Mensheviks’ Critique Of Bolshevism And The Bolshev Essay, Research Paper

Mensheviks’ Critique of Bolshevism and the Bolshevik State “I often remember a funny conversation which was, however,significant for me…when I was taking [university] courses, I talked witha classmate who condemned the members of the People’s Will formurdering people. I didn’t know her very well, so I had to be cautious,and I said, ‘Of course, killing is bad, but it ultimately depends on yourpoint of view.’ And she said so sadly, ‘That’s the whole problem, howto get that point of view.’” Lydia Dan, quoted in The Making of Three Russian Revolutionaries Introduction There are two primary questions with which study of the Mensheviks’struggle against the Bolsheviks must begin. First: Which of theBolsheviks’ policies did the Mensheviks’ oppose? Second: On whatideological grounds did this opposition depend? The second questionis particularly crucial if one wishes to demonstrate that the Mensheviksoffered their contemporaries a viable alternative to both the czaristmonarchy and the Bolshevik dictatorship. It is also important toexamine this question if one wishes to show that the Mensheviks havevaluable lessons for modern Russia. Answering the first question tellsus about historical fact, about what did happen; answering the secondquestion allows us to extrapolate our knowledge of the Mensheviks tocounterfactual and hypothetical cases, to what could have happenedin the past or what might happen in the future.From a different perspective: a universal claim such as: “TheMensheviks would have established a democratic society andrespected civil liberties,” cannot rest upon a particular claim such as:”In 1918, the Mensheviks opposed the suppression of dissidentnewspapers.” The particular claim is consistent with a wide body ofprinciples in conflict with the universal claim. For example: “Dissidentsshould not be suppressed in 1918, but in some years it is quiteadmirable to do so.” Instead, it is necessary to study the ideologicalfoundation of the Mensheviks’ opposition to the Bolsheviks’ policies,and see how they deduced their practices from their theories. Onlywith this full context in mind will it be possible to judge the possibilitiesthat the Menshevik movement had and the lessons that it offers to thepresent.With these standards in mind, it will be argued that the disputesbetween Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, both in theory and in practice,were dwarfed by their shared devotion to orthodox Marxism. Theirdisagreements can be best explained as differences in attitude andemphasis rather than basic principles. Both factions accepted theestablishment of Marxian socialism as an ideal goal, and both rejectedindividualist political theories that demanded toleration of dissent andpluralist democracy as a matter of principle. Instead, the Mensheviksrested their opposition to repressive Bolshevik policies on secondarytheorems in the Marxian system, and would have supported dictatorialpolicies under different circumstances. Many Mensheviksdemonstrated a surprising tolerance of Bolshevik policies. In fact,some were so in sympathy with the Bolsheviks that they voted withtheir feet and joined the Bolsheviks just as Lenin’s authoritarianismwas becoming most obvious.The major theme of this essay, then, is that the differences betweenthe Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks have been overrated. Theirdifferences may be better explained as variations upon shared Marxistthemes than major differences. The magnitude of their philosophicdisagreement, not the emotional intensity of their internecine disputes,is the proper yardstick for comparing and contrasting eachmovements’ likely effects upon a society under its sway. In the contextof the full range of political ideologies, this magnitude is a small one,and the effects of both movements if one came to dominate a societywould have been similar.Brief Review of Relevant Marxist Concepts Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks described themselves as “orthodoxMarxists,” so it seems important to have a basic understanding of theirshared Marxist theories. Then it will be possible to understand how thetwo factions could disagree with each other yet share a commonreverence for Marx. Four themes that recur throughout the debates ofthe Russian Marxists are: the economic interpretation of history, thestage theory of social development, the class struggle, and their”positive” as opposed to “negative” or “bourgeois” view of humanfreedom. Let us briefly elaborate upon each.The economic interpretation of history argues that economic ortechnological changes, changes in the means of production, are the”ultimate” determinants of a society’s condition. Ideas, philosophy,religion, and sociology are not independent variables, but must betraced back to changes in the methods of production. Quoting Marx:”The social relations are intimately attached to the productive forces.In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode ofproduction, and in changing their mode of production, their manner ofgaining a living, they change all their social relations. The windmillgives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with theindustrial capitalist.”1 In Marx’s view, therefore, social change must ultimately be explainedby changes in the means of production, not by individual action orideas. And, because technological progress follows a predictablecourse, history should also be predictable, governed by scientific laws.According to Marx, these laws state that history is divided into differentperiods or “stages,” feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communismbeing the four final stages. And, since capitalism comes betweenfeudalism and socialism, it is quite impossible to jump from one to theother. Instead, a society must pass through each in due time.2 Untilhumanity reaches the communist stage, Marx believed, each historicalperiod would be characterized by what he termed “class struggle.”Different social groups have incompatible interests, while members ofthe same social groups have similar interests, so the natural tendencyis for classes with conflicting interests to strive to thwart and exploitone another. Each stage of history ends when a previouslysubordinate class attains power and becomes the new exploitingclass. And, because it is an historical law that ruling classes do notgive up their power voluntarily, one should expect changes in powerrelations to be accompanied by violence, by some sort of class war.Thus, when socialism replaces capitalism: “The proletariat will use itspolitical supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from thebourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands ofthe state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class”3 A finalelement in Marx’s system that tends to derail analysis of theMensheviks and Bolsheviks is Marx’s theory of freedom. He clearlydoes not accept the individualist, “bourgeois,” theory of freedom that aperson is “free” if he is left alone, if he is not aggressed against. AsMarx states: “And the abolition of this state of things is called by thebourgeoisie, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. Theabolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, andbourgeois freedom is undoubtably aimed at. “By freedom is meant,under present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, freeselling and buying.”But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buyingdisappears also.This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other ‘brave words’of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any,only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fetteredtraders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to thecommunistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeoisconditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.”4 Theimplications of this viewpoint are quite interesting. First, buying andselling – free exchange among consenting adults – is