Democratic Peace Theory Essay, Research Paper

Democratic peace is presently a theory that has come under fire from many individuals due to the complex nature in which it is applied to nations and their handling of foreign affairs. There are currently two accepted arguments: (1) Democracies do not fight one another because they are self-organizing systems and are therefor fundamentally distinct from other states, and (2) they are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies or quasi-democracies as nondemocracies are with one another. These views on democratic peace are one of a dyadic effect, which implies that democracies are only more peaceful with one another, and not a monadic effect, which would mean that democracies are more peaceful in their relations with all countries (Rousseau 512).

The argument that democracies do not fight one another is a relatively easy, while at the same time complex concept to argue. Many researchers try to argue that democratic peace is reliable based solely on liberal and democratic norms. It is not that norms are not unimportant, it is just that they are alone unable to explain why peace continues between democratic nations. The concept behind the statement democracies do not fight one another is supported by the fact that when two democracies confront one another in conflicts of interest, they are able to effectively apply democratic bargaining in their interaction, which then prevents most conflicts from escalating to a military conflict. In a conflict between democracies, by the time the two states are militarily ready for war, diplomats have had the opportunity to find a nonmilitary solution to the conflict (Gartzke 2). It is also feasible to say that democracies do not fight one another due to trade interaction. Democracies are generally involved in the practice of liberal economic policy, meaning that to an extent international trade between many nations is undertaken. If one democratic nation is heavily involved in trade relations with another democratic nation then it is in neither of these nations best interest to get involved in a conflict that requires military intervention. The possibility of a spurious correlation between domestic and international politics has been explored by an increasing number of researchers with results that seem to indicate that liberalism is at least partially responsible for the democratic peace (Gartzke 3).

Another explanation for democracies remaining at peace with one another is because they are self-organizing systems. As systems, liberal democracies have more in common with science and the market than with undemocratic governments. These similarities explain their peaceful relationships with one another (diZerega 280). Because democracies are not hierarchically structured, they do not suffer from the problems hierarchical institutions do. A hierarchical government faces the problems of setting specific goals, and once these goals are set the system either achieves its goals or fails and disintegrates. With constitutional rules in place, a democratic system has no specific goals. Instead a democracies will form a framework so that the politicians can work within it. Self-organizing systems are quite common. Language, science, and the market are all self-organizing systems. The members of a self-organizing system, or spontaneous order, pursue independently chosen ends without being subject to any specific over arching common purpose (diZerega 285). In contrast to the way a democracy operates one could turn to Maoist China and the specific goals that were set. Mao decided that China was going to industrialize in a rapid manor and nothing was going to stop this industrialization. Millions of Chinese citizens melted down everything they owned in order to meet quotas imposed by the national communist party. A specific goal would almost certainly not be set in a democratic nation in peacetime conditions. There are specific examples of democratic nations setting very specific goals, but only during times of war.

One can also look at the political as well as domestic costs of using force. Decisions to use military force are based on domestic and international cost-benefit calculations. For one democratic nation to use military force on any nation, especially a democratic one, has costly domestic political repercussions. The expenditure of resources and loss of human life can mobilize opposition groups or fracture a ruling coalition (Rousseau 513). In order for a democratic leader to make the decision to use military force to resolve a conflict, the individual most consider these factors more so than other forms of political systems. In order for the concept of democratic leaders having to consider the political as well as human life cost factor to be effective four assumptions can be laid out.

Assumption One. The central goal of democratic leaders is to retain their position of political power.

Assumption Two. Political opponents of the ruling party will attempt to rally political opposition when domestic and foreign policies pursued have failed to achieve the stated policy goals.

Assumption Three. In democracies, political opposition is better able to mobilize opposition to unseat an incumbent.

Assumption Four. In all political systems leaders believe that diplomatic retreat or a military defeat could threaten their domestic political position (Rousseau 514).

These four assumptions are a direct result of the democratic system, and the way that the people elect the individuals who have the power to control whether or not the nation solves its conflicts through peaceful negotiations or through militarily intervention.

Although opposition for political regimes exists in all forms of government, the more democratic the government is the higher the probability the opposition will have the opportunity to rise into the public eye. Leaders of democratic nations face a higher cost of failure and therefore must handle international incidents with extreme caution, especially when dealing with a situation that could include military force. The use of military force is especially risky because it is difficult to calculate the success rate with confidence.

When discussing the second part of democratic peace, democratic nations are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies or quasi-democratic nations, as nondemocracies are with one another, one must examine why this is true. When a democratic nation is faced with a democratic opponent, the democracy believes that its opponent would share its desire to avoid the use of force, but when faced with a non-democratic nation, these reassurances of similar goals are removed. When the goals are removed the democratic nation feels less restrained concerning the use of force. A democratic nation is less likely to start a conflict with a non-democratic nation, but once involved in the situation, it is more likely to use force when dealing with the non-democratic state then with a democratic one. The vast majority of crises fall into two categories: Territorial disputes (50%) and antiregime disputes (30%) (Rousseau 521).

There are many examples of antiregime disputes that can be used to demonstrate a democratic nation (The United States) intervening in quasi-democratic nations. In 1954 the United States assisted the violent overthrow of the constitutionally elected Guatemalan government, leading to years of dictatorship and civil war. President Johnson ordered the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent the elected president from taking office. In the early 1970s President Nixon encouraged the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. These three incidents are not the only examples of a democracy intervening in a quasi-democratic states affairs. Executive inspired military actions took place in Iran, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Grenada, Nicaragua, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti.

These small conflicts prove that it is not democracy that creates peace, but the relationships and the systems in the democracies that help perpetuate the peace. When the relationship between the two nations who are having a conflict are weak, then the record of the democracy for turning the conflict into one which requires military intervention is no better than that of a non-democratic government. These examples prove the inability of the norms alone to explain democratic peace. Democratic politicians are no more reliably peaceful than individuals in other forms of governments.

In order to fully understand the low-intensity conflicts and the mechanisms, which differ them from a high-intensity conflict, one must understand the mechanisms through which the president (U.S.) uses the military to intervene. It is possible to imagine that the above low-intensity conflicts would have never taken place if the president had to receive congressional approval for military intervention. If the president did have to receive approval from congress, the internal and external factors that were previously discussed would come into play and would decreased the likelihood of military intervention. Many of these actions were kept secret and congress and the public were misled. These facts alone suggest that the president felt there would have been sufficient domestic opposition to stop the intervention. The frustration that the public causes the executive branch helps maintain the peace. Michael Doyle finds the reason for democratic peace more in liberal ideology than in the systematic characteristics of democratic politics. He advocates strengthening the executive branch in order to increase the peacefulness of democratic politics (diZerega 306). But if Doyle were correct than this would contradict the fact that in order to follow through on executive plans to use the military to intervene in international situations the executive has deceived the public and congress.

Although democratic peace seems to be easily supportable and all the above is supported by situations in the past it does not mean that war between two democracies is impossible, although unlikely. War between a democracy and a quasi-democratic state or a non-democracy is not likely as well, but more probable. The fact that governments of democratic states have more challenges to overcome when attempting to mobilize military forces to intervene in an international situation is a deterrence for the leaders of these governments, but this obstacle can be overcome when the leader believes it is in the best interest of the nation.

Works Cited

Rousseau, David L. . Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace,

1918- 1988. American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 512-526

Gartzke, Erik. Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins

of the Democratic Peace. American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998): 1-26

diZerega, Gus. Democracies and Peace: The Self-organizing Foundation for the

Democratic Peace. Review of Politics 57 (1995): 279-308

International Security Policy

Democratic Peace Theory: Why it Works and Why it is Broken