Strategic Bombing During World War 2 Essay, Research Paper

“World War 2 was a war fought in two distinct phases. The first was the last war of a new generation. The second was emphatically the first of a new era” . “The British strategic bomber campaign was of doubtful cost effectiveness” . Bomber Command was by far the largest claimant on labour and factory space within the armed forces. Relative to their size they suffered more casualties than any other sector. The Anglo-American bomber force was divided in terms of strategy. Bomber Command believed it was too risky to bomb by day, while the Americans believed it was too difficult to bomb by night. Initially both forces lacked accurate navigational equipment, which deterred them from precision bombing. Germany developed a ?night fighter? force to counteract the bomber fleet. They were equipped with an on board radar, which enabled them to locate the bombers in the darkness. The German industry was sub-divided in an attempt to minimise the effectiveness of bombing raids.Both the Britain and Germany made substantial scientific developments throughout the course of the war. Prior to the development of the Lancaster, the British Air Force lacked a long-range bomber, capable of carrying substantial bomb loads. Wattson Watt foresaw the need for an early detection system; he developed the ?Radiolocation? system, which alerted Britain to invading forces. The German Air Force developed an on board radar, called the ?Metric system?, which was equipped to German night fighters.Bomber Harris believed in the theory of ?carpet bombing?. Nick named ?butcher Harris?; he was known as the man who supported such campaigns as Dresden. He believed in breaking the morale of the German people. The strategic bombing campaign significantly shortened the length of the war. It disabled the production industry and weakened the German morale. Between Jan. 12-23 of 1943 President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill meet at Casablanca, to plan the ?future global military strategy for the Western Allies?. The work of the conference was primarily military; deciding on the invasion of Silicy, apportioning forces to the Pacific theatre and outlining major lines of attack in the Far East. Most important of all was Roosevelt?s claims for the “unconditional surrender” from Germany, Italy, and Japan. Hamburg was largely responsible for the production of German U-boats. Subsequently it was the target of numerous air raids. In an attempt to protect the fragile industry, three huge anti-aircraft artilleries were built.Few foresaw the radical development the fighter would undergo after World War I. Such was the extent many of the doctrines established in the previous war were outdated by World War II. During the early phases of the war the Anglo-American bomber force readily accepted Douhets theory . Both the R.A.F and the U.S.A.A.F were to adhere to this doctrinal policy until they suffered severe losses in 1943-1944. The U.S.A.A.F believed unescorted bombers flying in well-designed formations could penetrate deeply over enemy skies. This theory was quickly dispelled in such battles as the Reich, where the Americans suffered significant losses. The 8th Air Force went into war with the assumption their tactical approach, although not yet proven in combat, would be successful. Another pre-war assumption was that air attacks would be directed against specific military and economic targets. Initially civilians were avoided, as they played no part in the war, but as the campaign progressed civilian targets became of higher strategic importance, “Air raids involving indiscriminate killing of enormous numbers of civilians were the current step in the natural evolution of the art of war” . Sir Hugh Trenchard stressed the morale effect of bombing civilian targets “?German people deteriorated under aerial attack” . Official records showed that absenteeism within the work place didn?t increase until later in the campaign , therefore a conclusion can be drawn that the “?value of morale, or area bombing as a war winning strategy was certainly over estimated” . The morale of the German people was not affected enough to effect their war-waging capacity. “Neither a maintenance of productivity nor a rebuilding of industry could have been achieved by means of compulsive but only by virtue of the voluntary response of German workers” . It was assumed that bombing raids would be made in the daylight. In August 1940 German bombers suffered heavily in daylight even though they were escorted. This helped to confirm to Bomber Command that night bombing was the best policy. Bomber Command flew night missions over Germany during the winter of 1940-1941 in the belief their bombs had fallen within about 300 yards of their targets. This figure was plainly wrong, a new assumption was made. The R.A.F decided the average error was closer to 1000 yards, which meant that Bomber Command could not be expected to hit targets as small as oil facilities, until they had been equipped with vastly improved navigational aids. The U.S.A.A.F opposed Bomber Commands view, they believed accurate bombing could only be achieved during the day. They assumed unescorted bombers flying in well-designed formations could penetrate the German lines. On 14th October 1943, 60 out 291 flying fortresses were shot down by German fighters during the last major raid on Schweinfurt. The formation had been obliged to fly 400 miles without fighter cover. The Americans suspended daylight raids, as they