not an aspect offreedom, but an obstacle to it. True freedom exists when suchexchanges are “abolished,” presumably with violence. Second,”freedom” does not include the “freedom to be a member of thebourgeoisie.” Instead, Marx’s freedom appears when the bourgeoisieis “abolished.” Once again, this appears to imply violence, since thebourgeoisie could hardly be expected to abolish itself voluntarily. Inshort, the Marxist view of freedom, rather than assuring protection forthose who do not fit into the Marxist pattern, sanctions theirsuppression.The Early Menshevik-Bolshevik Debates and the 1903 Schism Given this admittedly oversimplified background, we may now jump tothe early stages of the Russian Marxist movement. The first majorattempt to unite Russian Marxists occurred in 1898, when a congressof Russian socialists met in Minsk and announced the formation of theRussian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). This fell apart whenthe czarist police captured the members of the party’s CentralCommittee a few weeks later.5 The next important step came in 1900and 1901 when Lenin, Martov, Plekhanov, Axelrod, and otherrevolutionary socialists began publishing two Marxist periodicals:Iskra, a popular weekly, and Zaria, a more theoretical journal.6 Thisphase is interesting because the future Bolsheviks and Menshevikswere acting jointly. Lenin and Martov, among others, vigorouslyattacked various “deviationist” factions, such as Economists andRevisionists, and revealed a shared tendency to equate ideologicaldisagreement with intellectual dishonesty. Thus, Martov wrote, “Thestruggle between the ‘critics’ and ‘orthodox’ Marxists is really the firstchapter of a struggle for political hegemony between the proletariatand bourgeois democracy. In the uprising of the bourgeoisintelligentsia against proletarian hegemony, we see, hidden under anideological mask, the class struggle of the advanced section ofbourgeois society against the revolutionary proletariat.” Compare thisto Lenin: “Hence, to belittle socialist ideology in any way, to deviatefrom it in the slightest degree, means the strengthening of bourgeoisideology.”7 Martov and Lenin also voiced similar views about the”spontaneously” emerging labor movement, stating that it would shiftthe workers’ attention from changing the social system to changingtheir relative position within the existing system. Some form ofauthoritarian paternalism would, under such circumstances, bejustified. As Haimson describes Martov’s view: “In the face of the’treachery and violence of the reactionaries,’ it was their [SocialDemocrats'] duty to temporarily ‘organize the movement from the topdown so as to insure the careful selection and training of itsmembers.’”8 The first obvious break in the ranks of the avowedly”orthodox” Marxists occurred during the second congress of theRSDLP in July 1903, when a debate betweeen Lenin and Martovprecipitated a full-fledged schism. Interestingly, the debate was noteven over the proper aims of the party. Plekhanov wrote the followingprogram of ultimate demands, which, according to Landauer, wasapproved without controversy: “By replacing the private ownership ofthe means of production with public ownership and by introducing aplanned organization of the processes of production in order tosafeguard the welfare and the many-sided development of all themembers of society, the social revolution of the proletariat will put anend to the division of society into classes and thus will liberate all theoppressed humanity as well as end all forms of exploitation of one partof society by another.”An essential condition for this social revolution is the dictatorship ofthe proletariat, i.e., the conquest by the proletariat of such politicalpower as will enable it to quell all opposition by the exploiters.”9Instead of arguing about these propositions, quite authoritarian in theirconcrete implications (Who will “plan” the processes of production?How can the proletariat simultaneously “quell all opposition byexploiters” and “end all forms of exploitation by one part of society byanother”?), the debate broke out over the proper method of achievingthese goals. Even the differences over the proper means were notparticularly great. As Getzler explains, “both [Lenin and Martov]wanted a centralized party. But as soon as they turned to considerhow completely the party should be centralized, how its centralismshould be organized, and above all who should man and control itscentre, they turned by degrees from partners to opponents.”10 Whatwere these two different conceptions of the party? Lenin expressed hisviews in his famous essay “What is to be Done?” In his opinion, theparty should consist exclusively of full-time revolutionaries. Theseprofessional activists would necessarily be under strict control of thecentral committee of the party, which would make every effort tomaintain the orthodoxy and ideological purity of Social Democracy.Important decisions would be made by the central committee. On theother hand, Martov believed that the party should include politicallyinterested workers, peasants, and intellectuals as well as full-timerevolutionaries. And, given this broader definition of a “party member,”discipline and orthodoxy would be less strict than under Lenin’ssystem.The actual schism came about when Lenin exploited the votingsystem at the congress to achieve a formal approval for his plans.Following debate and disagreement between Martov and Lenin on theparty membership question, minority factions of the RSDLP walkedout of the congress. This walk-out left a disproportionately large groupof “hards,” i.e., adherents of the Leninist conception of the party.There were twenty Leninist delegates with a total of twenty-four votes.This gave his faction a majority. Lenin’s forces then barred Martov andPotresov from addreessing the congress, expelled Axelrod, Zasulich,and Potresov from the editorial board, and elected a CentralCommittee of Leninists. Martov refused to serve on the new editorialboard.11 The second congress adjourned on August 23, 1903, with allthe important aspects of Lenin’s program in place. Since Lenin’sfaction held a majority of the votes for a brief moment, they quicklydubbed themselves “Bolsheviks,” or “Majorityites.” Their opponentswere called Mensheviks, or “Minorityites.” The question that now facedthe the Mensheviks was: How do we differ from the Bolsheviks? Tosplit solely on organizational grounds would seem trivial indeed.Haimson aptly summarizes this curious dilemma: “Already, theMartovites were searching for some doctrinal grounds upon which tobase their opposition, and at first this search was difficult, not so muchbecause such differences were absent, but because they were still sosubtle and had been buried and evaded for so long.”12 EventuallyMenshevik writers came to justify their break on the grounds thatLenin’s conception would make the party a “mechanistic centralist”one. It would exclude revolutionary elements of the proletariat whounfortunately were not fully enlightened. It would also stifle politicalinitiative. Hence, the Mensheviks spurned Lenin’s belated peaceofferings.Next, Plekhanov, who originally sided with Lenin, tried to reunite thedivided factions of the party. He had not changed his mind, butbelieved that the issue was not worth splitting over. Lenin, now firmlydedicated to wiping out the Menshevik deviation, proceeded to breakwith Plekhanov, stating, “I am now fighting for the CC [CentralCommittee] which the Martovites also want to seize, brazened byPlekhanov’s cowardly betrayal.”13 Over time, the Mensheviks came tore-define their doctrinal differences in a more sophisticated andtechnical way. Martov and Akselrod discovered a full-fledgedcontradiction in Lenin’s system. As Martov and Akelrod explained it,the subjective goal of Social Democracy was to advance the politicalmaturity and independence of the proletariat. Lenin’s objectivemethod, however, was to create a class of revolutionary intelligentsiato dominate the proletariat. Lenin’s means, then, was