Rise Of The Superpowers Essay, Research Paper

It is often wondered how the superpowers achieved their position of

dominance. It seems that the maturing of the two superpowers, Russia

and the United States, can be traced to World War II. To be a

superpower, a nation needs to have a strong economy, an overpowering

military, immense international political power and, related to this, a

strong national ideology. It was this war, and its results, that caused

each of these superpowers to experience such a preponderance of power.

Before the war, both nations were fit to be described as great powers,

but it would be erroneous to say that they were superpowers at that

point.

To understand how the second World War impacted these nations so

greatly, we must examine the causes of the war. The United States

gained its strength in world affairs from its status as an economic

power. In the years before the war, America was the world?s largest

producer. In the USSR at the same time, Stalin was implementing his

?five year plans? to modernise the Soviet economy. From these

situations, similar foreign policies resulted from widely divergent

origins.

Roosevelt?s isolationism emerged from the wide and prevalent domestic

desire to remain neutral in any international conflicts. It commonly

widely believed that Americans entered the first World War simply in

order to save industry?s capitalist investments in Europe. Whether this

is the case or not, Roosevelt was forced to work with an inherently

isolationist Congress, only expanding its horizons after the bombing of

Pearl Harbour. He signed the Neutrality Act of 1935, making it illegal

for the United States to ship arms to the belligerents of any conflict.

The act also stated that belligerents could buy only non-armaments from

the US, and even these were only to be bought with cash.

In contrast, Stalin was by necessity interested in European affairs, but

only to the point of concern to the USSR. Russian foreign policy was

fundamentally Leninist in its concern to keep the USSR out of war.

Stalin wanted to consolidate Communist power and modernise the country’s

industry. The Soviet Union was committed to collective action for

peace, as long as that commitment did not mean that the Soviet Union

would take a brunt of a Nazi attack as a result. Examples of this can

be seen in the Soviet Unions? attempts to achieve a mutual assistance

treaty with Britain and France. These treaties, however, were designed

more to create security for the West, as opposed to keeping all three

signatories from harm. At the same time, Stalin was attempting to

polarise both the Anglo-French, and the Axis powers against each other.

The important result of this was the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact,

which partitioned Poland, and allowed Hitler to start the war. Another

side-effect of his policy of playing both sides was that it caused

incredible distrust towards the Soviets from the Western powers after

1940. This was due in part to the fact that Stalin made several demands

for both influence in the Dardanelles, and for Bulgaria to be recognised

as a Soviet dependant.

The seeds of superpowerdom lie here however, in the late thirties. R.J.

Overy has written that ?stability in Europe might have been achieved

through the existence of powers so strong that they could impose their

will on the whole of the international system, as has been the case

since 1945?.? At the time, there was no power in the world that could

achieve such a feat. Britain and France were in imperial decline, and

more concerned about colonial economics than the stability of Europe.

Both imperial powers assumed that empire-building would necessarily be

an inevitable feature of the world system. German aggression could

have been stifled early had the imperial powers had acted in concert.

The memories of World War One however, were too powerful, and the

general public would not condone a military solution at that point.

The aggression of Germany, and to a lesser extent that of Italy, can be

explained by this decline of imperial power. They were simply

attempting to fill the power vacuum in Europe that Britain and France

unwittingly left. After the economic crisis of the 1930?s, Britain and

France lost much of their former international standing–as the world

markets plummeted; so did their relative power. The two nations were

determined to maintain their status as great powers however, without

relying on the US or the USSR for support of any kind. They went to

war only because further appeasement would have only served to remove

from them their little remaining world standing and prestige.