were not equipped to bomb by night, the 8th Air Force could do nothing.Bomber Command “?was of doubtful cost effectiveness” ; it accounted for less than a quarter of the R.A.F, yet it was the largest claimant of factory space and labour. By the end of the war capital expenditure on buildings and extending aircraft factories had reached $1.3 billion, plus almost as much for the aircraft themselves. Of the 3.3 million people employed in the engineering industry (service requirements sector), 1,400,000 were working for the Ministry of Aircraft production, most of them making bombers, while another 400,000 were producing ground equipment or bombs, or were contracted to aircraft repair. “So many people, parts and processes were involved that it is almost impossible to cost accurately the bomber offensive, but one estimate places the total bill at around $30 billion” .In relation to its size, Bomber Command suffered more casualties than any other section within the armed forces. 47,268 men were killed on operations and another 8,090 were killed while undertaking non-operational duties, 9,874 became prisoners and another 8,403 were wounded. Some 330 ground staff were killed and another 759 were wounded while handling bombs. Over the course of the war Bomber Command lost more than 65,000 lives. Aerial reconnaissance pictures measured the effectiveness of the Bomber campaign. The bomber fleet was a vital offensive weapon but, for the damage it inflicted, it was substantially over priced. What campaigns were effective, were turned into great propaganda victories. Initially the Anglo-American bomber force was confined to ?area bombing?, because they lacked time over the target and accurate navigational equipment. Prior to 1942, Bomber Command lacked accurate navigational equipment. During the battle of the Ruhr a dismal one tenth of all bombs dropped landed within a two and half mile radius of the target. Subsequently three systems were developed to narrow down the scope of error. Bomber commands first new navigational aid was a position finding system called ?Gee?. It was dependent on the use of a cathode ray tube and other such devices to measure very short intervals of time. Two signals were transmitted simultaneously by a pair of transmitters on the ground, if the operator received these simultaneously he knew he was on a line, which bisected the line joining the two stations. If one signal arrived before the other he knew that he was closer to one station than he was to the other. A second pair of transmitters generated a second positional line. The pilot then knew that his aircraft was on two positional lines and that his exact position was where the two lines intersected. Gee was immensely helpful to Bomber Command and later to the Royal Navy. It was extremely accurate. It was a passive, in that it did not require the bomber to reveal its location by transmitting a radio frequency. But it could be jammed and was limited by range.Oboe was the next navigational aid to be introduced into the bomber force. It officially came into service in December 1942. With Oboe the pilot would fly along a positional beam, receiving coded instructions from the ground to tell him whether he was off track. Another station would read the aircraft?s range, once it reached the point on the beam where it should release it bombs the second station would signal him to do so. Oboe was restricted by range, but was even more accurate than Gee.The third navigational aid to be introduced was, which was an onboard radar set directed at the ground. It did not require ground transmissions, therefore it had an unlimited range, but it was a powerful transmitter. The Germans could detect aircraft using the H2S system. The radar picture produced was extremely confusing. It worked most efficiently over Hamburg, where the Alster Lakes contrasted comparatively sharply with the built up area around. To exploit these newly developed devices, Bomber Command adapted a new technique. A special group of bombers, called ?Pathfinders?, would precede the main bomber stream. Equipped with all three navigational aids, they would mark the target for the bombers following behind. They would often drop flares indicating the precise target. Initially precision bombing was not a practical option for the American bomber fleet. The Americans swore by the efficiency of the Norden bombsight, which they believed, could hit a ?pickle barrel?, from an immense height. The bombsight was particularly accurate, if the pilot flew level for a sustained period of time, prior to the release of the bomb load. But the bombsite proved to be impracticable, for the simply fact that bombers were unable to fly level for such a sustained period of time, while under attack from the German fighters. The consequences were that bombers failed to hit the precise target, factories and production facilities, which were vital to the German war time industry. Therefore the Americans were restricted to ?area bombing? until the development of the North American P-15B Mustang fighter, which was more capable than previous escorts, of defending the bombers against the German fighters.German countermeasures proved to be sufficient in that, they initially limited the effectiveness of the bombing raids. To offset nightly raids, the Luftwaffe established a ?night fighter? force. The force comprised of Me109?s fighters, which were equipped with a comparatively long wave radar, called the ?Metric? system. Bomber Commands loses steadily mounted throughout 1943. By March 1944, the