incompatiblewith his end, because his method of advancing the proletariat actuallywound up by ruling it. Naturally, Lenin counterattacked. He repeatedhis earlier arguments, then denounced the “anarchistic, individualistic”character of the Mensheviks’ opposition to ultra-centrism. Thespontaneous flailing of the masses, unguided by a sound and sturdyMarxist vanguard could never represent the march of history. In short,without the Leninist party, the workers would, at best, develop mere”trade-union consciousness” and would never work to attain truesocialism.Plekhanov, the senior member of the Iskra board, rebuked Lenin. Infact, Marx claimed exactly the opposite of what Lenin was claiming:not only were the masses capable of achieving proletarianconsciousness all by themselves, but they would do so inevitably,since economic forces are the ultimate determinants of ideas andactions.14 By November of 1903, Plekhanov turned against Lenin,and invited Martov, Akselrod, and other Mensheviks back to Iskra’sboard. Lenin resigned but was not expelled from the party. Now, underPlekhanov’s leadership, the Mensheviks rejoined the moderateBolsheviks to form a single party.15 Analysis of the Debates andSchism The early debates between the future factions of the RussianMarxists and their subsequent schism illustrate their similarity nicely.At no point did any faction openly challenge any of the basicpostulates of Marx. Indeed, they considered Marx to be anauthoritative guide to the truth. Both factions of the party willingly andfreely voted for Plekhanov’s statement of the ultimate demands ofSocial Democracy cited above. Both factions favored some form ofcentralized party: Lenin leaned towards one-man rule, while Martovfelt more comfortable with some kind of collective leadership. Leninwanted a carefully regulated party membership, while Martov wasmore tolerant, more concerned with admitting enlightened members ofthe masses.There were other differences between the Bolsheviks and theMensheviks that surfaced at this time. For example, Getzler statesthat Martov “reproved Plekhanov for his cynical rejection of democraticprinciples at the party congress and told him that he should at leasthave added that ’so tragic a situation was unthinkable as one in whichthe proletariat to consolidate its victory would have to violate suchpolitical rights as, e.g., the freedom of the press.’” Also, theMensheviks’ opposition to Lenin’s ultra-centralism reveals someconcern for free voting and pluralism that could obviously not exist in aLeninist party.Still, this dispute over the status of civil liberties and free voting couldby no stretch of the imagination be transformed into the heart of theMenshevik-Bolshevik dispute. There was no important argument overPlekhanov’s statement of principles, which are staggeringlyauthoritarian in their implications. If one studies Plekhanov’sstatement (cited above), one can see that it was not a watered-downbody of vague generalizations that anyone could agree with. Instead,it stated explicitly that the RSDLP intended to abolish privateownership of the means of production with “planning of the productiveprocesses.” Such planning necessarily implies the existence ofplanners who do the planning; in short, of some kind hegemonicsystem that would impose its views upon the entire society. Similarly,Plekhanov’s program stated plainly that a dictatorship of the proletariatwould have to seize control of the state and quell all opposition. Thiswas not controversial among the delegates to the congress, whoratified it quickly and turned to other matters. If the issue of civilliberties and competetive voting were truly important to theMensheviks, why did they fail to demand a prominent and explicitaffirmation of their values in Plekhanov’s statement? A reasonablehypothesis is that Martov and his fellow Mensheviks were notconcerned about civil liberties and democracy in a serious way. Whilethey thought that civil liberties and democracy were good in theory, didnot want to argue about it. In fact, they were quite willing to cooperatewith other Marxists who openly scorned these values.Further support for this interpretation comes from the remainder of thedebates.At no point did Martov or any other Menshevik demand that Lenin’sfaction guarantee their support for political freedom. The properstructure of the party was the issue that dominated the debates. TheMensheviks’ conception of the party was more sympathetic to civilliberties and democracy than Lenin’s, but it was hardly the thrust of theMensheviks’ argument. Instead, they favored their kind of partybecause it would advance the cause of Social Democracy, asenunciated by Plekhanov, more efficiently than Lenin’s system (whichwould alienate almost everyone). As Martov put it, “the wider the titleof party member is spread, the better. We could but rejoice is everystriker or demonstrator, when called to account for his actions coulddeclare himself a party member.16 Lenin denounced Menshevikconceptions of the party as “anarchistic” and “individualistic,” but thiswas mainly name-calling rather than serious criticism. Martov andAkselrod, for example, did not concentrate on the dictatorial characterof Lenin’s party. Instead, they made technical philosophicalarguments. They argued that there was a contradiction between thesubjective goal of enlightening the proletariat and the objective meansof ultra-centralization. Plekhanov, likewise, chastised Lenin forimplicitly denying the inevitability of the proletarian revolution. Sincethe proletariat, driven by the laws of history, was destined to overthrowcapitalism and establish Marxian socialism, it was incorrect for Leninto argue that an elitist revolutionary party was necessary to groom theproletariat before it could attain this goal.If the Mensheviks were advocates of civil liberties and democracy,their behavior up to the schism reveals that they were among the mostanemic and apathetic advocates of political freedom in history. Theybelonged to a party of which a major faction had open contempt forsuch concerns. While in that party, they did not make a big issue outof their differences. They cooperated freely with avowed authoritariansto achieve social change. They were able to endorse Plekhanov’sstatement of principles without a large debate. Their most vigorousargument against Lenin’s theory of the party was that it was aninefficient means for achieving socialism. In sum, while someMensheviks voiced minor interest in political freedom, it was near thebottom of their agenda. We shall see how much that agenda changedas the Menshevik movement matured.Bolshevik-Menshevik Conflict to the February Revolution Wartime reveals interesting facts about the Mensheviks and theBolsheviks. Under critical and intense circumstances such as thoseprovided by war, one can observe the similarities and differences oftheir respective positions and the reasons behind those positions. Ashistory would have it, both factions of Russian Marxism were alive andactive during both the Revolution of 1905 and World War I. It is tothese phases of Menshevik-Bolshevik debate that we will now turn.The Revolution of 1905 was preceded by the outbreak of thee Russo-Japanese War. Martov was particularly vocal in denouncing this war,and hoped that it would end with a negotiated peace. He supportedneither government, saying, “We are international socialists, andtherefore any political alliance of the socialists of our country with anyclass state whatever, we regard as betrayal of the cause ofrevolution.” His slogan was “peace at any price.” Getzler remarks that,”there was also an element of humanitarian pacifism in him even if hewould not explicitly admit it.”17 Perhaps, but the thrust of Martov’sargument against the war was that it was a conflict between rulingclasses and as such contrary to the interests of the proletariat of bothnations. The position of Lenin and the Bolsheviks was similar.The Revolution of 1905 followed the Russo-Japanese War. Thisrevolution was not led by the RSDLP, but both factions were intenselyinterested in it. Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks generally agreed withMarx’s view that in a country such as Russia, still ruled by an absolutemonarch and without a large proletariat, the revolution would not besocialist in character. Instead, at this stage of historical development,it was necessary for the bourgeoisie to seize power from the czar andestablish a liberal democratic regime favorable to their own interests.The proletariat would gain somewhat from this shift, but the mainbeneficiaries would be the bourgeoisie itself. Once the bourgeois werefirmly in command, they would clear the road for the impendingtransition to socialism.18 There were many variations and differenceswithin this paradigm. Potresov looked upon a government of, for, andby the bourgeoisie with satisfaction. He was confident that thebourgeoisie would allow political freedom and sweep away theremnants of czarist feudalism. Plekhanov was less enthusiastic. Heagreed that it was historically necessary for the bourgeoisie to hold thereins of power for a while, but disliked it nevertheless. Still, hebelieved that the bourgeoisie would grant everyone political freedomso long as they were not frightened by radical movements. Martov wasmore hostile to the bourgeoisie, arguing that they were timid andconservative and therefore interested in a compromise with the czar.All these factions basically agreed that the proletariat could bestadvance its interests by throwing its support behind the bourgeoisieand refraining from any attempt to establish socialism before its time.Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks were ambivalent. They agreed that thebourgeoisie was a progressive force in society, then appended thatsocialists should only support the bourgeoisie until it developed itsown political program and organizations. Then, the duty of socialistschanged: socialists should advance the more radical program ofsocialism rather than the half-hearted program of liberal democracy.19Most of the Russian Marxists were unwilling to participate in thedemocratic government that the revolution temporarily established.Getzler explains this position succinctly: “To govern in coalition withliberals and democrats would be to renounce their class opposition tothe existing order, to accept responsibility for bourgeois policies, andeven to find themselves in conflict with the masses of theproletariat.”20 Moreover, both Martov and Lenin believed that the timewas not yet ripe for socialist parties to seize power for themselves.They must limit themselves to assisting the bourgeoisie against theautocracy. There was an important exception to this rule. If thebourgeoisie proved too timid and weak to seize power, then thesocialist parties would have to do so in their place. Given that mostMarxists agreed that the Russian bourgeoisie had a history of timidityand weakness, this exception is more important than it seems.Once the 1905 Revolution created parliamentary organizations, theMensheviks tended to favor improving the workers’ position bychanging the laws democratically; the Bolsheviks were less friendlytowards such means. Some of the demands that the Mensheviksmade in 1906 included the creation of unemployment insurance, theeight-hour day, and municipalization of land. The Mensheviks wereafraid of the full-fledged nationalization of land; this measure wouldsurely strengthen state power, and, as Martov put it, “so long as thecapitalist mode of production prevails, state power will always bebourgeois.”21 By opposing the nationalization of land, the Mensheviks differed with both the Bolsheviks and non-Marxistsocialists such as the Social Revolutionaries.Concurrently, inter-party disputes gradually led to an official splitbetween the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. At the fifth congress ofthe RSDLP in 1907, the division between the two wings was obvious.The Mensheviks opposed revolutionary activity because it wouldendanger parliamentary institutions under which the proletariat hadwon impressive gains. Trade unions were legal, and the newgovernment respected the freedom of the press and the right ofassembly. Some Mensheviks wished to make Social Democracy anumbrella party which would include labor unions, socialists, andcooperatives of all types.The Bolsheviks took a very different position: Social Democratsshould try to inflame the masses by denouncing the moderation andweakness of the Duma.22 Between the 1907 conference and the finalschism of 1912, three distinct factions appeared amongst the RSDLP:the moderate Mensheviks, the revolutionary Mensheviks, and theBolsheviks. The moderates devoted themselves to peaceful reformsand cooperation with the labor movement. They favored the abolitionof the illegal portions of the party apparatus. The revolutionaryMensheviks included Plekhanov, Martov, Dan, and Trotsky. They likedthe legal gains that socialism had made but also wanted to preservethe illegal party structure. Lenin and the Bolsheviks denounced thereformist trend running through Menshevism and repeated theirdemands for the centralized and revolutionary party described byLenin in his “What is to be Done?” These factions were ablecooperate successfully until 1912, when the party congress invitedsome deviationist factions to attend the London conference in order tounify the party. Lenin was particularly outraged by this compromise. Through skillful political maneuvering, Lenin split off his faction fromthe rest of the RSDLP, then proclaimed his faction to be the complete”true” RSDLP.Trotsky tried to bring Lenin back into the fold and failed. World War I’ssudden beginning overshadowed the drive to reunite RussianMarxism.23 World War I challenged the world-view of orthodoxMarxists. They were internationalists, who believed that strugglebetween nations distracted workers from the real struggle betweenclasses. Yet most socialists in Europe chose to support theirrespective national governments. Naturally, this seemed like a greatbetrayal. And, as a corollary, any faction that remained internationalistdemonstrated the genuineness of its orthodoxy and virtue.Most of the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks remained devotees ofinternationalism; as a consequence, they grew together during thewar. Three distinct positions sprang up in their ranks. The first was apro-Russia position called “revolutionary defensism.” These camefrom Plekhanov’s section of Menshevik camp. At the other extremewas Lenin, who advocated “revolutionary defeatism,” i.e. the defeat of”his” native government by the Germans. Martov favored a positionbetween these extremes: immediate negotiated peace withoutannexations or indemnities. Lenin respected Martov’s opinion butdenounced the defensists vigorously. Martov, while theoreticallysympathetic to Lenin, distrusted him as a person; at the same time,Martov refused to condemn pro-war socialists without reservation. Hedisagreed with them but forgave them because he thought that theywere mistakenly obeying the will of the masses.24 Let us compareand contrast the positions of Lenin and Martov. Lenin believed that the