The creation of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and

Germany can be viewed as an example of imperial decline as well. Stalin

explained the fact that he reached a rapprochement with Germany, and not

one with Great Britain by stating that ?the USSR and Germany had wanted

to change the old equilibrium? England and France wanted to preserve

it. Germany also wanted to make a change in the equilibrium, and this

common desire to get rid of the old equilibrium had created the basis

for the rapprochement with Germany.? The common desire of many of the

great European powers for a change in the world state system meant that

either a massive war would have to be fought; or that one of the great

powers would need to attempt to make the leap to superpower status

without reaping the advantages such a conflict could give to the power

making the attempt. Such benefits as wartime economic gains, vastly

increased internal markets from conquered territory, and increased

access to resources and the means of industrial production would help

fuel any nation?s drive for superpowerdom.

One of two ways war could have been avoided was for the United States or

Russia to have taken powerful and vigorous action against Germany in

1939. Robert A. Divine, holds that ?superpowerdom gives a nation the

framework by which a nation is able to extend globally the reach of its

power and influence.? This can be seen especially as the ability to

make other nations (especially in the Third World) act in ways that the

superpower prefers, even if this is not in the weaker nation?s self

interest. The question must then be raised, were the United States and

Russia superpowers even then, could coercive, unilateral actions taken

by them have had such significant ramifications for the international

order? It must be concluded that, while they were not yet superpowers,

they certainly were great powers, with the incredible amount of

influence that accompanies such status. Neither the United States nor

the Soviet Union possessed the international framework necessary to be a

super power at this time. It is likely that frameworks similar to Nato

or the Warsaw Pact could have been developed, but such infrastructures

would have necessarily been on a much smaller scale, and without

influence as the proposed Anglo-American (English speaking world) pact

was. At this time, neither the United States nor Russia had developed

the overwhelming advantages that they possessed at the end of the war.

There are several factors that allowed them to become superpowers: a

preponderance of military force, growing economies, and the creation of

ideology-backed blocs of power.

The United States, it seems, did not become a superpower by accident.

Indeed, Roosevelt had a definite European policy that was designed from

the start to secure a leading role for the United States. The US

non-policy which ignored Eastern Europe in the late thirties and

forties, while strongly supported domestically, was another means to

Roosevelt?s plans to achieve US world supremacy.

After the war, Roosevelt perceived that the way to dominate world

affairs was to reduce Europe?s international role (vis-à-vis the United

States, as the safest way of preventing future world conflict), the

creation of a permanent superpower rivalry with the USSR to ensure world

stability. Roosevelt sought to reduce Europe?s geopolitical role by

ensuring the fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively

powerless, and ethnically homogenous states. When viewed in light of

these goals Roosevelt appears very similar to Stalin who, in Churchill?s

words, ?Wanted a Europe composed of little states, disjointed, separate,

and weak.? Roosevelt was certain that World War Two would destroy

continental Europe as a military and economic force, removing Germany

and France from the stage of world powers. This would leave the United

States, Great Britain, and the USSR as the last remaining European world

powers.

In order to make it nearly impossible for France to reclaim her former

world position, Roosevelt objected to De Gaul taking power immediately

after the war. Roosevelt defended the Allies ?right [to] hold the

political situation in trust for the French people.? He presented

General Eisenhower control of France and Italy for up to a year, in

order to ?restore civil order.? As British foreign minister Anthony

Eden stated, ?… Roosevelt wanted to hold the strings of France?s

future in his hands, so that he could decide that country?s fate.? It

seems inexcusable that Roosevelt desired to hold an ally?s nation in

trust, comparable to Italy, who was a belligerent. It could be argued,

however that they were taking the reigns of power, not from the

resistance, but from the hands of the Vichy French.

It might be asked why Roosevelt did not plot the fall of the British

Empire as well. A cynical answer to this is that Roosevelt understood

that the United States was not powerful enough to check the Soviet

Union?s power in Europe by itself. It made sense that because the

United States and Britain are cultural cousins, the most commodious

solution would be to continue the tradition of friendliness, set out in

the Atlantic Charter earlier. As far as economic or military

competition, Roosevelt knew that if he could open the British Empire to

free trade it would not be able to effectively compete with the United

States. This is because an imperial paradigm allows one to sell goods

in a projectionist manner, finding markets within the Empire. This

allows a nation to have restrictive tariffs on imports, which precludes

foreign competition. A nation, that is primarily concerned with finding

markets on the other hand, is in a much better position for global

economic expansion, as it is in its interest to pursue free trade.

