The Okinawa Problem Essay, Research Paper

THE OKINAWA PROBLEM

The Battle of Okinawa, in which both Japanese and American forces suffered enormous casualties, marked its fiftieth anniversary on June 23, 1995. In commemoration of this important date, the Cornerstone of Peace was erected and unveiled that day to, as Okinawa Governor Ota Masahide put it, “convey the peace-cherishing heart of Okinawa and its yearning to live in peace with all.”. These noble sentiments were shattered less than three months later, however. on September 4, when a 12-year-old Okinawan girl was abducted, beaten and raped by three US servicemen.

The three were part of the 28,000 US troops stationed in the prefecture. Although Okinawa makes up just 0.6% of the total land area of Japan — almost exactly the size of Los Angeles — it hosts 75% of all US military forces stationed in Japan. Okinawa prefecture is composed of the Ryukyu Islands, with the main island being Okinawa island. US bases occupy 11% of the total land area of the prefecture, including 20% of the main island and 40% of six Okinawan cities.

The 1995 rape case exacerbated long-standing resentment against the US military presence in Okinawa. Outraged local people held numerous demonstrations, and calls increased for the reduction of US military presence on the islands. The case proved to be a turning point for the so-called “Okinawa problem,” and a series of events attempting to remedy the situation followed. As Okinawa is a strategically vital point for US Forces in the Far East, the Okinawa problem and its consequences have grave implications for both the US and Japan.

Crimes committed by US military personnel against the local people of Okinawa were in fact nothing new. According to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, between 1972 and 1995, US military personnel were implicated in 4,716 crimes, or nearly one per day. Local authorities stated that 22 murders, 354 robberies, and 110 rapes were committed by US military members during the same period.

Background

The US presence in Okinawa dates back to 1944, in the final days of World War II, when Okinawa became the site of the only ground battles fought on Japanese soil during the war. Although the fighting claimed the lives of more than 10,000 American and 90,000 Japanese troops, the greater tragedy was the number of noncombatant victims: more than 100,000 people, nearly a third of the Okinawan population, were killed.

In 1945, after US troops invaded the island, they built bases in preparation for an attack on mainland Japan. Thousands more Okinawans were forced into relocation camps and mountainous villages to clear the way for base development.

Seven years after Japan fs surrendered, in April 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and US-Japan Security Treaty went into effect. The Peace Treaty secured Japan’s independence, but retained Okinawa as a US-administered territory. Even though the US recognized Japan’s residual sovereignty over the islands, since Okinawa remained under US control, the Security Treaty did not apply to the island. Although international law, as determined by the Hague Convention, prohibits the confiscation of private property without payment even during war, the US claimed its administrative authority as an excuse to requisition as much land as it pleased for military bases. Thus, many of the refugees, upon their release from relocation camps, found their homes and farmlands requisitioned by the US military. Some of the land was even confiscated by force, with armed troops and military vehicles surrounding villages and bulldozing or burning houses. The confiscation of land actually occurred at a greater scale after the war was over and the US assumed administrative authority, thus creating the vast military bases still present in Okinawa today.

In 1972, sovereignty over Okinawan territory was returned to Japan. The main reason many Okinawan people voted to rejoin with Japan was the false belief that US bases would be eliminated or greatly reduced upon the return to Japan. However, in the 28 years since Okinawa’s restoration to Japan, only about 15% of the total base area has returned to private land owners, compared with 60% of bases on mainland Japan. One reason was that the Japanese-American Defense Treaty of the same year essentially assured the US that its base functions in Okinawa would not decline even after the reversion — a treaty that was drafted and signed without consulting with the Okinawans.