situation was becoming desperate. “The German air defences had got on top of the night bombers and were inflicting an insupportable casualty rate upon them [Bomber Command]. In March 1944 Bomber Command was no longer in a position to sustain a major night offensive against German cities? The German night fighter force, destroyed more than the equivalent of the whole front line of Bomber Command.” The night fighters proved to be an effective defence against allied bombers. Bomber Command was ineffectual until the development of the Mustang fighter.Germany scattered there industry, in an attempt to ?present a more difficult target system? for the bomber fleet. The plan of dispersal provided the breaking up of production and the establishment of multiple sources of each part. For example, the twenty-seven main aircraft plants were dispersed to three hundred sub-centres and fifty-one aircraft engine plants were scattered to 249 locations between April and August of 1944. Attempts were made to move more vital production facilities underground. Disused railway tunnels, salt mines, fortifications and mine galleries were utilised to the extent that by January 1945 a total of 425,000 square meters of industrial plant existed underground. Therefore by mid 1945, the Germans had gone a long way towards successfully shielding themselves against air attacks. This compelled Bomber Command to make a more concerted effort to disrupt the German economy. Time restricted them to only undertake missions with which carried a strategic importance (i.e. oil production facilities). The German industry was particularly vulnerable to an aerial attack while it was clustered in industrial regions. It was painfully of Bomber Commands ability to ?area bomb?. Initially the Anglo-American bomber force was incapable of bombing small pockets of industry. Precision bombing didn?t become an option until the introduction of the newly developed navigational equipment in the mid 1942?s.A small fleet of high-powered aircraft (i.e. Mosquitoes) would precede each major bombing raid, dropping coloured flares over the precise target. Initially this tactic proved to be invaluable to the bomber fleet but the Germans soon became aware of this tactic. When flares were dropped the Germans would light flares some distance from the target confusing the bomb aimers of the precise target. German forces knew a bombing raid was eminent once the flares had been deployed. Consequently the preceding bomber fleet lost any chance of a surprise attack. This countermeasure proved to effective, in that the bomb aimer was forced to rely more on the ability of the navigator.In mid-January 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met at Casablanca, to plan the ?future global military strategy for the Western Allies?. Politically, the Casablanca Conference owes its importance to the fact that, at its end, Roosevelt publicly announced a demand for the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Both the announcement and the policy of unconditional surrender came in for severe criticism after the war, when it was contended that opposition groups in Germany might have overthrown Adolf Hitler and, negotiated an earlier peace if they had not been discouraged by fear of Allied vindictiveness. Only four months after Casablanca it became necessary to hold another Anglo-American conference. In mid-May 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met in Washington, D.C., for the conference code-named Trident. There the Sicilian project was effectively confirmed, and the date May 1, 1944, was prescribed. These meetings proved to be effectual, in that they integrate the intentions of the Anglo-American forces.It was inevitable that both sides would make scientific discoveries throughout the course of the war.Preceding 1935, England?s early detection system consisted of; ground spotters and aerial patrols. With Britain so close to the continent, they were susceptible to aerial raids, consisting of fast bombers that would fly short distances to England?s largest city. In preparation for such an event Watson-Watt was asked to design an early detection system. Several years prior to the battle, the head of the Luftwaffe signals organisation, sailed over the East Coast of England in an airship, the ?Graf Zeppelin?. The ships? technicians picked up only a deafening noise, not realising their equipment was malfunctioning they overlooked England?s key defence tool. By the out break of war the Germans had learnt of the capabilities of the ?Radiolocation system? (Radar). They planned to destroy all of the radar stations alone the English Coast, leaving England blind to an airborne attack. The open girder construction of the huge transmission towers made them difficult to destroy by level bombing and their 350-foot height inhibited dive-bombing. The radar system gave the English the upper hand; it enabled Fighter Command to dispatch a sufficient number of planes to deal with each German attack. It prevented aerial patrols, enabling English pilots to rest between missions. Germany underestimated the ability of the radar, subsequently they lost the benefit of surprise. “In battle we [Germans] had to rely on our human eyes. The British fighter pilots could depend on the radar eye, which was far more reliable and had a longer range. When we made contact with the enemy our briefing was already three hours old- the time it took to access the latest position by means of radar to the transmission of the attacking orders from Fighter