The more generous, and likely the correct interpretation is that

Roosevelt originally planned to have a system of three superpowers,

including only the US, the UK, and the USSR. This was modified from the

original position which was formed before the USSR joined the allies,

that held for Great Britain to take a primary role in Europe, and the

United States to act as a custodial in Asia. Later, after it was seen

that either the Germans or the Russians would dominate Eastern Europe,

the plan was forced to change. The plan shifted from one where the US

and Great Britain would keep order in Europe, to one where Great Britain

and the USSR would keep order in Europe as local superpowers, and the US

would act as an impartial, world wide mediator. Roosevelt hoped for the

creation of an Anglo-American-Russo world police force.

However, Roosevelt, underestimated the power of the Russian ideology.

He believed that the Russians would back away from communism for the

sake of greater stability and union with the West. Roosevelt saw the

Soviet Union as a country like any other, except for her preoccupation

with security (the safety corridor in Eastern Europe that Stalin

insisted on), but he thought that that this could be explained by the

cultural and historical background of Russia. It was not thought

unreasonable to request a barrier of satellite states to provide a sense

of security, given that Russia and the USSR had been invaded at least

four times since 1904. It was felt that granting the Soviet Union some

territory in Eastern and Central Europe would satisfy their political

desires for territory. It was only after experiencing post World War II

Soviet expansion, that the Soviet quest for territory was seen to be

inherently unlimited. Roosevelt felt that the position in Eastern

Europe, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, was analogous to that of Latin

America, vis-à-vis the United States. He felt that there should be

definite spheres of influence, as long as it was clear that the Soviet

Union was not to interfere with the governments of the affected

nations. The reason that Roosevelt did not object to a large portion

of Eastern Europe coming under the totalitarian control of the Soviet

Union was that he believed the weakness in the Soviet economy caused by

the war would require Stalin to seek Western aid, and open the Russians

to Western influence.

Many historians feel that Roosevelt was simply naive to believe that the

Soviet Union would act in such a way. Arthur Schlesinger saw the

geopolitical and ideological differences between the United States and

the Soviet Union. He stressed however, the ideological differences as

being most important. ?The two nations were constructed on opposite and

profoundly antagonistic principles. They were divided by the most

significant and fundamental disagreements over human rights, individual

liberties, cultural freedom, the role of civil society, the direction of

history, and the destiny of man.? Stalin?s views regarding the

possibility of rapprochement between the USSR and the West were

similar. He thought that the Russian Revolution created two antipodal

camps: Anglo-America and Soviet Russia. Stalin felt that the best way

to ensure the continuation of communist world revolution was to

continually annex the countries bordering the Soviet Union, instead of

attempting to foster revolution in the more advanced industrial

societies. This is the underlying reason behind the Soviet Union?s

annexation of much of Eastern Europe, and the subjugation of the rest.

The creation of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe did not come as a

total surprise. Roosevelt thought that America?s position after the war,

vis-à-vis the rest of the world, would put him in a very good position

to impose his view of the post-war world order. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff however, predicted that after the German defeat, the Russians

would be able to impose whatever territorial settlement they wanted in

Central Europe and the Balkans.

World War II caused the USSR to rapidly evolve from a military farce, to

a military superpower. In 1940 it was hoped that if the Soviet Union

was attacked, that they could hold off the Germans long enough for the

West to help fight them off with reinforcements. In 1945 the Soviet

Army was marching triumphantly through Berlin. Was this planned by

Stalin in the same way that Roosevelt seems to have planned to achieve

world supremacy? The answer to this question must be a somewhat

ambivalent ?no.? While Stalin desired to see Russian dominance in

Europe and Asia if possible, he did not have a systematic plan to

achieve it. Stalin was an opportunist, and a skilful one. He demanded

that Britain and America recognise territory gained by the Soviet Union

in pacts and treaties that it had signed with Germany, for instance.

