Anarchy Essay, Research Paper

Anarchy is seen as one end of the spectrum whose other end is marked by the

presence of a legitimate and competent government. International politics is

described as being spotted with pieces of government and bound with elements of

community. Traditionally, international-political systems are thought of as

being more or less anarchic. Anarchy is taken to mean not just the absence of

government but also the presence of disorder and chaos. Although far from

peaceful, international politics falls short of unrelieved chaos, and while not

formally organized, it is not entirely without institutions and orderly

procedures. Although it is misleading to label modern international politics as

anarchic, the absence of a universal international law prohibits well-regulated

behavior. But, international regulation is not completely absent from world

politics. With the end of the Cold War, the ground seems ready for an

acceleration of this century?s trend in increasing international regulation of

more issues once typically seen as part of state domestic jurisdiction. But as

international law embraces new actors and a growing range of forms, topics, and

technologies, and as it moves further away from strictly "foreign"

concerns to traditionally domestic areas, its proponents must increasingly

confront new obstacles head-on. Traditionally, most rules of international law

could be found in one of two places: treaties or customary law (uncodified, but

equally binding rules based on long-standing behavior). But as new domains from

the environment to the Internet come to be seen as appropriate for international

regulation, states are sometimes reluctant to embrace any sort of binding rule.

Today all but the most doctrinaire of scholars see a role for so-called soft

law-precepts emanating from international bodies that conform in some sense to

expectations of required behavior but that are not binding on states (the World

Bank?s Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, for example).

Soft law principles also represent a starting point for new hard law, which

attaches a penalty to noncompliance. Whether in the case of hard or soft law,

new participants are making increased demands for representation in

international bodies, conferences, and other legal groupings and processes. They

include both recognized and unrecognized substate entities (Hong Kong and Tibet,

for example); nongovernmental organizations; and corporations. Scholars accept

that these other actors have independent views that do not fit neatly into

traditional theories of how law is made and enforced. Most states comply with

much, even most, international law. But without a mechanism to bring

transgressors into line, international law is "law" in name only. The

traditional toolbox to secure compliance with the law of nations consist of

negotiations, mediation, countermeasures, or, in rare cases, recourse to

supranational judicial bodies such as the International Court of Justice. For

many years, these tools have been supplemented by the work of international

institutions, whose reports and resolutions often help "mobilize

shame" against violators. But today, states, NGO?s, and private entities

have striven for sanctions. And the UN?s ad hoc criminal tribunals for the

former Yugoslavia and Rwanda show that it is at least possible to devise

institutions to punish individuals for human rights atrocities. Nonetheless, the

success of these enforcement mechanisms depends on the willingness of states to

support them. When global institutions do not work, regional bodies may offer

more influence over member conduct in economics, human rights, and other areas.

In addition, domestic courts increasingly provide an additional venue to enforce

international law. Even with a defined international law and a ?world

government? to enforce it, cooperation in general, in international politics,

is troubled. Research on international regimes moved from attempts to describe

the phenomena of interdependence and international regimes to closer analysis of

the conditions under which countries cooperate. How does cooperation occur among

sovereign states and how do international institutions affect it? Indeed, why

should international institutions exist at all in a world dominated by sovereign

states? This question seemed unanswerable if institutions were seen as opposed

to or above, the state but not if they were viewed as devices to help states

accomplish their objectives. The new school of thought argued that, rather than

imposing themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the

demand by states for cooperative ways to fulfill their own purposes. By reducing

uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing agreements, international

institutions help states achieve collective gains. This new institutionalism was

not without its critics, who focused their attacks on two perceived

shortcomings. The counterargument focused on the absence of a world government

or effective international legal system to which victims of injustice can

appeal. Second, theorists of cooperation had recognized that cooperation is not

harmonious: it emerges out of discord and takes place through tough bargaining.

Nevertheless, they claimed that the potential joint gains from such cooperation

explained the dramatic increases in the number and scope of cooperative

multilateral institutions. Critics pointed out, however, that bargaining

problems themselves could produce obstacles to achieving joint gains.

Cooperation requires recognition of opportunities for the advancement of mutual

interest, as well as policy coordination once these opportunities have been

identified. Transaction and information costs are high. The complexity of

international politics militates against identification and realization of

common interest. Avoiding nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis called for

cooperation by the Soviet Union and the United States. The transaction and

information costs in the crisis, though substantial, did not preclude

cooperation. By contrast, the problem of identifying significant actors,

defining interests, and negotiating agreements that embodied mutual interests in

the case of 1914 was far more difficult. There was no common procedure to handle

the situation or resolve it in an efficient manner. In international politics,

the likelihood of autonomous defection and of recognition and control problems

increases. Cooperative behavior rests on calculations of expected utility -

merging discount rates, payoff structures, and anticipated behavior of other

players. Nations dwell in perpetual lawlessness, for no central authority with a

defined law limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common condition

gives rise to diverse outcomes. War and concert, arms races and arms control,

trade wars and tariff truces, financial panics and rescues, competitive

devaluation and monetary stabilization mark relations among states. At times,

the absences of centralized international authority preclude attainment of

common goals. Because, as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their

conduct to a world government, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to

their commitments. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation

even when cooperation would leave all well off. Yet, at other times, states do

realize common goals though cooperation under lawlessness. Despite the absence

of any ultimate international law, governments often bind themselves to mutually

advantageous courses of action. And, though no international sovereign stands

ready to enforce the terms of agreement, modern states can and do realize common

interests through tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multilateral

negotiation, and the creation if international regimes.