Heideggers Conceptual Essences: Being And The Nothing, Humanism, And Technology Essay, Research Paper

Heideggers Conceptual Essences:

Being and the Nothing, Humanism, and Technology

Being and the Nothing are the same.

The ancient philosopher Lao-tzu believed that the world

entertains no separations and that opposites do not actually

exist. His grounding for this seemingly preposterous proposition

lies in the fact that because alleged opposites depend on one

another and their definitions rely on their differences, they

cannot possibly exist without each other. Therefore, they are

not actually opposites. The simple and uncomplex natured

reasoning behind this outrageous statement is useful when trying

to understand and describe Martin Heideggers deeply leveled

philosophy of Being and the nothing. Lao-tzus uncomplicated

rationale used in stating that supposed opposites create each

other, so cannot be opposite, is not unlike Heideggers

description of the similarity between the opposites Being and the

nothing.

Unlike Lao-tzu, Heidegger does not claim that no opposites

exist. He does however say that two obviously opposite concepts

are the same, and in this way, the two philosophies are similar.

He believes that the separation of beings from Being creates the

nothing between them. Without the nothing, Being would cease to

be. If there were not the nothing, there could not be

anything, because this separation between beings and Being is

necessary.

Heidegger even goes so far as to say that Being itself

actually becomes the nothing via its essential finity. This

statement implies a synonymity between the relation of life to

death and the relation of Being to nothingness. To Heidegger,

the only end is death. It is completely absolute, so it is a

gateway into the nothing. This proposition makes Being and the

nothing the two halves of the whole. Both of their roles are

equally important and necessary in the cycle of life and death.

Each individual life inevitably ends in death, but without this

death, Life would be allowed no progression: The nothing does

not merely serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it

originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such (104).

Likewise, death cannot occur without finite life.

In concordance with the statement that the nothing separates

beings from Being, the idea that death leads to the nothing

implies that death is just the loss of the theoretical sandwich’s

bread slices, leaving nothing for the rest of ever. The

existence of death, therefore, is much more important in the

whole because it magnifies the nothing into virtually

everything. The magnification of the nothing serves as an

equalizer between Being and nothing because Being is so robust

and obvious that it magnifies itself. In this case, the

opposites are completely reliant on each other, not only

conceptually but physically.

Heidegger gives new meaning to Lao-tzus philosophy that

opposites define each other when he tries to uncover the true

essence and meaning of Being, and he reveals another level of

intertwination between the nothing and Being. In order to define

Being, it is mandatory to step outside of it, into the nothing

because:

Everything we talk about, mean, and are

related to in such and such a way is in

Being. What and how we are ourselves are is

also in Being. Being is found in thatness

and whatness, reality, the being at hand of

things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence,

validity, existence [Dasein], and in the

there is [es gibt] (47).

Heidegger is very adamant on the importance of unbiased

judgments and definitions, and how could he possibly calculate

the exact meaning of Being while viewing it from a state of

Being? Thus it is necessary to step out into the nothing to

fully comprehend Being. For this reason, human beings are the

only beings capable of pondering the essence of existence and

nonexistence. Dasein are the only creatures capable because

they are held out into the nothing: Being and the nothing do

belong together . . . because Being itself is essentially finite

and reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is

held out into the nothing (108).

The highest determinations of the essence of man

in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of man

(233).

When Heidegger rejects the title humanist, it is not

because he is anti-humanity or even pessimistic about the fate of

the human race. Rather, he rejects the category because he

rightly sees humanism as defined with man at the center, which

is a point of view he very strongly rejects. Perhaps in some

other era, Heidegger could fittingly be called a humanist;

however, he believes that the word humanism … has lost its

meaning (247). The modern connotation of humanism is not

suitable for Heidegger mainly because in relation to the cosmos,

other beings, and even life itself, Heidegger believes that man

is essentially out of control.

Instead of Heideggers philosophy revolving around mankind,

it is centered on the question of Being. Dasein is often the

main character of Heideggers elaboration, but not because he is

the center. Instead, it is because he is the mechanism through

which the nothing and hence the answer to Being can be

discovered:

If the answer to the question of Being thus

becomes the guiding directive for research,

then it is sufficiently given only if the

specific mode of being of previous

ontology–the vicissitudes of its questioning,

its findings, and its failures–becomes

visible as necessary to the very character of

Dasein (62-63).

Because of their trancendence and resulting link to Being and the

nothing, they are the best route to the answer of Being. Even

his focus on Dasein, however, leaves no trace of humanistic

qualities: he doesnt even keep the title human: The analysis

of Dasein thus understood is wholly oriented toward the guiding

task of working out the question of Being (60). When Heidegger

does speak of humanitys goodness, he does not incorporate the

entire species in his statements. Only a percentage of the race is

included in his vision of humanity. This is because he sees

humanity as a goal for mankind. If he were reffering to all of

humanity, wouldnt he just use the word mankind?