Stalin?s main plan seemed to be to conquer all the territory that his

armies could reach, and create to socialist states within it.

From this it can be seen that one of the primary reasons for the

superpower rivalry was Roosevelt?s misunderstanding of the Soviet

system. Roosevelt and his advisors thought that giving the Soviet Union

control of Central and Eastern Europe, would result in the creation of

states controlled somewhat similar to the way in which the United States

controlled Cuba after the Platt Amendment. The State Department assumed

that the USSR would simply control the foreign policy of the satellite

nations, leaving the individual countries open to Western trade. This

idea was alien to Soviet leaders. To be controlled by the Soviet Union

at all was to become a socialist state; freedom to decide the domestic

structure, or how to interact with the world markets was denied to such

states. Stalin assumed that his form of control over these states would

mean the complete Sovietization of their societies, and Roosevelt was

blind to the internal logic of the Soviet system which in effect

required this. Roosevelt believed that the dissolution of Comintern in

1943, along with the defeat of Trotsky, meant that Stalin was looking to

move the Soviet Union westward in its political alignment. While Stalin

might have been primarily concerned with ?socialism in one country,?

communist revolution was a ?paramount, if deferred policy goal.?

Roosevelt?s desire for a favourable post-war settlement appears to be

naive at first glance. The post war plan that he had created was

dependant upon the creation of an open market economy, and the

prevailing nature of the dollar. He was convinced that the Soviet Union

would move westward and abandon its totalitarian political system along

with its policy of closed and internal markets. When seen from such a

perspective, Roosevelt?s agreement to let the Soviet Union dominate

half of Europe does not seem as ludicrous. His fundamental

misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet state can be forgiven, once

it has been allowed that an apparently peaceful nature was apparent at

the time, and that it had existed for a relatively short time. While

the United States wanted to ?eschew isolationism, and set and example of

international co-operation in a world ripe for United States

leadership,? the Soviet Union was organising its ideals around the

vision of a continuing struggle between two fundamentally antagonistic

ideologies.

?The decisive period of the century, so far as the eventual fate of

democracy was concerned, came with the defeat of fascism in 1945 and the

American-sponsored conversion of Germany and Japan to democracy and a

much greater degree of economic liberalism?.? Such was the result of

America attempting to spread its ideology to the rest of the world. The

United States believed that the world at large, especially the Third

World, would be attracted to the political views of the West if it could

be shown that democracy and free trade provided the citizens of a nation

with a higher standard of living. As United States? Secretary of State

James F. Byrnes, ?To the extent that we are able to manage our domestic

affairs successfully, we shall win converts to our creed in every

land.? It has been seen that Roosevelt and his administration thought

that this appeal for converts would extend into the Soviet sphere of

influence, and even to the Kremlin itself. The American ideology of

democracy is not complete without the accompanying necessity of open

markets.

America has tried to achieve an open world economy for over a century.

From the attempts to keep the open door policy in China to Article VII

of the Lend-Lease act, free trade has been seen as central to American

security. The United States, in 1939, forced Great Britain to begin to

move away from its imperial economic system. Cordell Hull, then

Secretary of State, was extremely tough with Great Britain on this

point. He used Article VII of the Lend-Lease, which demanded that

Britain not create any more colonial economic systems after the war.

Churchill fought this measure bitterly, realising that it would mean the

effective end of the British Empire, as well as meaning that Great

Britain would no longer be able to compete economically with the United

States. However, Churchill did eventually agree to it, realising that

without the help of the United States, he would lose much more than

Great Britain?s colonies.