war was an expression of capitalist imperialism. It was a strugglebetween ruling classes and therefore opposed to the interests of themasses. Lenin hated the czarist government so much that he saidthat he would prefer a German victory to a Russian victory. Yet he didnot condemn the war for its massive destruction of innocent life; to hismind, the true revolutionary was not in any sense a “pacifist” or”humanitarian.” He sought to use the war to destroy capitalism andimprove his faction’s position vis-a-vis other socialist organizations.Lenin explained the pro-war nationalist stance of other socialists as adeliberate betrayal of the masses. Hence, he refused to deal withdefensists on any terms.Martov agreed with Lenin that the war was an expression of capitalistimperialism, a struggle between ruling classes and contrary to theinterests of the masses. Unlike Lenin, Martov believed that since allnations were partially in the wrong it was incorrect to desire the victoryor defeat of any combatant. He was morally appalled at the horrors ofwar. Therefore he favored, “the speediest possible termination of thewar and the most radical steps in the direction of disarmament.” Giventhis, he obviously did not plan to use the war to advance the cause ofsocialism; he wanted to end it at once. Martov believed that pro-warsocialists had been swayed by the patriotic masses, and yearned topersuade his fellow socialists that they were wrong.25 Martov wantedsocialists to take an active part in the peace negotiations. As he wrotewith Lapinsky, “Only in the event that peace is conquered through thepressure of the popular masses, and is not the result of a newconspiracy of predatory diplomacy and reactionary cliques afteruniversal exhaustion, only then will socialism and democracy be sureto assert their influence on the peace settlement and the future orderin Europe.” He believed that a reunited international socialistmovement, standing up in favor of a negotiated peace, could lead thepost-war struggle of the proletariat for political power. The proletariat’sstruggle for power would begin in the most advanced capitalistcountries. Backward areas like his native Russia would still need topass through their bourgeois democratic phase before they would beready for socialism.26 Analysis of the Conflict to the FebruaryRevolution Since the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks only emerged asdistinct parties after 1903, it might be unreasonable to expect sharpdifferences between them before that break. Perhaps only after thebreak did they develop their distinctive ideologies and politicalprograms. In this case, the student of the Mensheviks could chart theirevolution and argue that their initial differences with the Bolshevikswere the first step on a long road of intellectual growth. The crucialquestion then becomes: Did Menshevism develop a distinct identity asan ideology and a movement after 1903? The correct answer is aqualified No. Almost all of their post-1903 battles with the Bolshevikswere either foreshadowed by earlier debates or minor arguments overtactics. Both factions continued to religiously interpret all events andstrategies through the categories invented by Marx in his philosophicalwritings. Both continued to uphold Marxian socialism as an ideal goal.For all the emotion of their arguments and frantic inter-party politicalmaneuvering, their initial differences were minor and did not growappreciably over time.Most Bolsheviks and Mensheviks shared the same theories about warand social development. In both the Russo-Japanese War and WorldWar I, most of them agreed that socialists should not support anygovernment in international disputes, because wars are conflictsbetween ruling classes, all of whose interests are opposed to theproletariat’s. The real “war” was being waged internally in each nationby the exploiting classes against the exploited classes. On this issue,both factions agree with Marx that workingmen have no country.The main difference between the anti-war Marxists is that Martov andhis followers added a humanitarian pacifist element to the aboveMarxist criticism, while Lenin did not. Martov, then, was convinced thatwar was bad as such, so he wanted to end it immediately with victoryfor none. Lenin believed that war could be a catalyst for revolutionarychange, so he hoped for the defeat of his own government by themore historically advanced nation of Germany.Both factions also agreed that all social development must follow thesame route. It was impossible, in their opinion, to leap from czaristautocracy straight to socialism. Instead, it was absolutely necessarythat Russia pass through an intermediate stage of bourgeoisdemocracy. Most of them were not enthusiastic about this, but viewedit as a necessary step forward. The Mensheviks stressed thatbourgeois democracy would bring political liberty. This might be agood argument that they differed from the Bolsheviks – except that theBolsheviks made exactly the same argument! Quoting Lenin, “Thedemocratic revolution is a bourgeois revolution. But we Marxists mustknow that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to realfreedom for the proletariat and the peasantry than the path ofbourgeois freedom and bourgeois progress. We must not forget thatthere is not, nor can there be at the present time, any other means ofbringing socialism nearer than by complete political liberty, ademocratic republic, a revolutionary- democratic dictatorship of theproletariat and the peasantry.”27 The fact is that Marxists believed thatsocialism could only develop under bourgeois capitalism with the civilliberties and political freedom that accompanied it. This is not goodevidence for the claim that the Mensheviks or Bolsheviks valued civilliberties on principle. One could argue, in a similar way, that theseMarxists “really” favored capitalism just because they admitted that theexistence of capitalism was a necessary precondition for the existenceof socialism.Of course, there were variations upon this world-view. Mensheviksgenerally thought that the proletariat should avoid frightening thebourgeoisie by making radical socialist demands; Lenin took theopposite view. Mensheviks had more hope for improving workers’well-being through parliamentary democracy than Bolsheviks did. Butboth agreed that a violent revolution would eventually be necessary.Consider the final break between the two factions in 1912. Whathappened here is that the Mensheviks tried to open up the RSDLP byinviting minor factions to attend the party congress. The Bolsheviksretaliated by breaking away from the Mensheviks. Lenin thenproclaimed his followers the “real” RSDLP and re-organized the partyon Leninist principles. The Mensheviks tried to heal this split. Theyfailed.The 1912 schism, in short, resembles the 1903 schism very closely.The Mensheviks, in both cases, leaned toward a broader membership;the Bolsheviks did not. The Mensheviks wanted a less centralizedparty; the Bolsheviks wanted a Leninist ultra-centralist party. In bothcases the issue was the proper way to organize a party to advance thecause of Marxian socialism. They split into rival factions on the basisof this derivative issue that seems unimportant (or at best a redherring) to non-Marxists. Ergo, their differences were slight in both1903 and 1912, and the grounds for both breaks were nearly identical.Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were alike in most respects whether oneexamines them at a particular party congress or over the course of adecade.Theory Becomes Practice: February Revolution to 1922 Crackdown When the February Revolution started, Marxists had to determine howthey would deal with the new government. The Mensheviks voted tojoin the provisional government, over the protest of Martov.28 Themajority of Bolsheviks, too, looked at new government with pleasure.Only after Lenin announced his bitter opposition to the new regimeand struggled to rally his followers behind him did Bolshevik opinionturn against the provisional authorities.29 During the reign of theprovisional government, defensist Mensheviks backed thegovernment’s plan to prolong the war. Martov took the opposite view -Russia should give up the war effort and strive for a general peacesettlement. Lenin disagreed with both groups: in his analysis, it wasfutile to ask the bourgeois government of Russia to conclude a peace;instead, Russia should make a separate peace by overthrowing thecurrent government.In the interim between the February and the October Revolutions, theMensheviks and Bolsheviks tried to reunite. Martov sent a concilatoryletter to the Bolsheviks when the government cracked down uponthem. Even though Martov criticized the Bolsheviks for their extrememethods, they accepted his letter with warmth. Martov thought that aparty that included a wide range of social democrats, includingBolsheviks, would be a good idea. He was, in fact, mainly afraid of areactionary coup that