Ethnic And Racialinequalities In Western Society Essay, Research Paper

The 1990’s have been marked by the global revolution in changing ethnic and racial policy and attitude, and have seen a number of dramatic events, sparked by inequality between individuals, such as the collapse of Apartheid in South Africa and the Los Angeles riots. In this essay I hope to discuss the theoretical sociological explanations of ethnic and racial inequality in contemporary western societies centering on Michael Banton’s work on race in Racial Theories (1987) and Racial and Ethnic Competition. Early theoretical work on racial and ethnic relations in Britain was based upon two major concerns. First, the patterns of immigration and incorporation in social and economic relations of black and other ethnic communities. And second, the role of colonial history in determining popular conceptions of colour, race and ethnicity. Banton, Glass, Rex and Patterson were the pioneers of this approach yet failed to provide a clear theoretical perspective about what constituted the object of analysis in these studies, and secondly, the absence of a wider socio-political perspective about the interplay between race relations and other kinds of social relations. The status of race as a social construct was never addressed. Considering race relations from a global and historical perspective, Banton argued that six basic orders of race relations could be delineated: institutionalised contact, acculturation, domination, paternalism, integration, and pluralism. This established what many have termed the ‘race relations problematic’ approach to racial and ethnic analysis. Membership of an ethnic or racial group will have psychological consequences, yet it will also bring a whole range of restrictions of access to different material goods, social positions and social occasions. These effects are brought about by either influencing a person’s tastes, and thus what a person wants to do, or by influencing how the person is received by others, and thus what a person is able to do, given that those others can in some way exert control over the individual. In situations of scarcity of goods, positions or occasions, it is very likely that these mechanisms will come into play, and Alan Carling in Social Divisions (1991), suggests a means by which racial inequalities can be understood in this context. Thus in situations where demand exceeds supply, or where the good is not a public good, racial competition will take place alongside the other mechanisms of resource allocation. A factor common to all these systems is precedence which will determine who gains the good ahead of all others. Precedence usually functions by raising a social barrier to acquisition whose height serves to distinguish the successful from the unsuccessful applicants for the given good or material. Carling identifies unjustified precedence as discrimination, which equates to racial inequality. The effect of membership of a particular ethnic or racial group is thus either to change a person’s tastes, in which case the members of different groups are likely to disperse freely in pursuit of their different preferences, or to subject members of one group to unequal treatment of an unjustified kind with respect to the acquisition of goods and/or social positions which are allocated preferentially to members of other ethnic or racial groups (Carling 1991 pp 317). Carling identifies the main variants of this discrimination, the first being Membership of a particular group is a dominant qualification of access to a given good or position. In this instance exclusive criterion is used so that the identity can never be out weighed by other personal characteristics. An example of this would be “Slegs Blankes” in which instance a change of identity, race, would be impossible. In the second variant Membership of a particular group is a qualification for access to a given good or position, but it is not a dominant qualification. In this instance personal criteria is amongst several relevant criteria such that members of a group disadvantaged by the personal criterion are less likely to be regarded as qualified, though not excluded completely. Banton saw Southern Europeans in South American as employing this mode of racial classification, and Northern Europeans in Africa, North America and Asia. In the third variant Membership of a particular group is a qualification- even a dominant qualification – but it is said not to be such a qualification. Contemporary Britain would seem to fit this third variant. The technique is to displace the ethnic or other non-OK grounds, which are infact operating but are not publicly acceptable, onto bogus grounds which are not in fact operating but which would be publicly acceptable. A fourth variant is also noted by Carling Membership of a particular group is not a qualification- not even one qualification among others- but it is appears to be such a qualification. Such a scenario can arise in situations when a disadvantaged member is excluded on OK criterion. The ability to speak English is a good example. If English is a criterion for the job, then recently arrived immigrants who do not speak the language are legitimately excluded from the job. The explanation of discrimination has long been a problem for economic analysis. In general terms, the competitive logic of the market should lead to the eradication of discrimination via market forces. However the empirical data does not support this prediction. Inequalities of most notably gender and race in employment are well known, and to explain why this is so is to explain why the competitive logic of the market does not apply in the instances. In terms of precedence, we must explain the occurrence of a composite system of allocation which mixes market forms