prussia Arinori saw that foundation to

be Christianity and he decreed that in Japan the Education system was

to be based on reverence for the Imperial Institution. A picture of

the Emperor was placed in every classroom, children read about the

myths surrounding the Emperor in school, and they learned that the

Emperor was the head of the giant family of Japan.Footnote20 By the

time the Imperial Rescript on Education was decreed by the Emperor in

1889 the Japanese education system had already begun to transform

itself into a system that did not teach how to think but instead what

to think. The Imperial Rescript on Education in 1889 was according to

Japanese scholars such as Hugh Borton , “the nerve axis of the new

order.”Footnote21 Burton believes that the Imperial Rescript on

Education signaled the rise of nationalistic elements in Japan. The

Imperial Rescript on Education was the culmination of this whole

movement to the right. The Rescript emphasized loyalty and filial

piety, respect for the constitution and readiness to serve the

government. It also exalted the Emperor as the coeval between heaven

and earth.Footnote22

The Constitution of 1889 like the changes in the education

system helped strengthen reverence for the Imperial Institution.

The 1889 constitution was really the second document of its kind

passed in Japan the first being the Imperial Oath of 1868 in which the

Emperor laid out the structure and who was to head the new Meiji

government.Footnote23 This Imperial Oath was refereed to as a

constitution at the time but it only very vaguely laid out the

structure of government. The constitution promulgated by the Emperor

in 1889 did much more then lay out the structure of Japanese

government it also affirmed that the Emperor was the supreme sovereign

over Japan.Footnote24 The signing ceremony itself was an auspicious

event on the way to it Mori Arinori one of the moderate leaders of the

Meiji government was attacked and killed by a crazed rightist.

Footnote25 The ceremony itself evoked both the past and present and

was symbolic of the Meiji governments shift toward the right and the

governments use of the Emperor as supreme ruler. Before signing the

document Emperor Meiji prayed at the palace sanctuary to uphold the

name of his imperial ancestors he then signed the constitution which

affirmed the sanctity of the Emperor’s title (Tenno Taiken), and his

right to make or abrogate any law.Footnote26 The constitution also set

up a bicameral legislature.Footnote27 The constitution codified the

power of the Emperor and helped the Meiji oligarchy justify their rule

because they could point to the constitution and say that they were

carrying out the will of the Emperor. The Meiji Emperor even after the

Constitution of 1889 enjoyed little real power. The Meiji Emperor did

not even come to cabinet meetings because his advisors told him if the

cabinet made a decision that was different then the one he wanted then

that would create dissension and would destroy the idea of the

Imperial Institution. So even after the Meiji Constitution the Emperor

was still predominantly a symbol.Footnote28 The Constitution ingrained

in Japanese society the idea that the government was being run by

higher forces who new better then the Japanese people, it also

broadened the base of support of the Meiji Rulers who now had a

document too prove they were acting on Imperial Will and their

decisions were imperial decisions not those of mere mortals.Footnote29

The symbolism of the Emperor and use of Confucianism allowed

the Meiji rulers to achieve their goals. One of their goals was the

abolishment of the system of fiefs and return of all land to the

Emperor. At first the new Meiji Rulers allied themselves with the

Daimyo clans in opposition to the Tokugawa Shogun. But once the Meiji

leaders had gained a control they saw that they would need to abolish

the fief system and concentrate power in the hands of a central

government. The Meiji rulers achieved their goals by having the

Choshu, Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen clans give up their lands, granting

the Daimyos large pensions if they gave up their clans, and by having

the Emperor issue two decrees in July 1869, and August 1871.Footnote30

The role and symbolism of the Emperor although not the sole factor in

influencing the Daimyo to give up their fiefs, was vital. The Meiji

Oligarchs said that not turning in the fiefs to the Emperor would be

disloyal and pointed to the historical record which Meiji scholars

claimed showed that historically all fiefs were the property of the

Emperor.Footnote31 They showed this by claiming that the Shogun would

switch the rulers of fiefs and this proved that the Daimyos did not

control the title to their land but merely held it for the Emperor.

Imperial decrees and slogans of loyalty to the Emperor also

accompanied the abolishment of the Samurai system.Footnote32 In the

abolishment of both these feudal systems the symbolism of the Emperor

as both the director of the initiative and recipient of the authority

afterwards played a vital role in ensuring there success.Footnote33

The abolishment of fiefs and the samurai class were essential

for the stability and industrialization of Japan.Footnote34 Without

the concentration of land and power in the hands of the Meiji

oligarchs and the Emperor the Meiji oligarchs feared they would

receive opposition from powerful Daimyos and never gain control and

authority over all of Japan. Historical examples bear out the fears of

the Meiji Oligarchy; in 1467 the Ashikaga Shogun failed to control

many of the fiefs and because of this a civil war raged in

Japan.Footnote35 The centralization of power allowed the Meiji

government to have taxing authority over all of Japan and pursue

national projects.Footnote36 The unity of Japan also allowed the Meiji

Oligarchs to focus on national and not local issues.