would destroy the provisional government. Onlylater did he see that the Bolsheviks were dangerous enemies of thedemocracy.During this time, the Bolsheviks were expanding in numbers, partiallyat the expense of the Mensheviks. Martov and other Menshevikleaders did not give full-fledged support to the new government; theywere also unwilling to oppose it. The reason for this is clear: asorthodox Marxists, they believed that a period of bourgeois democracymust precede the socialist revolution, hence their support. But, asMarxists, they were enemies of bourgeois democracy and identifiedthat social system as an enemy of the proletariat, hence theirunwillingness to participate in it. The Lenin and his Bolsheviks lookedat the situation otherwise. They went directly to the masses withsolutions to their major problems and asked for the power to carry outthe solutions. The Bolshevik approach proved more persuasive.30 Butpersuasion was hardly the essence of the Bolshevik strategy. InNovember of 1917, they managed to disband the preparliament andarrest many of its leaders. Next they began their assualt upon theremnants of the provisional government. In Petrograd, they built thenucleus of the new Soviet state.The Mensheviks were displeased by this – but hardly outraged.Instead, they thought that their task was to moderate the policies ofthe Bolsheviks. Also, they wanted to persuade Lenin to admit otherparties into the new government. Some Mensheviks backed the newgovernment; others did not. Both groups weighed what were, as theysaw it, the relative benefits and costs of collaboration versusopposition. If they collaborated, they would be supporting an extremistfaction bent upon thrusting Marxism upon an unprepared nation.However, they would also be supporting a party intent upon a socialisttransformation of society, which, however poorly timed, seemedadmirable. If they opposed the Bolsheviks, they would lend strength toreactionaries who surely had plans for a counter-revolution. Yet if they did not oppose them, democracy mightdisappear. Since socialism would inevitably fail unless preceded by anera of bourgeois democracy, the masses’ feelings towards socialismmight permanently sour.31 Most Mensheviks took a middle ground -they would try to persuade their fellow Marxists to adopt a more sanecourse of action.32 Two important factions existed amongst theMensheviks. The larger was that of Martov. Here is Brovkin’ssummary of his position: “The party’s historic role at this stage of therevolution, as Martov saw it, lay, on the one hand, in opposingBolshevik extremist, destructive, anarcho-syndicalist, and dictatorialpolicies, and on the other, in preventing the organization by the RightSocialists of armed struggle against the Bolsheviks.” The smallerfaction, a coalition of the supporters of Potresov, Liber, and Dan, wasopenly hostile to Bolshevism: “To the Defensists, the Bolsheviks werea destructive force, an irresponsible, adventuristic, extremist clique ofparty activists who had deceived the workers and betrayed RussianDemocracy. The Defensists portrayed the Menshevik party as theparty of the conscious proletariat, opposed to the destruction of theforces of production. Consequently, the Mensheviks should seekalliances with other democratic forces and not with the Bolsheviks.” 33The final vote at the Extraordinary Congress where the Mensheviksdebated was (out of 120): Martov, 50; Dan, 26; Liber, 13; andPotresov, 10. Brovkin notes that even if all of the opponents ofMartov’s position had united, they would still have been defeated.Lenin’s early policy was to “Seize the bourgeoisie by the throat!” asthe Bolshevik slogan went. He did not like the results, so he changedhis program.Now he favored what he called “state capitalism.” This was neverrigorously defined, but it seemed to mean that private enterprise wouldbe permitted but heavily regulated by the state. Mensheviks of allpersuasions looked upon this favorably. Potresov attacked it asinsufficiently capitalist; Martov and Dan were pleased by Lenin’schange of mind, and rejected Potresov’s more laissez-faire view. Ofcourse, as Marxists, their opinions were explicitly based upon theirtheory of historical development which precluded a jump from theirpresent state to socialism. Lenin’s “Socialism now” policy was naive inits disregard of historical law.34 Once Lenin revealed the concretemeaning of “state capitalism,” the Mensheviks were critical. Leninadvocated full government control of the economy; Menshevikswanted a partnership between government, organized labor, andindustrialists. Lenin wanted trade unions that would serve thegovernment, whereas Mensheviks wanted independent trade unions.Both groups favored state regulation of industry, but the Mensheviksopposed the Bolsheviks’ extreme centralization of this regulation. TheMensheviks favored partial denationalization of the banks and wantedthe fixed food prices raised to encourage more food production; theBolsheviks rejected these revisions.35 Let us turn to the Mensheviks’position on civil liberties. They certainly criticized the Bolshevikspersecution of people on account of their opinions, whether written orspoken. In fact, the Mensheviks were often on the receiving end of thisrepression. However, it appears that they mainly criticized theBolsheviks for their attacks upon the non-Bolshevik socialist press.The Mensheviks did not favor silencing the bourgeoisie and czarists.Neither did they condemn the Bolsheviks on principle for punishingpeople for their opinions. This would be the acid test of theircommitment to civil liberties. As in the 1903 debates, the Mensheviksgave only tertiary attention to this issue.36 By July 1919, in their “Whatis to be Done?”, most of the Mensheviks had switched to whatamounts, more or less, to a sanction of repression: they favored civilliberties for all parties of the “toiling masses” and asked only that suchrepression as did exist be carried out by a judiciary rather than theCheka.37 As the Bolsheviks became more violent and dictatorial inmid-1918, the two distinct factions in Menshevism polarized and finallysplit. The larger section, guided by Martov, decided to accept theOctober Revolution as “historically necessary” and support the Redsin the civil war against the Whites. They criticized uninhibiteddictatorship by Lenin because of its psychological effects upon themasses: while proletarians needed to develop political consciousnessto prepare for socialism, the dictatorship bred the opposite. Thisfaction decided that, for all its faults, Bolshevism was superior to aWhite victory, and therefore condemned the other faction ofMenshevism.38 These people, the Right Mensheviks, favored acomplete boycott of Bolshevik institutions. Mensheviks should notlegitimize the Bolsheviks by becoming their junior partners. The Rightsargued for parliamentary democracy, not a “soviet democracy,” as afinal goal. Interestingly, the latter plank, asserted by Liber, wasapparently the position of all Mensheviks just a year earlier.39 Getzlerindicates that the Menshevik majority’s compromise was in partmotivated by the defection of many Mensheviks to the Bolsheviks.40As the civil war intensified the Bolsheviks became progressively morebrutal and totalitarian. This change was not mere pragmatism in theface of war; instead, Bolshevik theoreticians defended their behaviorrighteously. Trotsky did so publicly with writings such as “The Defenseof Terrorism.” In My Life Trotsky justified his liberal use of the deathpenalty upon uncooperative conscripts with these words: “An armycannot be built without reprisals. Masses of men cannot be led todeath unless the army command has the death penalty in its arsenal. So long as those malicious tailless apes that are so proud of theirtechnical achievements – the animals that we call men – will buildarmies and wage wars, the command will always be obliged to placethe soldiers between the possible death in the front and the probableone in the rear.”41 There is no small irony in the writings of Trotskyduring and about the