Vietnam Post 1950 Essay, Research Paper

Describe and assess the role of the USA in Indo-China in the period 1945-1954

In 1943 President Roosevelt suggested that Indochina come under the control of four powers after the war, proposing that the eventual independence of the Indochinese might follow in twenty to thirty years time. No one knew whether the policy would require American troops, but America was firm on the fact that independence could not be taken by the Vietnamese, but would be granted to the Vietnamese by the Great Powers at their convenience.

At the Yalta conference Roosevelt repeated his desire for a trusteeship but during March 1945 he considered the possibility of French restoration in return for their promise that independence would eventually occur. At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the issue of Indochina was resolved by authorizing the British takeover of the nation south of the 16th parallel and Chinese occupation north of it. This meant that the French, whom the British had supported since 1943, would return. This effectively made the USA responsible for the French reoccupation. USA?s support for the French return to Indochina was logical, as this provided a way to stop the Communists from advancing in the East. By mid-August French officials were hinting that they would give the USA and Britain equal economic access to Indochina. At the end of August De Gaulle went to Washington, where the President told him that the United States was in favour of a French return to Indochina. Proof of this came in the form of financial aid.

The USA worked with the Viet Minh who were led by Ho Chi Minh, during the final months of the war where they provided arms in exchange for information and assistance with downed pilots. They eventually came to know Minh and the other leaders. American military men who arrived in Hanoi during the first heady days of freedom were unanimous in believing that Ho ?… is an old revolutionist … a product of Moscow, a communist?. (1) The OSS understood the nationalist ingredient in the Vietnamese revolution, but they emphasized the communist in their reports to Washington. (2) During September the first British troops began arriving in Indochina and imposed their control over half of a nation largely controlled by the Viet Minh. The British arranged to bring in French troops in as quickly as possible, and deployed Japanese troops in the Saigon region and elsewhere. ?On 23 September,? the British commander later reported to his superiors, ?Major-General Gracey had agreed with the French that they should carry out a coup d??tat; and with his permission, they seized control of the administration of Saigon and the French Government was installed.?(3) By the end of the Second World War the Vietnamese were in conflict with the French, English and Americans.

1947-1950: United States inaction

By 1947 the American doctrine of containment of communism required the USA to think of the dangers Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh posed. This meant taking a tolerant attitude towards the bloody French policy in Vietnam, one the French insisted was essential for their empire, prosperity, and the political stability of the nation. At the end of 1949 the State Department was convinced that the future of world power remained in Europe, but, as was soon to become evident, this relied upon a French victory in Vietnam. The United States? saw only one way to end the Vietnam problem. It was determined to stop the sweep of revolution in Asia along the fringes of China, by that time Vietnam was the most likely outlet for any United States action. American intervention in Vietnam was now only a matter of time.

1950-53: America escalates the war in Indochina

The significance of the struggle in Vietnam for the United States always remained a global one, and for this reason Vietnam became the most important issue concerning Washington. A ?series of disasters can be prevented,? Dulles advised in May 1950, ?if at some doubtful point we quickly take a dramatic and strong stand that shows our confidence and resolution. Probably this series of disasters cannot be prevented in any other way.?(3) It would be necessary, he believed, even to ?risk war?. (4) The Truman Administration regarded Vietnam as a European affair.

By this time the French were beginning to feel the economic pressures of the war, and therefore desperately needed United States aid. In May 1950 the USA began its economic aid program in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. After the Korean War Truman pledged greater support to the French and the Bao Dai regime. October of 1950 saw some serious military reverses. Jules Moch, the French Minister of National Defence, arrived in Washington in an effort to gain greater United States military aid. It was at this point that the French realized that their efforts in Vietnam relied on the intervention of US forces.

The total military aid to France in the 1950-53 period was $2,956 million, plus $684 million in 1954. The United States suggest that $1.54 billion in aid was given to Indochina before the Geneva Accords, and in fact Truman?s statement in January 1953 that the United States paid for as much as half of the war is accurate.

It was Dulles, in the middle of 1951, who discovered in Bao Dai?s former premier under the Japanese, Ngo Dinh Diem. The political solution for Indochina had been found. At the end of 1950 he was willing to believe that the expansion of communism in Asia had to be stopped.

The United States wanted to bring France back to Europe through a victory in Vietnam.

Victory rather than a political settlement in Vietnam was necessary. The United States was convinced that the ?domino? theory would operate should Vietnam remain with the Vietnamese people. ?There is no question,? Bruce told a Senate committee, ?that if Indochina went, the fall of Burma and the fall of Thailand would be absolutely inevitable. No one can convince me, for what it is worth, that Malaya wouldn?t follow shortly thereafter, and India … would … also find the Communists making infiltrations…?(5)

The political character of the regime in Vietnam was less consequential than the larger United States design for the area, and the seeds of future United States policy were already forecast when Bruce suggested that ?… the Indochinese – and I am speaking now of the… anti-Communist group – will have to show a far greater ability to live up to the obligations of nationhood before it will be safe to withdraw, whether it be French Union forces or any other foreign forces, from that country?. (5) If the French left, someone would have to replace them.

Given the American idea of the importance Vietnam, which impelled the United States to support it financially, the future of the war no longer depended on whether the French would fight or meet the demands of the Vietnamese for independence. The war, even by 1952, was becoming internationalized, with America exercising her strength for its control. When Eisenhower came to the Presidency in January 1953 the United States government was aware of the French role in its global strategy, and it was believed in Congress that if the French pulled out, the US would not permit Vietnam to fall. The French were divided on the response the American intervention into the war required. In September the United States agreed to give the French a grant of $385 million to begin the ?Navarre Plan?, a plan devised to destroy the Viet Minh forces by 1955. The problem the United States faced was how to apply its military power in a way that would avoid a land war in the jungles, one that Dulles always opposed in Asia. Given the regional, even global, context of Vietnam for the United States, a peaceful settlement would have undone all that Washington had tried to achieve since 1947. There was no effective means for a US entry into the war, and such power as the Americans had would not be useful in what ultimately had to be a land war if they could hope for victory.

(1) General Philip Gallagher to General R. B. McClure, 20 September 1945 (Department of State Report, Gallagher Papers).

(2) Department of State, Research and Intelligence Service, Biographical Information on Prominent Nationalist Lead 6.

(3) UK Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict, 1945-65, Cmd 2834 (London, 1965).

(4) Ibid. p.405. . (5) Ibid. p.20850.