Thus Spoke Zarathustra Essay, Research Paper

Philosophers sometimes convey incredibly complex ideas in cryptic forms, and Friedrich Nietzsche was no exception. His aphorisms, by their very definition, condense a powerful message into a terse, perhaps oversimplified phrase. His parables, on the other hand, veil his thoughts in narratives and force the studious reader to dig for deeper meaning. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche made his first attempt to put down his philosophy not merely sundry observations in one major work that most critics consider his magnum opus. Nietzsche wrote most of Zarathustra in the form of a third-person parabolic narrative that follows a hermit named Zarathustra on a symbolic descent from the mountains into populated areas. As he encounters others on his journey, he imparts his wisdom to them through rhetorical questions and a form of Socratic oration.

In one speech, entitled On the Way of the Creator, Nietzsche s Zarathustra describes the phases of the journey for self-knowledge. Occasionally Zarathustra punctuates a phase with a structurally simple yet seemingly contradictory argument; for example, his admonition to the lonely one to beware the good and the just [who] like to crucify those who invent their own virtue for themselves. One would expect that a good person would remain so regardless of external circumstances, but Zarathustra s warning indicates otherwise. Why would such a person, who society normally considers an upstanding citizen, suddenly become so violent? The lonely man, as he begins to form his own definition of what is good, becomes a threat to those who the masses consider good. In the introduction to his book Leviathan, seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes describes a state of nature in which man s every action serves himself alone, and relates this theory to everyday life. For example, Hobbes would say that the good give to charity not because they interpret the act as generous but because they delight in demonstrating their wealth and power to others. The confusion, then, resides in our definition of good. If we revise the social definition of a good person to one who contributes positively to society, irregardless of the reason, instead of one who is truly benevolent and philanthropic, it becomes easier to accept that, in the interests of maintaining their social position, the so-called good persecute those whose ideas differ from those of the masses.

Zarathustra ends his speech with a explanation of love as it relates to those on a quest for self-knowledge. He suggests, again in a cryptic, contradictory manner, that the lonely man seeks to better himself because he loves yet simultaneously despises himself. Again, if we provide suitable definitions, we can begin to understand this concept. If to love means to hold dear, and to despise means to look down on with contempt, it logically follows that a man who loves yet despises himself would want to both destroy in himself that which he finds contemptible and recreate that which he holds dear. Zarathustra proclaims his love for those who have courage enough to consume [themselves] in [their] own flame: how could [they] wish to become new unless [they] had first become ashes! But does this love then imply that Zarathustra concurrently despises such people? Zarathustra acknowledges that he who does not despise precisely what he love[s] knows nothing of love, but Nietzsche fails to address this point, and thus we can only conjecture as to his intentions. Perhaps these new free thinkers threaten Zarathustra s monopoly of wisdom much as they threatened the good person s social position. Or perhaps Zarathustra, as the narrative embodiment of Nietzsche, the teacher s teacher, represents the exception to this rule. Unfortunately, we cannot resolve this dilemma by simply reevaluating a set of common definitions.