The use of Confucianism and the Emperor also brought a degree

of stability to Japan during the tumultuous Meiji years. The Emperor’s

mere presence on a train or in western clothes were enough to convince

the public of the safety or goodness of the Meiji oligarchy’s

industrial policy. In one famous instance the Japanese Emperor

appeared in a train car and after that riding trains became a common

place activity in Japan. The behavior of the Imperial family was also

critical to adoption of western cultural practices. Before 1873 most

Japanese women of a high social position would shave their eyebrows

and blacken their teeth to appear beautiful. But on March 3rd 1873 the

Empress appeared in public wearing her own eyebrows and with

unblackened teeth. Following that day most women in Tokyo and around

Japan stopped shaving their eyebrows and blackening their

teeth.Footnote37 The Imperial institution provided both a key tool to

change Japanese culture and feelings about industrialization and it

provided stability to Japan which was critical to allowing

industrialists to invest in factories and increase exports and

production.Footnote38

The symbols and the traditions the Meiji leaders inculcated

Japanese society with helped the Meiji government maintain stability

and pursue its economic policies but it also had severe limitations

that limited the revolutionary scope of the Japanese government and

helped bring about the downfall of the Meiji era. The use of

Confucianism and the Emperor to bolster the Imperial restoration laid

the foundation for a paradox of state affairs. The system that sought

to strengthen Japan through the use of modern technology and modern

organization methods was using traditional values to further its

goals.Footnote39 This caused some to turn toward the west for the

“enlightenment” the Meiji era promised this was the case with Okuma

who was eventually forced out of the increasing nationalist

Genro.Footnote40 For others it lead them to severe nationalism

rejecting all that was western. This was such the case of Saigo who

believed till his death on his own sword that the Meiji leaders were

hypocritical and were violating the Imperial Will by negotiating and

trading with the west.Footnote41 The Meiji government used the same

symbols and traditions that the Tokugawa used and like the Tokugawa

gave the Emperor no decision making power. The Meiji Emperor although

he had supreme power as accorded in the constitution never actually

made decisions but was instead a pawn of the Meiji Genro who claimed

to carry out his Imperial Will. This Imperial Will they decided for

themselves. Like the Shogunate the Meiji governments claim to rule for

the Emperor was fraught with problems. The Imperial Will was a fluid

idea that could be adopted by different parties under changing

circumstances. And just like the Meiji rulers were able to topple the

Shogun by claiming successfully that they were the true administrators

of the Imperial Will; the militarist elements in the 1930’s were able

to topple the democratic elements of Japan partially by claiming the

mantle of ruling for the Emperor.Footnote42 From this perspective the

Meiji Oligarchs building up of the Imperial Myth was a fatal flaw in

the government. The constitution which says in article I, “The empire

of Japan shall be governed over by a line of Emperors unbroken for

ages eternal” gave to whoever was acting on the Imperial Will absolute

right to govern.Footnote43

The symbols of the Emperor and the tradition of Confucianism

did not end with the end of the Meiji era or world war two. Today the

idea of filial piety is still strong, multiple generations of a family

still usually live together even in cramped Japanese housing. The

religion of Shinto that the Meiji leaders rejuvenated during their

rule in order to help foster the imperial cult is still thriving as

the thousands of Tori gates and Shrines around Japan attest.Footnote44

But the most striking symbol to survive is that of the Emperor

stripped after world war two of all power the Emperor of Japan is

still revered. During the illness of Emperor Showa in 1989 every

national newspaper and television show was full of reports related to

the Emperor’s health. During the six months the Showa Emperor was sick

before he died all parades and public events were canceled in respect

for the Emperor. Outside the gates of the Imperial palace in Tokyo

long tables were set up where people lined up to sign cards to wish

the Emperor a speedy recovery. The news media even kept the type of

illness the emperor had a secret in deference to the Emperor. At his

death after months of illness it was as if the Imperial Cult of the

Meiji era had returned. Everything in Japan closed down , private

television stations went as far as to not air any commercials on the

day of his death. And now almost six years after his death more then

four hundred and fifty thousand people trek annually to the isolated

grave site of Emperor Showa.Footnote45

The traditions and symbolism of Confucianism and the Emperor

were critical to the Meiji oligarchs gaining control of power and

goals of industrialization. The oligarchy inculcated the Japanese

public with these traditional values through an education system that

stressed moral learning, and through a constitution that established

the law of Japan to be that of the Imperial Will. The values of

Confucianism and symbol of the Emperor allowed the Meiji government to

peaceful gain control of Japan by appealing to history and the

restoration of the Emperor. But the Meiji oligarchs never restored the

Emperor to a position of real political power. Instead he was used as

a tool by the oligarchs to achieve their modernization plans in Japan

such as the abolishment of fiefs, the end of the samurai, the

propagation of new cultural practices, and pubic acceptance of the

Meiji oligarchs industrialization policies. The symbols and traditions

of Japan’s past are an enduring legacy that have manifested themselves

in the Meiji Restoration and today in Japans continued reverence for

the Emperor.