Heidegger believes that part of mans essence is the ability

to step out of his essence. This ability he calls ekstaticism,

and it means that there is no question as to whether or not man

is at the center. The answer is no because man is actually

outside of what humanity claims revolves around men. This

transcendence is often unrecognized to the point of causing man

not to understand or fully evaluate his environment, which just

reiterates that he is not in control:

Because man as the one who ek-sists comes to

stand in this relation that Being destines

for itself, in that he … takes it upon

himself, he at first fails to recognize the

nearest and attaches himself to the next

nearest. He even thinks that this is nearest

(235).

Paradoxically, this eksistence characteristic of Dasein, which

gives him the ability to transcend and reach a level of humanity

also can cause inhumane acts. In this way, the possibilities of

eksistence threaten its goals: the inhumanity that mankind is

capable of threaten the very concept of humanity.

If man were at the center, he would be granted control. His

control would be indicated by his initiation, recognition, and

decision. But he is not the beginning or the end, and neither

does he understand them. From the point of view of Heidegger,

control is something men obviously lack. Man is not even in

control of his own existence. He does not decide to be given

life. Being is given to man, but man does not command it; man

occurs essentially in such a way that he is the there … that

is, the clearing of Being (229). Man through thinking takes

over this gift, but does not own it. Man does not even own his

thoughts. Being does not revolve around man. Man is thrown

into his eksistence; Da-sein itself occurs essentially as

thrown (231). Man revolves around Being, and serves as one of

Beings expressions.

Humanity believes that because man is the center, it is his

place to rule over all other life forms on the planet. Heidegger

strongly refutes this notion. He recognizes the elementary

aspect to the logic applied in the claim that because men are

more intelligent than animals, they are better. First of all,

men are not mere animals. They exist differently because of

their ability to step out of their essence and into the nothing.

People and animals are different, so they are not comparable.

The elementary concept that man is an animal better than other

animals implies prejudice against less intellectual persons.

Technologys essence, relationship with man,

and future are at the hands of Being, not humanity.

Heidegger’s views of technology and its relation to ethics

are complicated and difficult, not unlike his views on nearly

everything else. He saw the journey of technology as an

inevitable process that began slowly but quickened via its

vicissitudes. He sees the process as a means to an end.

However, this “means to an end” is different from most “means to

an end” because its “end” is more “means,” so it inevitably

progresses faster and faster. In other words, the result of

technology is more and more technology in larger and larger

amounts. Also, he believed that its progression is out of our

control.

Technology is inarguably the result of thinking. Heidegger

claims that no thought is original in that the thinker does not

actually conjure it. Rather, the thought reveals itself to the

thinker, even if he is the first person to ever think of it. So,

human beings are not the creators of technology even if they

created it because the thinker only respond[s] to what

address[es] itself to him (323). In this way, technology

existed even before some prehistoric ape scraped some bugs out of

a piece of bark with a twig. This means that there must be some

other cause for technology besides man. Heidegger says,

thinking, propriated by Being, belongs to Being. At the same

time thinking is of Being insofar as thinking, belonging to

Being, listens to Being. As the belonging to Being that listens,

thinking is what it is according to its essential origin (220).

The combonation of these two quotes means that Being actually

created technology with thought as its messenger to humanity.

The handing over of the invention of technology to Being

intensely complicates things. Now finding technologys essence

becomes almost as difficult as finding Beings definition.

Of course, it was necessary for Heidegger to understand the

essence of technology. The importance is due to the fact that

man cannot gain control or understanding of technology without

knowing its essence and attaining a free relationship with it

(311). By free, he means free of bondage, subjectivity, and

slavery. One cannot objectively calculate the implications of

technology while bound to it by lifestyle, opinionated about it,

or reliant on it to the point of slavery. This freedom is

granted by looking at the big picture, way back before technology

in the modern sense existed, even with the apes. This allows one

to view technology with unbiased eyes. Then, the will to

mastery becomes all the more urgent the more tecchnology

threatens to slip from human control (313). The only control

humanity has over technology is in internal will that leads to

understanding of the essence and eventually to mastery.

Technology’s essence has two equal conceptual divisions

which are reliant on each other: (1) technology as instrumental

and as (2) a human activity. Its means that lead to more means

also have two characters: (1) that of revealing and (2) that of

self-creation. Thus, technology is an instrumental human

activity that self-creates its revealing with vicissitude. It cannot be

controlled unless the complexity of these concepts are understood.

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