Rome Essay, Research Paper

The first question that has to be asked is why did Caesar win the civil war with Pompei? Most basically, he was the better general of the two. His army was better and faster, allowing him always to be on the offensive, and allowing him in turn to always provide his (retiring) soldiers with the material bases for survival. In the post-Marius era, a general’s ability to support his current and retired soldiers was paramount in determining his own survivability. As well, Caesar demonstrated repeatedly his ability to provide clemency to erstwhile opponents, and was thus able to a gather more supporters to his banners. Therefore, through growing army power, increasing finances, and patronage, Caesar ascended to the rank of the most powerful Roman warlord and obtained powerful supporters, made up of a coalition of some senators, growing numbers of mounted and wealthy equities from provincial Italian municipalities, as well as foot-soldiers and elites fro regions where his own reputation was based, such as Gaul. All the while, he could count on the support of centurions and veterans. While they made him great, he looked after them, and al these groups came together into the factio–Caesar’s faction. Caesar was also unusual, in that he combined being a good general with great political and legislative skills, as well as excellent rhetorical capabilities.

Next, we must ask why he was killed. While the individual conspirators may have had individual, opportunist motives, in general terms, the assassins all felt they were acting to preserve the republic from growing tyranny and dictatorship of an individual who had made his writ stick by dint of armed force. Of course, Caesar’s senatorial expansion had represented an attack on the exclusivity of the legislative body and its reduction to a rubber stamp. This greatly offended senatorial aristocracies going back hundreds of years. The irony here, though, is that from the days of Sulla, all had seen their own actions in the context of republic-restoration, not recognizing that a government suited to running the affairs of a large city-state was totally inadequate to the needs of a multi- continent empire with a changing socio-economic complexion.

In the same way, the second triumvirate could not last. After Caesar had put forward the model of one man ruling all, no one was likely to be interested in prolonged power sharing. More concretely at least between Octavian and Mark Antony, tension pervaded their relations. Mark Antony perceived himself as the true heir with the proper experience, and viewed Octavian as an inexperienced neophyte. Indeed, on the surface, the latter was hampered from the start. He was quite young, and had no military reputation or demonstrable martial skills. He also went on to only muddle through in these matters. Further, he was financially strapped from the very beginning of the contest, thanks to Mark Antony, and ran the risk of becoming the Senate aristocracy’s creature in their ostensible quest to preserve the republic. Still, Octavian had the legitimacy of Caesar’s will on his side, as well as a growing body of senators who saw Mark Antony as the preeminent threat to the republican order. These latter Octavian was well able to manipulate, just as he cultivate the masses and provincial equities in a way beyond Mark Antony’s capacity.

Thus, trust was conspicuously absent from these two triumvir’s relations. Preeminence was needed, and it was assumed to be obtainable through war. In this, Mark Antony had more lucrative enemies, but also faced more costly and more enervating campaigns. Conversely, Octavian perceived that it was now possible to obtain a good reputation without engaging in far-flung campaigns. People in Otaly and other parts of the Roman core were sick of war, and needed the reestablishment of law and order for human and material survival. Octavian held himself out as able to provide all this, as his settlement of ex-soldiers shows. Thus in addition to the conflict of two individuals, what emerged was the conflict of two political programs, Mark Antony’s based on the old rules of power politics, and Octavian’s resting on new concepts. With critical mass tending in Octavian’s favor, it would have required superb generalship for Mark Antony to prevail, and he was caught short here, even though Octavian was not an exceptional commander and had to rely on allies such as Agrippa. It is important to remember, though, that while what was at stake was the recasting of Rome politically and somewhat sociologically, it is highly likely that none of the major protagonists had any idea that they were on the cusp of an historical hinge, and were all ostensibly fighting for the restoration of the republic as they conceived it. None of the leaders, by 30, were looking beyond the situation at hand.

A brief note should be made of Antony’s Cleopatran diversions. First, Italian Romans were in no way at the point of tolerating anything hinting at a demotion in status in comparison to another region of the state. Second, Egypt under Cleopatra appeared to most Romans as an odd melding of Pharaonic and Hellenic, with none of the positive attributes of republican government and society. Third, and perhaps most directly resonant at the time, though Romans were soon to live under monarchs in all but name, citizens of the republic had a deep, chronic distaste for kings. This was what Egypt had, and what Mark Antony was purported by Octavian’s propagandists to have in store for Rome.