Control to the already airborne force” Initially Bomber Command was restricted by the performance of their heavy bombers. The Manchester was Bomber Commands first attempt at a four-engine bomber. Although it was able to carry a heavier bomb load than the Wellington, it had a tendency to spin while flying at low speeds. The Lancaster evolved from the design of the Manchester. The two were virtually identical, the only exception was that the Lancaster was powered by four Rolls-Royce Merlin engines. The development of the Lancaster was one of the pivotal points within the war. It allowed the bomber fleet to reach all parts of Germany.The introduction of the North American P-15B Mustang Fighter was a pivotal turning point in the war. Equipped with an Anglo-American Rolls-Royce engine, the P-15B turned out to be “? the most remarkable combat aeroplane produced during World War Two” . Its performance was considerably better than that of its counterpart, the German Me 109. Above all it could be equipped with long-range fuel tanks, capable of reaching Berlin. The deployment of the Mustang was a turning point in the war, not only because it had the ability to stay with the bombers all the way but also, because the Americans used it more intelligently than the Germans used there escort fighters. The Mustang gave the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command air superiority over Germany. The Anglo-American used the Mustang to “? wage a bombardment campaign which came as close to being decisive as anything that was achieved by air bombardment throughout World War Two” Germany pioneered the development of rocket propelled aircraft. The Me.262 jet fighter and the Me.163 rocket propelled fighter had been developed before the war. It wasn?t until mid way through the war that the Me.262 went into production, of which 1294 were made. Neither of these aircraft went into mass production because Hitler and Goering believed the war would be “?won and finished without them” . Germany also developed a range of V weapons (V standing for Vergeltung or retribution). There were three V weapons. V1 was a jet propelled pilotless aircraft twenty-five feet long, a range of 200-250 miles, a speed of 470 m.p.h. and a one ton warhead. Each cost approximately $375 to produce. Beginning in June 10,942 were aimed at London, 2,448 hit Antwerp, while 3,132 hit other parts of England. The V2 was a rocket. It was fifty feet long and carried a one ton warhead. It climbed for fifty to sixty miles, with a range of 220 miles and, could reach a speed of 3,600 m.p.h. It was impossible to intercept and couldn?t be detected with convention radar as it travelled faster than the speed of sound. However each rocket cost $18000 (research and development inclusive). Again Antwerp received 1,265 hits; London received 517 and other parts of England 537. Fuel shortages, inflicted by the Allied bombing raids, hampered the use of V1 and V2 aircraft towards the end of the war. Hitler saw them as an added luxury, which he later scraped in favour of the Luftwaffe. V3 was a long-range gun. It had twenty-five barrels each 416 feet long. It was to fire one shell on London every twelve seconds but allied bombing scored a direct hit with a heavy bomb and allied forces later overran it. The bombing raids effectively saved London from the V weapons. Hamburg was largely responsible for the production of German U-boats. Subsequently it was the target of numerous air raids. In an attempt to protect the fragile industry, three huge anti-aircraft artilleries were built. These were equipped with large anti-aircraft guns (12.8 cm Flak 40). Each consisted of two buildings, a G-Stand: and an L-Stand. The G-Stand was the bunker with the armament. The L-Stand was used for the control of the armament, which was usually equipped with radar. A total of three were built. One was built in Wilhelmsburg; the other two were built in the town centre, Heiligengeistfeld. The buildings also provided air shelter for up to 18,000 civilians. During the heaviest air raids 60,000 people were squashed into these bunkers. The largest attack was at the end of July 1943, which caused a horrific firestorm. Around 50% of all dwellings, 80% of the port area and commercial shipping, and 40% of its industry was destroyed. An estimated 45,000 people died due to the air raids.The bomber fleet forced Germany to invest valuable resources into protecting such vital industries as Hamburg.Arthur Harris faithfully believed in Douhets theory, he “? believed that bombing could and would by itself somehow destroy the enemy?s morale and his will to continue” . Harris was seemingly ignorant to the real affect of area bombing. Harris believed that there could be no real defence against bombing, “Having got through the bomber will be able to wreak such destruction that the nation would simply give up the struggle and sue for peace” . Area bombing didn?t effect the morale of the civilians enough to influence their war-waging capacity. In March 1944, the average weekly hours worked by a wage earner in the German industry amounted to only 48.3. This was an increase of more than two hours from 1938. Harris believed the civilians were the weakest link in the German economy. If they were stricken with fear they would be incapable of operating the machinery. In actually the efficiency of the German economy steadily increased throughout the course of the war.The defence formation around the bomber, under went a radical transformation following the introduction of the Mustang escort