Machiavelli/Us Policy Essay, Research Paper

Great societies have risen and fallen throughout time, coming to power suddenly or gradually, and either prospering for long periods of time, or ending as abruptly as they began. When Niccolo Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513, Italian society was in a state of disrepair. Italy was fragmented and its provinces were fighting amongst themselves, leaving the nation itself open to attack and vulnerable to interference from other countries. The Prince was written as a handbook for one of the most powerful men in Italy, Lorenzo de Medici, and urged him to take action to unify Italy. This handbook, now long infamous, has been seen as a guide for ruthlessness, cruelty, and even violence.

But, upon close examination, it is evident that Machiavelli was essentially extolling the logical virtues of the use of moderation. The entire book presents the art of politics in such a way that one is forced to see the duality of political issues, and also of human nature in those issues. Machiavelli distinguishes between power based on necessity and power based on morality, thereby effectively eliminating the prospect of hatred and violence simply by manipulating circumstances to favor the majority. A good ruler, Machiavelli states, must change with the times, with the people, and adapt to the circumstances. In addition, he must use any means necessary to maintain his control, but avoid any irrational conflict that could cause his ruin. This is what Serbian President Milosovich did in Kosovo, and the United States, in its foreign policy in Kosovo also used such methods. However, Kosovo would seem to be a U.S. mission that was largely humanitarian or moral. This would seem to be in conflict with Machiavellian principles, but the results of U.S. involvement in Kosovo did extend U.S. power and its uphold its president s prestige. Therefore, I would argue that the U.S. did act according to Machiavelli because there was self-interest underlying its moral endeavors in Kosovo, and it applied the correct amount of force that the situation necessitated.

Morality and necessity are an integral part of Machiavellian philosophy, for the simple reason that those are what limit political action. For Machiavelli, politics is a separate realm from morality, because morality does not rely on the practical, rational side of human nature, but constitutes the irrational passions that are destructive to the maintenance of power. Moral action in politics is an extension of the weak side of human nature, and must be kept in check so that it does not interfere with true political action, which is completely reliant on virtue.

Virtue, according to Machiavelli, is a combination of the dual nature of humans, the good and the bad. These good and bad sides of humans are manifested and applied at different times and according to different circumstances. A ruler must transcend his own morality and sentiments and acknowledge the supremacy of reason. Therefore, virtue is the courage to ignore morality and act out of necessity. This necessity brings with it a need to be fair and just with the people, but also to incite fear and awe in order to preserve virtue and stability. This, Machiavelli insists, is because human nature responds more completely and more respectfully to fear (because of the human tendency toward self-preservation and self-interest), and a ruler should use fear as a tool to keep the peace and prevent violence. When this fails and violence erupts, it then becomes necessary to use violence to combat violence. But, the violence or force used must be proportional to the violence already in play. Excessive force, or too little force, will both lead to a bad end, but the necessary amount will help one prevail in such a matter. The proportional means used will justify the end, and maintain a balance. Therefore, fear is used as both a preventative measure and as a solution to violence.

Foreign policy in the U.S. seems to move back and forth between Machiavellian ideals, and it failed to come in concordance with them in the case of Bosnia. A few years before the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, there was the religious and ethnic cleansing taking place in Bosnia. This time, the U.S. responded to the situation because of humanitarian or moral reasons, and not from necessity. In addition, the U.S. publicly and repeatedly voiced its support for Bosnian Muslims, with good moral intentions, but instead the outcome was terrible. The U.S. was not able to ensure those rights nor did it give the support needed, and this led to the slaughter of thousands of Muslim Bosnians by Christian Serbians. Morality, in this instance, led to evil.

The violence in Kosovo brought on by Serbian President Milosovich began with Machiavellian principles, but eventually became disarrayed and lost the goals of true Machiavellian philosophy, whereas United States intervention in Kosovo was based on principles of self-interest and the furthering of U.S. power.

Milosovich lead a powerful majority: the Serbs of Yugoslavia (i.e., of Serbia, including those living in Kosovo). The ethnic Albanians of Kosovo were in this sense a minority. Serbian nationalism was certainly very sympathetic to crushing Kosovars and maintaining Serbia s territorial integrity. So, I would assert that Milosovich was virtuous in the Machiavellian sense that he acted out of necessity and not morality. Although Machiavelli does not discuss ethnic conviction, but would not ethnic nationalism be defined as a moral, value and sentiment based, and therefore irrational impulse? The necessity was to stop Kosovo from breaking away, so Serbian nationalism defined and gave meaning to Serbian actions, led by Milosovich. In this way he was protecting Serbian self-interest, i.e., the interest of the majority, and a necessity to his maintenance of power.

But, where Milosovich miscalculated, according to Machiavelli, is in overestimating Serbia s ability to do in Kosovo what it did in Bosnia, and he underestimated western resolve not to see another Bosnia. So, perhaps one can say he militarily and politically miscalculated. His military certainly was able to crush Kosovar resistance, and he had the Serbian majority behind him in the sense of its distaste for ethnic Albanians, but, when arrayed against the U.S. and NATO, his military certainly was no match. Complicating this matter is the fact that he undertook wars partly to deflect discontent and dissent in Serbia. Serbs wanted him out and wanted democracy, but they also shared his nationalism, or, more accurately, he reflected theirs. So, he was an unpopular leader internally but not necessarily in his external policies, only in his failure to achieve those policies. He was, after all, using whatever means he had at his disposal to maintain power and survival, hence paralleling Machiavelli.

Regarding U.S. involvement in Kosovo, while there are self-interests not wanting to see the war spread between NATO members Greece, a Serbian supporter, and Turkey, an Albanian supporter; being able to use air power more effectively than in Bosnia, without getting U.S. troops involved on the ground until Serb resistance was pretty much crushed it may also be argued that we intervened out of moral principles, that is, out of desire not to see a repeat of Bosnia. Is this Machiavellian? The United States used a proportionate measure of force that contained the conflict and was necessary for the situation, which crushed Milosovich and recently led to his downfall, all goals we wanted. So, the self-interests and preservation of U.S. power certainly were Machiavellian.

Also, U.S. actions in Kosovo did further its power globally. It stopped the conflict from spreading regionally but it also: assisted the other NATO allies in defending the Kosovars against further aggression; defended respect for international law; and established the right of military intervention in other states for human rights or humanitarian reasons. Previously, under international law, sovereignty did not allow the intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another, even if that state is violating human rights. These principles applied in Kosovo protect and extend US power–and therefore the current ruler s, i.e., president s prestige, power, and influence–globally by furthering US goals of free markets, democracy, and human rights.

Machiavelli s political philosophy revolves around the correct use of power, and the moderation of force necessary to maintain that power. Those who rule must separate morality from politics, and incorporate the virtues of reason and rationality in all matters of state. They must learn to use force only when necessary to achieve their ends, and in controlling the ruled, they must learn to cater to majority needs, because it is the majority that will keep them in power. Milosovich attempted to apply these principles, but failed. The United States has used these principles to ensure not only national affluence and power, but also to maintain international influence. Still, it sometimes fails to distinguish (as it did in Bosnia) between what is politically necessary and what is merely an extension of American morals and values

332