of (price) precedence with non-market forms of discriminatory precedence by race, gender and other variables of personal identity (Carling 1991 pp 325). Becker has assimilated discriminatory precedence to market precedence via the concept of taste for discrimination. This theory functions by giving monetary value to ‘taste’ in such a way that the actor will behave in a manner which fulfils the desire to discriminate. Thus a white farmer will employ more expensive white labour to justify his desire to discriminate. This theory can therefore explain why an actor acts irrationally by employing more expensive labour, yet it still does not tell us why the employer has this preference. Furthermore the discriminatory employer should still be driven out of business, due to his elevated costs of labour. Roemer suggests discrimination to be due to the work force and not the employers. Thus it is the tastes of the workforce and not the management which leads to discrimination. In this way it is working class racism which exposes the labour force to exploitation by a management which is able to divide and rule. As the workforce is not acting as a whole, the management is able to depress the wages of the mixed workforce. This depression of wages may also be differential. Furthermore Roemer argues that the management will employ a few of the more expensive employees to prevent any form of healthy union organisation, thereby maintaining depressed wage levels. Ultimately this results in an equilibrium of lowered wages for all, consistent with a wage differential in favour of a privileged few distinguished by some form of social marker such as colour or sex (Carling 1991 pp 325). One of the main problems with this analysis is that employers are rarely in the position where they can determine the composition of the workforce in the required way, because the composition is to a certain degree dependent upon employee choice as well as employer strategy. Again, as with Becker’s theory, Roemer fails to explain why there are discriminatory preferences in the first instance. Since the body of the explanation falls upon the peculiar character of the preferences, rather than the predictable behaviour given the preferences, neither economic model has proved useful in the explanation of racial discrimination. The value of Banton’s work lies in its genuine attempt to form a general theory of ethic formation and inequality. The theory may best be analysed in the context of three basic propositions. Individuals utilise physical and cultural differences in order to create groups and categories by the processes of inclusion and exclusion. Whenever an individual discriminates that individual is making use of certain physical or social differences. If the individual discriminates in favour of another individual, the discrimination is said to be inclusive. Should that discrimination be exclusive, then the individual is discriminating against another person. This first proposition summarises all the processes of affiliation and discrimination mentioned so far. Furthermore Carling believes Banton to suggest that individuals utilise differences in order to create groups and categories de novo, where none existed before (Carling 1991). The theory is governed by rational choice motivational assumptions: “individuals act so as to obtain maximum advantage.” Thus the discriminator will have the incentive to discriminate if there is gain involved. However, the mere existence of incentive does not necessarily imply the power to bring the system into being. The advantage therefore has its roots not in the comparison between two actions which the discriminator might perform, but arises almost regardless of the person’s actions from the person’s comparative positions in two social systems: one free of discrimination and the other including racial discriminatory social precedence. Thus a general explanation of the existence of the second social system would have to propose that: groups and categories whose membership depends upon perceptions of physical and cultural difference will be found to exist when and because it is in the interests of the members of such groups and categories such that groups and categories exist (Carling 1991). When this is viewed alongside Banton’s original proposition, Carling suggests that Banton may well be confusing a theory which depends on the notion of maximum net advantage with a theory which depends on a rational choice conception of human action (Carling 1991). Banton’s second propositions states Ethnic groups result from inclusive and racial categories from exclusive processes. Being a corollary to the first proposition, the second amplifies a point about inclusive and exclusive processes by connecting them respectively with ethnic groups and racial categories. Carling divides this proposition into two versions. The first is the definitional version which proposes that any group whose identity arises from inclusive social processes is an ethnic group; and any group whose identity arises from exclusive social processes is a racial group. The empirical version proposes that ethnic groups tend to set most store by inclusive practices of boundary maintenance, whereas racial groups do so by exclusive practices of boundary maintenance. The third of Banton’s propositions is that When groups interact, processes of change affect their boundaries in ways determined by the form and intensity of competition; and, in particular, when people compete as individuals this tends to dissolve the boundaries that define the groups, whereas when they compete as groups this reinforces those boundaries. This proposition shows the processes by which groups either establish themselves through group competition, or fail through individual competition. On the one hand, group