civil war. In tone, they resemble a debate overthe fine points of Marxist dogma; in content they concern life anddeath for millions of human beings.It is in this cultural context that Martov, in 1919 and 1920, advanced anew position towards Bolshevism that he termed “semi-loyal, semi-irreconcilable.” He admitted to his fellow Mensheviks that thedictatorship had allowed a “thick layer of careerists, speculators, newbureaucrats, and plain scoundrels” to grow. The Bolshevik state had”ceased” to be a state of peasants and workers, but it was stillpossible (though unlikely) for the Bolshevik state to regeneratebecause of the idealists present among those in power. In the finalanalysis, the Bolsheviks were bad but a successful counter-revolutionwas worse. The militant enemies of Bolshevism among theMensheviks denounced Martov’s position; indeed, even moderatesfound parts of it hard to swallow. Martov’s reply was simple and clear:”We reject the Bolshevik way of posing the question – victory first,reforms after – because the absence of reforms makes for defeat andnot for victory. But we also reject your way of putting it – reforms firstand a revolutionary assualt on counter-revolution after – because itmay happen that nothing survives to be ‘refomed” if counter-revolutiongains a decisive victory.”42 Since mid-1918, radicals amongst theBolsheviks had frankly advocated killing off the Mensheviks along withother socialist opposition – whether Martov’s “semi-loyal” brand or themore vociferous sort of Potresov. In July of 1918, the BolshevikLashevich stated this explicitly: “The Right SRs and Mensheviks aremore dangerous enemies of soviet power than the bourgeoisie. Yetthese enemies still have not been shot and are enjoying freedom. Theproletariat must finally get down to business. The Mensheviks and theSRs must be finished off once and for all!”43 This began as a minorityposition and spread as the Bolsheviks entrenched themselves. Theefforts of Mensheviks like Martov to become a legal opposition partycrumbled. The Bolshevik leaders intensified their attacks upondissenters gradually but consistently. The truces made during the civilwar were pure pragmatism; they were broken when the Bolsheviks feltsecure. By 1922 legal opposition all but disappeared. Mild dissent wasstill officially legal, but the Cheka arrested anyone who tried toexercise his rights.There was no place for Menshevism in this kind of a society: theMensheviks either fled abroad, were arrested or shot, or joined theBolsheviks. Their history as an active movement had come to anend.44 Analysis from the February Revolution to the 1922 Crackdown The Revolution of February 1917 immediately changed the focus ofRussian Marxists from the European war to the internal situation intheir native country. This revolution led to a string of events thataltered the very nature of their fratricidal quarrels. Before, thesequarrels were theoretical disputes about the fine points of Marxistideology. Now they had a practical aspect as well. The Bolsheviks, asit turned out, were able to seize and hold center stage for themselves.The Mensheviks mainly reacted to what the Bolsheviks did. Yet theurgency and the need for swift action did not prevent the two factionsfrom engaging in a wealth of philosophical dialogues. Thesecontroversies proceeded “dialectically”; that is, abstract “theses” aboutthe proper paths were advanced, and when these paths led topractical difficulties, the theses were challenged with “antitheses,”different policies designed to cope with the problems of the originaltheses. With the Bolsheviks, the final “synthesis” was full-fledgedtotalitarianism that embraced slavery, execution for contrary politicalbeliefs, government ownership of virtually all productive organizations,and one-party rule. With the Mensheviks, the final synthesis (withhonorable exceptions) was appeasement, half-hearted criticism, andan amazing double-standard that led them to believe that, in somesense, Lenin’s dictatorship was better than old-style authoritarianism.For example, at first the Mensheviks supported the provisionalgovernment and denounced the Bolsheviks for a host of reasons. When the Bolsheviks ousted the Kerensky government with violence,the majority of Mensheviks shortly quieted down and tried to offerconstructive criticism to those in power. When the civil war began,most Mensheviks backed the Bolsheviks, deeming a counter-revolution even worse. They did so when the government’s reign ofterror was in full swing and while Trotsky wrote official defenses formass murder and slavery. Surely the Mensheviks, who shared withthe Bolsheviks a genuine desire to see their philosophic ideals madereal, could understand that the Bolsheviks meant every word.The issue of civil liberties is another instructive instance of theMensheviks’ dialectical critique of Bolshevism. At first, the Bolsheviksmainly suppressed non-socialist expression. The Mensheviks were, inprinciple, opposed to this, but failed to come forth and defend therights of their “class enemies.” Then, the Bolsheviks turned on theirfellow socialists; to this, the Mensheviks responsed with anger. Withina year, however, majority Menshevik opinion accepted thesuppression of non-socialists and asked merely that sedition chargesbe handled by the judiciary instead of the Cheka. At no point did theMensheviks denounce censorship unequivocally.Landauer is especially perceptive when he analyzes the dilemma ofthe activist who translates Marxist theories into reality: “If it waspermissible and even necessary to throw one’s country for so long aperiod into the horrors of civil war and dictatorship, was it then notillogical to balk at the use of deceit, torture, provocation – in fact of anymeans that would speed up the revolution?. As long as thedictatorship of the proletariat was a matter of theoretical speculation, itwas unnecessary to draw this conclusion. But when Marxists hadacquired the power to be ruthless, they had to answer the question ofthe extent to which this power ought to be used. For a real dialectician,only one answer was possible: Everything must be done that is in theinterests of the revolution. If Lenin did things that would have horrifiedMarx or even Sorel, it was not because of any deviation from Marxism;rather, it was, first, because he had made his choice between twoconflicting tendencies in Marxism, and, second, because men ofaction have to make decisions from which philosophers canescape.”45 Lenin’s choice was totalitarianism. The Mensheviks did notgo this far, but were willing to make a series of concessions to Leninthat they would not have considered if he had not been a fellowMarxist. Their attacks upon him, though sometimes angry and sincere,were half-hearted. After all, they considered him better than a counter-revolution, and could not paint him as a heartless monster since hewas the lesser of evils.The Right Mensheviks, it should be mentioned, were an importantexception to these generalizations. They were militant in their criticismand refused to compromise with a government that sanctioned terroras an official policy. Even as early as June of 1918, the RightMenshevik Mirov wrote prophetically: “the workers are many timesmore helpless and powerless…than in the era of capitalism. Havingproclaimed the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorestpeasantry, the Bolshevik regime has in fact turned into a dictatorshipover the proletariat.”46 Some of these Mensheviks, such as Potresov,even opposed Lenin’s “state capitalism” on the grounds that it wasinsufficiently capitalist. To these thinkers, a period of free-marketcapitalism, as opposed to state capitalism, was an essentialprecondition for the creation of a socialist society. The mainweakness in their analysis was that, as Marxists, Mensheviks had toconcede that many of Lenin’s current policies would eventually benecessary, perhaps in a modified form. But if these policies led todictatorship and economic collapse under Lenin, how could theypossibly avoid identical results if they were tried