Personal Identity: Philosophical Views Essay, Research Paper

Personal Identity: Philosophical Views

Tim V Kolton

Alan Watts once said, “Trying to define yourself is like trying to bite

your own teeth.” The task of personal identity is to define a quality of a

human which makes him or her a unique self. The person whose identity is in

question must realize themselves, and other people must identify this person.

In other words, what makes John unique from Bob? One must consider both

internal (mind) and external (body) perspectives. There are several general

philosophical theories of this identity problem. In the following paragraphs

one will find the body theory, soul theory, and a more detailed explanation of

the conscious theory.

One theory of personal identity is known as the body theory. This is

defined as a person X has a personal identity if and only if they have the same

body Y. However there are two problems with this definition. The first is

qualitative. It is necessary to have the same body, but if that body is changed,

is one the same person? Someone’s body is surely different at age 40 than at

age 4. Also a problem arrives in alterations to a body. If John goes to war,

becomes injured by a mine, and then has his legs amputated is he not still the

same person, John? Therefore, the preceding definition of body theory is not

sufficient, since it does not account alterations to the same body. Yet another

problem is numerical. If someone were to get a finger chopped off, would that

finger be considered another person? What if a scientist was to use someone’s

DNA and replicate another person with the same body? Surely just because there

are two identical bodies, these bodies cannot be the same person. They would

live two different lives. Therefore, the body theory alone cannot be considered

a necessary and sufficient definition when defining personal identity.

Another common theory of personal identity is the soul theory. This

theory is: a person is has personal identity if and only if they have the same

soul. The problem with this theory is arrived from the definition of a soul.

Soul is a very difficult term. It is thought by many to be a spirit that passes

from your body into another realm (i.e., heaven, hell, etc.). However, since no

one has ever seen, felt, touched, smelled, or tasted a soul, it is a mysterious

phenomenon. Since we have no clear and distinct idea of a soul , it would not

be wise to base the definition upon it. For instance, some religions believe in

reincarnation after death. This is when a soul enters another body. With this

in mind, someone’s soul such as Elvis could become reincarnated in someone else

named John. However, we would not say that this Elvis and John are the same

person . Therefore, the definition of the soul theory fails in that the

definiens does not become sufficient for defining personal identity.

The most recognized true philosophical theory of personal identity is

the consciousness theory. The consciousness theory is believed by most to be

the best definition of personal identity according to most philosophers. However,

there are three different versions of the consciousness theory that will be

discussed in further detail: the conscious self, experiential content, and

connected stream of consciousness theories. First, we have the theory of a

conscious self: a person has a personal identity if he or she has the same

conscious self. In other words, if two people have a different conscious, then

they each have personal identity. At a first glance, this would be a good

definition of a personal identity. It is analogous to Descartes’ cogito, “I

think therefore I am.” Being conscious would mean knowing that one exists, and

able to think about any experience that happens. However the main fault with

this is that it is a circular definition. We are using the definiens in the

definiendum which is not a good tactic of defining personal identity. Next, a

common derivative of the consciousness theory is the consciousness of

experiences theory. This is defined as having the same experiential content.

This theory is based upon Locke’s theory of the mind being blank, and building

from experiences. One would have personal identity because only one being can

go through the same experiences in a finite space. This theory does solve some

problems arrived at by other theories. Say for instance there are two twins.

This would be difficult to explain in the body theory of personal identity, but

with the conscious experience theory it would be simple. Although they have

identical bodies, since the day they are born they go through different

experiences. Therefore the twins do have their own identity since they have

both had different experiences. However, there are some problems that arrive

with this theory. First, the definiens is not necessary. Say for instance a

person has two different conscious experiences. Some people have a multiple

personality disorder, but that does not mean they are truly different people,

although they may have several identities. Another problem is the definition is

not sufficient. Say for instance a brain was replicated and was put into a

computer. At the exact time the brain was replicated, both “brains” had the

same experiential content. Yet the most devastating deviation from this theory

is the simplest. The biggest problem is that we cannot consciously remember

every experience of our lifetime. For instance, when one tries to remember what

they got for their fifth birthday the day after their birthday they would be

able to tell another. However, trying to remember what one received for their

fifth birthday when they are thirty is most of the time impossible. Also, just

because a person may be drunk and does some action does not make him or her

another person! In other words, the conscious experience theory fails because

the human mind cannot remember every conscious experience. Last of all, we have

the connected stream of consciousness. This theory states that a person’s

identity is made up of a “stream” of connected conscious experiences. This

theory solves the problem of having a different memory of at different times of

life. For instance, when we are forty we certainly have a different memory than

when we were four years old. With the connected stream theory though, we are

still the same person whether we are four or forty. In general, we have a

finite mind, so are conscious is connected in a chronological pattern. To make

it simple, it is analogous to a river. If you were to see a river every day,

one is not looking at the same particles of water (representing body or

experiences), however one cannot dispute that it is not the same river.

Therefore the river represents personal identity. This theory solves most of

the problems arrived at from the other two forms of conscious theories. It

would seem that the connected stream of consciousness is a definition which is

both necessary and sufficient in defining personal identity.

In conclusion, we have discussed the three common theories of personal

identity: the body theory, the soul theory, and the conscious theory. The main

problem with the body theory is that people’s bodies change, yet they still have

the same identity. The main problem of the soul theory is that it is immaterial,

and the whole idea of souls is disputable. Of the three consciousness theories,

the conscious self theory fails in that it is a circular definition. The

conscious experience theory fails in that a human cannot be conscious of

everything of his or her life. Finally we discussed the connected stream of

consciousness theory which is the best description of a personal identity.

Personal identity therefore is made up of a connected stream of consciousness

(i.e., thoughts, memories, actions), and therefore is always changing slightly.

As James Baldwin, a U.S. author once quoted, “An identity would seem to be

arrived at by the way in which the person faces and uses his experience.”

Bibliography

1 Alan Watts (1915?73), British-born U.S. philosopher, author. Life (New York,

21 April 1961).

2 Locke, John. Personal Identity. Page 69.

3 Locke, John. Personal Identity. Page 70.

4 James Baldwin (1924?87), U.S. author. The Price of the Ticket, “No Name in

the Street” (1985; first published 1972).

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