—

Footnote1

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 47.

Footnote2

Takatsu Kuwasaburo, The History of The Empire of Japan (Tokyo: Dai

Nippon Tosho Kabushiki Kwaisha, 1893) 206.

Footnote3

Ibid., 17.

Footnote4

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987) 112.

Footnote5

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

32.

Footnote6

Shusuke Sato, Some Historical Phases of Modern Japan (New York: Japan

Society, 1916) 4.

Footnote7

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

44.

Footnote8

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph (London: Purnell and Sons,

1971) 8.

Footnote9

David Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1974) 55

Footnote10

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 73.

Footnote11

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 142.

Footnote12

Ibid., 35.

Footnote13

Stephen Large, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989) 27.

Footnote14

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

70.

Footnote15

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 116.

Footnote16

Ernest Best, Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis the Japanese Case

(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966) 108.

Footnote17

Ibid., 105.

Footnote18

Ibid., 106.

Footnote19

Ibid., 106.

Footnote20

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 117.

Footnote21

Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press, 1955)

524.

Footnote22

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 118.

Footnote23

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

69.

Footnote24

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 60.

Footnote25

Ian Nish, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London: Suntory-Toyota

International Centre, 1989) 9.

Footnote26

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

193.

Footnote27

Ibid., 192.

Footnote28

Stephen Large, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989) 27.

Footnote29

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 89.

Footnote30

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

77.

Footnote31

Ibid., 78.

Footnote32

Ibid., 77.

Footnote33

Ibid., 83.

Footnote34

Ibid., 82.

Footnote35

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987) 66.

Footnote36

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 117.

Footnote37

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph (London: Purnell and Sons,

1971) 41.

Footnote38

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 84.

Footnote39

Ibid., 119.

Footnote40

Ibid., 88.

Footnote41

Ibid., 94-95.

Footnote42

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987) 166.

Footnote43

Ibid., 167.

Footnote44

Ibid., 13.

Footnote45

Stephen Large, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989) 20.

Bibliography

Footnote1

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 47.

Footnote2

Takatsu Kuwasaburo, The History of The Empire of Japan (Tokyo: Dai

Nippon Tosho Kabushiki Kwaisha, 1893) 206.

Footnote3

Ibid., 17.

Footnote4

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987) 112.

Footnote5

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

32.

Footnote6

Shusuke Sato, Some Historical Phases of Modern Japan (New York: Japan

Society, 1916) 4.

Footnote7

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

44.

Footnote8

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph (London: Purnell and Sons,

1971) 8.

Footnote9

David Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1974) 55

Footnote10

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 73.

Footnote11

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 142.

Footnote12

Ibid., 35.

Footnote13

Stephen Large, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989) 27.

Footnote14

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

70.

Footnote15

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 116.

Footnote16

Ernest Best, Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis the Japanese Case

(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966) 108.

Footnote17

Ibid., 105.

Footnote18

Ibid., 106.

Footnote19

Ibid., 106.

Footnote20

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 117.

Footnote21

Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press, 1955)

524.

Footnote22

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 118.

Footnote23

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

69.

Footnote24

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 60.

Footnote25

Ian Nish, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London: Suntory-Toyota

International Centre, 1989) 9.

Footnote26

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

193.

Footnote27

Ibid., 192.

Footnote28

Stephen Large, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989) 27.

Footnote29

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

(Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921) 89.

Footnote30

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916)

77.

Footnote31

Ibid., 78.

Footnote32

Ibid., 77.

Footnote33

Ibid., 83.

Footnote34

Ibid., 82.

Footnote35

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987) 66.

Footnote36

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 117.

Footnote37

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph (London: Purnell and Sons,

1971) 41.

Footnote38

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976) 84.

Footnote39

Ibid., 119.

Footnote40

Ibid., 88.

Footnote41

Ibid., 94-95.

Footnote42

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987) 166.

Footnote43

Ibid., 167.

Footnote44

Ibid., 13.

Footnote45

Stephen Large, The Japanese Constitutional of 1889 (London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989) 20.