fighter. Initially escorts were given clear directives to “?fly close to the bombers where they felt comfortable by seeing us [fighters] and where, the notion, was we could do a batter job at protecting them” . New directives were issued shortly after General Doolittle took command of the 8th Air Force. “We would fly a high squadron, a medium squadron and a low squadron, with the squadrons in visual sight of each other?one going well ahead of the bomber force and usually high, and another on fairly well behind the bomber force and about level with it. Third squadron we called the ?roving squadron? would usually break down into two flights of eight ships and fly around the bomber and a little closer than the other squadrons” . The new directives allowed the Anglo-American air force to fully exploit the capabilities of the Mustang.In my opinion the bomber campaign significantly shortened the war. In June 1944 the Allied Air Force launched a concerted attack on German oil installations. The object was to immobilise the German armed forces. The campaign was an imminent success, although it was not apparent until later. In May 1944 the German produced 156,000 tons of aviation gasoline and the allied forces dropped 51,000 tons of bombs on German and Rumanian oil installations. In August the tonnage of bombs dropped had risen to 26,300 and the amount of gasoline produced had dropped to 17,000 tons. By January 1945 aviation gasoline production had fallen to 11,000 tons. By March it ceased altogether. Moreover the production of gasoline for road vehicles had dropped from 134,000 tons in March 1944 to 39,000 tons in March 1945. The production of diesel oil had fallen from 100,000 tons in March 1944 to 39,000 tons in March 1945. Even if the Luftwaffe had found a way to combat the Mustang, they would have had no fuel to do so. Allied forces advancing from the Normandy beachhead were overrunning many of the aerodromes. While at the same time the German army was forced to abandon a lot of its equipment reliant on gasoline, because of the acute shortage.Germany heavily relied on foreign resources. The loss by 1945 of most of the foreign sources caused industrial steel production to slump. In 1943 30.6 million tons of steel were produced, by 1945 output had fallen to 1.2 million tons. Of the 29.4 million-ton drop, bombing was responsible for approximately 8.5 million tons. The disintegration of the steel industry prevented Germany from continuing the mass production of aircraft and tanks. Germany possessed one of the most complex and well maintained railway systems in the world, but a complacency which grew from this fact meant few steps had been taken to prepare against an air attack. By the end of 1944, marshalling capacity had fallen to forty percent of normal and barely twenty percent by the end of January 1945. This hampered the receipt of raw materials and delivery of the finished products. The water transport system, which was mainly used for the transport of coal and coke, was initially very efficient. In the first few months of 1944, 66.2 thousand tons of coal and coke were moved by water daily. By October 1945, the daily average had fallen to 23.4 thousand tons. This crippled the industrial and railway sectors. They were effectively useless without coal to heat their boilers.None of the major battles of World War II proved the correctness of Douhets theory. In reality, the German industry worked harder for longer as the war progressed. Efficiency continued to increase until it reached its crescendo. Where from there it continued to drop until the conclusion of the war. The shortage of fuel was a contributing factor to the allied victory. The German armed forces were defenceless without vital oil supplies. The Luftwaffe was unable to maintain air superiority and the armies were forced to abandon tanks and alike simply because they had no fuel. The bomber fleet disabled the train systems, destroying the German marshalling yards. Initially precision bombing was not a practical option for the Anglo-American bomber fleet. The development of Gee and Oboe proved to be a turning point in the war. In that they guided the pilot directly over the assigned target. The Norden bombsite proved to accurate if enemy fighters could be distracted for long enough to line up the target.The German night fighters proved their effectiveness against British bombers. Prior to the introduction of the Mustang they controlled the skies by night. Deterring the Anglo-American bomber fleet from unnecessary missions. The Conference at Casablanca united the two forces. The conference proved too particularly effective, in that detail successful plans were designed.The development of the Lancaster and the Mustang proved to be pivotal turning points in the war. The Lancaster was able to fly further and carry heavier bomb loads. The Mustang was more capable of dealing with the German night fighters.The bombing campaign prevented Hitler from devastating the Anglo-American air force with his newly developed V weapons. The fuel shortages effectively ruined the V1 and V2 weapons. A heavy bomb halted operations long enough for allied forces to overrun the third.Hamburg suffered heavily at the hands of the bomber fleet. The bombing raids disabled the production of German U-boats.The new directives issued by General Doolittle allowed the Anglo-American air force to fully exploit the capabilities of the Mustang. The tactical change was inevitable, with the performance and relative speeds of aircraft continually increasing.