American leadership of the international economy–thanks to the

institutions created at Bretton Woods in 1944, its strong backing for

European integration with the Marshall Plan in 1947 and support for the

Schuman Plan thereafter? (both dependent in good measure on American

power) created the economic, cultural, military, and political momentum

that enabled liberal democracy to flourish in competition with Soviet

communism.

It was the adoption of the Marshall Plan that allowed Western Europe to

make its quick economic recovery from the ashes of World War II. The

seeds of the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex of the

early fifties are also to be found in the post war recovery. Feeling

threatened by the massive amount of aid the United States was giving

Western Europe, the Soviet Union responded with its form of economic aid

to its satellite counties. This rivalry led to the Western fear of

Soviet domination, and was one of the precursors to the arms-race of the

Cold War.

The foundation for the eventual rise of the Superpowers is clearly found

in the years leading up to and during World War II. The possibility of

the existence of superpowers arose from the imperial decline of Great

Britain and France, and the power vacuum that this decline created in

Europe. Germany and Italy tried to fill this hole while Britain and

France were more concerned with their colonial empires. The United

States and the Soviet Union ended the war with vast advantages in

military strength. At the end of the war, the United States was in the

singular position of having the world?s largest and strongest economy.

This allowed them to fill the power gap left in Europe by the declining

imperial powers.

Does this, however, make them Superpowers? With the strong ideologies

that they both possessed, and the ways in which they attempted to

diffuse this ideology through out the world after the war, it seems that

it would. The question of Europe having been settled for the most part,

the two superpowers rushed to fill the power vacuum left by Japan in

Asia. It is this, the global dimension of their political, military and

economic presence that makes the United States and the USSR

superpowers. It was the rapid expansion of the national and

international structures of the Soviet Union and the United States

during the war that allowed them to assume their roles as superpowers.

Bibliography

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Divine, Robert A. ?The Cold War as History? Reviews in American History.

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1.<#1> Overy R.J. The Origins of the Second World War (Longman: New

York) 1987 p.7 <#2> Overy pp. 88-89

2.<#3> Overy p .8

3.<#4> Ovsyany, Igor. The Origins of World War Two (Novosti Press

Agency: Moscow) 1989 pp. 31-34.

4.<#5> Overy p. 70

5.<#6> Overy p. 85

6.<#7> Overy p. 89

7.<#8> Overy p. 91

8.<#9> Aga-Rossi p. 81

9.<#10> Divine, Robert A. "The Cold War as History" Reviews in

American History, Sept 93, vol 21. p. 528.

10.<#11> Aga-Rossi, Elena. "Roosevelt’s European Policy and the

Origins of the Cold War" Telos Summer 93.

Issue 96 pp. 65-66

11.<#12> Aga-Rossi p. 66

12.<#13> Aga-Rossi p. 69

13.<#14> Aga-Rossi p. 72

14.<#15> Aga-Rossi p. 73

15.<#16> Aga-Rossi p. 77

16.<#17> Aga-Rossi p. 70

17.<#18> Divine p. 528

18.<#19> Aga-Rossi p. 80

19.<#20> Aga-Rossi p. 68

20.<#21> Aga-Rossi pp. 74-75

21.<#22> Aga-Rossi p. 79.

22.<#23> Aga-Rossi p. 83.

23.<#24> Tony Smith, "The United States and the Global Struggle for

Democracy," in America’s Mission: The

United States and Democracy in the Twentieth Century (New York:

Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995)

[http://epn.org/tcf/xxstru 03.html.] 1995

24.<#25> Dukes, Paul. The Last Great Game: Events, Conjectures,

Structures (Pinter Publishers: London) 1989

p. 107.

25.<#26> Le Ferber, Walter. The American Age: US Foreign Policy at

Home and Abroad 170 to the Present.

(W.W. Norton Company: New York) 1994 p. 417-418.

26.<#27> Tony Smith, "The United States and the Global Struggle for

Democracy," in America’s Mission: The

United States and Democracy in the Twentieth Century (New York:

Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995)

[http://epn.org/tcf/xxstru 03.html.] 1995