later? Like Marx, theRight Mensheviks never held the reins of the state and were thereforeable to avoid answering this difficult question.Recapitulation and Reply to Criticism From its origins to its final elimination, Menshevism remained aspecies of orthodox Marxism, with all that it implies. The differencesbetween the Mensheviks and their Bolshevik cousins existed, buthave been overrated. Their similarities dominate any comparativestudy of the two movements. In 1903, both factions acceptedPlekhanov’s statement of principles, and split only over twomoderately different conceptions of the revolutionary socialist party.This split, moreover, was not primarily motivated by the Mensheviksabhorrence of autocracy, but by their conviction that it would alienatelarge segments of potential allies in the quest for socialism. TheBolsheviks were obviously authoritarian from the start; the Mensheviksoccasionally criticized them for this, but were still willing to cooperatewith them in a single party. If civil liberties were a main concern of theMensheviks, why didn’t they choose allies who shared this concern?The most compelling answer is that they did not care enough to spurnalliances with those who disagreed.The second and final split was very similar to the first; indeed, itshowed little evidence for the view that the Mensheviks had evolved toa less authoritarian point of view. The break came because theMensheviks tried to start better relations with other socialist parties,and the Bolsheviks opposed broadening of this kind. During the war,the debates amongst the Mensheviks were at least as virulent as theirdebates with the Bolsheviks. When the February Revolution createdthe provisional government, most Mensheviks and Bolsheviks initiallysupported it. Only after Lenin revealed that he wanted to smash thisnew government did a tactical chasm erupt among the RussianMarxists. Their difference was not based upon a principled oppositionto socialist coups. Instead, the argument that the Mensheviksrepeated without end was that a bourgeois capitalist phase washistorically necessary for socialism to appear. Ultimately, they wereaccusing the Bolsheviks more of poor timing than anything else.Once the Bolsheviks were in power, the Mensheviks split into twodistinct camps. The majority did not like what the Bolsheviks weredoing, but feared counter-revolution even more. They hoped tobecome a loyal opposition party. The minority, the Right Mensheviks,was more radical, and eventually endorsed a violent overthrow ofBolshevism. They saw that the dictatorship of Lenin was moreoppressive than the czarist autocracy had ever been. It is safe to saythat both sorts of Mensheviks did not approve of the unflinchingbrutality of the Bolsheviks and would have done things differently. It isalso safe to say that most of them were willing to tolerate it and that allof them would have endorsed some sort of dictatorship once itbecame “historically necessary.” There are many possible objectionsto this thesis. In an attempt to answer them, I shall emphasize first ofall what this thesis does not argue. It does not claim that there was nodifference between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, or that theMensheviks’ leanings towards what moderns would call “socialdemocracy” did not exist. It does not claim that the Mensheviks wouldhave been totalitarians if they ever held the reins of power. It does notclaim that the Mensheviks were not sincerely opposed to theBolsheviks’ more extreme policies.With this in mind let us consider two major counter-claims. The first isthat the Mensheviks, in time, would have become full-fledged socialdemocrats who opposed violent revolution and would have toleratedopposition. It is never impossible for anyone to change his or hermind, but there is not much evidence for this view in the Mensheviks’history. They never had passionate and lengthy debates with anyoneover the virtues of civil liberties and parliamentary democracy. Instead,their debates were over technical issues in Marxist ideology, such asthe proper party structure and the correct time for revolution. Theynever showed great enthusiasm for tolerating non-socialist parties.The real acid test of a group’s commitment to liberal values is whenthey extend tolerance to their enemies as well as their friends. TheMensheviks did not, and it is difficult to see how tolerance of this kindcould be derived from Marxist philosophy.Scholars of the history of socialist thought have noted that, at least inmodernized countries, there is a tendency for orthodox Marxistsocialists to gradually mellow: from Bernsteinism and “revisionism” toMarxist democratic socialism to middle-of-the-road non- Marxist socialdemocracy.47 Perhaps the Mensheviks would eventually havedeveloped in the same manner if they had not been largely destroyedor co-opted by the Bolsheviks. Some facts support the claim that sucha trend exists. Still, it is far from a perfect induction: witness the casesof the French and Italian Communist parties which have remained”orthodox” at least until recently. Even if this trend in the history ofsocialism correlated perfectly with the facts, it would remain a merehistorical truth (such as the “law” that American presidents elected inyears ending in a “0″ invariably die in office – incidentally refuted by thecase of Ronald Reagan) until justified by a cogent theory. This takesus outside the scope of this paper, so we will leave it an openquestion.The second major counter-claim is: the Mensheviks would not haveused terror and would have only pursued policies that the bulk of thepopulation endorsed. This seems more reasonable than the firstclaim. If by “terror” one means mass shootings and general arrest ofpeople for their opinions, one might be correct. Even this is arguable:when the time was right, they surely would have favored repressionagainst the bourgeoisie. Or suppose that the population was unwillingto go along with the pattern that Marx said was historically necessary? Wouldn’t the Mensheviks have to admit that the revolution is abovemere bourgeois morality and gone ahead whether the masses wantedto or not? In any case, this objection is not inconsistent with theargument of this paper. The Mensheviks certainly showedapprehension at the use of terror and wanted the masses toparticipate in the political process. They also embraced values thatcould conflict with these scruples. Who can say what they would havedone if they held power? We must answer, with Landauer, thatphilosophers can escape the responsibility to decide betweenconflicting ends while men of power cannot. Still, how complimentaryis it to say of a political party that, “They probably wouldn’t haveresorted to mass murder and totalitarianism”? The implication is thatthey possibly would have.Menshevisms’ Critique of Bolshevism: Its Current Relevance Most historians who have studied Menshevism, including Getzler,Brovkin, and perhaps Haimson, think that the Mensheviks had positivelessons for their country and the world. In his concluding tribute toMartov, Getzler states: “He was a fervent revolutionary pledged to theoverthrow of the tsarist regime which he profounded hated. He was ademocrat. He was a real socialist. He was an internationalist.”48Brovkin ends his study of post-October Revolution Menshevism withan equally laudatory passage: “The Bolsheviks appeared to be heirsto European traditions of socialism, Marxism, and proletarianrevolution.But in turning Marxism into Marxism-Leninism, they created a partyapparatus that Marx would not recognize. Menshevik opposition andMenshevik testimony represent the initial attempts to dispel theseclaims and to reveal the antidemocratic nature of Bolshevism.Although the Mensheviks were defeated in their own day, the historicalargument between Communists and Social Democrats overdemocracy, socialism, and the role of workers’ parties continues. Fromthis perspective, the Mensheviks’ critique of Bolshevism in 1918 andtheir struggle for democratic socialism have not lost their timelinesstoday.”49 Given