competition might mean “competition among individual persons which is affected by the group memberships of the individuals concerned” which will imply a society which legitimises group discrimination in the individual allocation of resources. By contrast, a society in which individual competition prevailed would be a society free of discrimination. Should the term group competition refer to the fact that social rewards are sought by collective (political) action, individual competition would imply that rewards are sought by individual action. Given that individuals are not able to choose the form of the society in which they live, they generally do not have the ability to choose whether or not the society is free of discrimination. Thus given a society which is already either discriminatory or not, individuals do have the ability to choose whether or not to engage in collective action, thereby changing the future form of their society. From this it is evident that in a society which is discriminating, collective action (group competition) will be designed either to overthrow the current form or to maintain it. Behaviour designed to maintain the form will have group goals whereas collective action designed to change society will inevitably lead to the situation where the group goal is to attain individual competition. Thus group action can have group or individualistic goals. In an already non-discriminating society, collective action might either encourage or discourage a new regime of discrimination as a group goal of some would be privileged group. The question therefore of whether there is a rational choice model of racial and ethnic competition is therefore a question of whether there is a rational choice model of the decision to engage in collective action with the aim of forming a society from which the individual will gain some benefit. This model will compare costs of collective action with the benefits derived from it. One of the most challenging difficulties faced by such a model is that collective action will hardly ever occur because it involves an N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma, involving a degree of free-riding, thereby preventing true collective action ever occuring. This is partly surmounted by assuming the existence of a ‘vanishing police force’ who ensure all rational actors bear their costs of collective action. Given this assumption it follows that ethnic groups may be treated as if they were collective actors. Consider then two perfectly formed collective actors who compete against each other on ethnic and racial grounds. Call these actors i and j in a total popultion of size N. Such that i+j=N. As both i and j are collective actors it is possible for them to attempt to install or overthrow a social system, inparticular instituting monopolies on behalf of their members. The object of monopoly is any divisible social benefit, U. Thus when spread out evenly to everyone, this benefit would give each member of society an ammount, u, where Nu = U. Were group j to monopolise the benefit and share none with group i, the members of j would share their own portion of benefit and that of group i. Thus the prospective benefit of group j membership is iu/j. Members of group i would recieve nothing such that the penalty of group i membership is u. Imagine therefore a contest between the two groups where the strength of each group depends on the amount it has to gain through instituting its own monopoly. Compliance costs tax s for i group members and t for j group members. Members of both groups suffer as a result of both the taxation to fund the war effort, and the sanctions imposed by the other side to maintain or remove the appropriate sanction. The limit to this collective war effort is given by the costs and benefits of the individuals concerned such that costs < benefits. If group i converts its tax revenue into sanctions against group j at rate y, then each member of group j suffers a military sanction isy/j. Suppose group j members converts its tax into sanctions against group i with the same efficiency, then group j members will act to sustain their monopoly position so long as iu/j – t – isy/j > 0 And group i members will be prepared to sustain the egalitarian regime so long as u – s – jty/i > 0 These inequalities lead to a possible four outcomes. In one case, the monopolists are defeated by the egalitarians, in the other the egalitarians are defeated by the monopolists, and in the remaining two scenarios, the struggle is undecided. This model, based upon rational choice, illustrates the need to investigate equilibrium properties of social systems. Racial in equality can therefore be said to exist where iu/j – t – isy/j > 0 is satisfired, yet u – s – jty/i > 0 is not. In this case the j group monopolists, the dominant race, can sustain their sanctions from the prospective benefits of monopoly, despite the opponents war effort. Indeed the i group would be better of with the cessation of conflict, (s=0 , t=0), even if this result implies an adverse monopoly. We have therefore arrived at a rational choice model of Racial Inequality, which is capable of decribing and explaining racial inequality in terms of cost and benefit. However, the victory of either side is a stable equilibrium, and yet there are in general no rational grounds upon which collective actors can decide to go for victory, high war effort, or risk the possibility of defeat by choosing alow war effort. It is therefore very difficult to use this model to predict the distribution of ethnic discrimmination or the lack of it. In terms of a model of prediction therefore, the rational choice model is insufficeint. Yet as a means of explanation, I believe this theoretical approach to be adequate.

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