Situation Out of Control

The 1995 rape case became the straw that broke the camel’s back. The outrage of the Okinawan people led to a series of events that have had great impact on the US-Japan alliance. While the alliance has remained intact and there have been no major changes in practical terms, the US and Japan have finally realized that Okinawa will no longer stay silent about the grape h of her land and people. The US and Japan were forced to adopt policies and agendas that would ease the anger of the Okinawan people and make up for the unfair treatment forced upon them for over 50 years. It is arguable that not much has really changed, and that most of the concessions made by both the US and Japan do not signal an automatic reversal of past policies, but the fact that some concessions were actually being made is still regarded as a great first step for Okinawa.

If anything had enraged the Okinawan people more than the actual rape of an Okinawan girl, it was the perceived reluctance of the Americans to assist in the investigation. The three suspects were arrested by US military authorities on September 5, the day after the rape was committed. But although Japanese authorities requested custody of the suspects on September 8, that request was rejected based on the extraterritorial status held by US personnel under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Japanese police interrogation therefore had to take place on base, with the cooperation of US military investigators, thus hampering the timely and smooth conduct of the investigation. It was not until September 29, after they were formally indicted, that the suspects were finally turned over to Japanese custody.

Outraged Okinawans took to the streets, rioting to let their anger be known. The biggest rally was in Ginowan City on October 21, with some 85,000 people (almost 8% of Okinawa’s population) participating. Demonstrators demanded the elimination of crimes committed by US military personnel, revision of the SOFA, and the realignment and reduction of US bases in Okinawa.

The day before the suspects were indicted, Okinawa Governor Ota Masahide announced that he would not sign by proxy the land-lease documents of 35 landowners who had refused to sign the documents needed to allow US Forces to continue to use their land. (About a third of the US-occupied land is leased private property.) The governor stood firm despite efforts by the central government in Tokyo to persuade him to sign, prompting many other landowners to announce that they would refuse to renew the leases on their land when the currnt leases ran out. This led to an amendment of the Special Land Lease Law in April 1997, thereby giving the central government the power to confiscate the land of people unwilling to sign lease renewals.

At a meeting in Santa Monica in February 1996, newly elected Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro brought up the subject of the return of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) on behalf of Okinawa Governor Ota, diplomatically asking US President Clinton to consider the possibility of the facility’s return. The Futenma MCAS was of particular concern to Ota, and symbolic of the base problem in Okinawa, because together with Camp Zukeran it occupies 90% of the total land area of the city of Ginowan (leading to a local population density of nearly 111,000 persons per square mile. Military training and activity on the base inevitably takes place very close to the city population, posing safety hazards as well as causing noise pollution (which has been shown to negatively affect the birth weight of newborns as well as the hearing of local residents). Commercial and residential growth of the city is also affected due to the size and activity of the base.

President Clinton went to Tokyo for the US-Japan Summit in April 1996. The trip was delayed from the initial November 1995 date because of the American budget crisis — a delay that was, in part, welcomed because there was fear of facing large Japanese public discontent about the US military presence in Okinawa with the September rape case fresh in mind. Though Clinton fs absence from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Osaka was taken as a sign of problematic US administration policy towards East Asia, it allowed time for Japan and the US to consult with each other on a package for the consolidation and reduction of US facilities in Okinawa. It gave time for the February 1996 Santa Monica meeting and for the US to devise a plan.

Just prior to Clinton’s arrival, a package was announced that provided for the return of Futenma, as well as for various measures to reduce the burden on Okinawa prefecture. US Defense Secretary William Perry, Ambassador Walter Mondale, Japanese Foreign Minister Yokuhiko Ikeda, and Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma officially signed the pact in December 1996. It states that the US will return 12,000 acres — about 20% of the land it leases in Okinawa –and close part or all of 11 facilities by 2008. The number of US troops stationed in Okinawa, however, would remain at 28,000.

This pact included the closing of Futenma MCAS within seven years of the signing, provided that a replacement base is available to relocate the aircraft and troops currently located there. Plans were initially made between the US and Japan to construct a floating heliport (five times longer than an aircraft carrier) near US Camp Schwab in Nago City, with Japan assuming the $2 billion bill. However, talks regarding how long the base is to be operational remain deadlocked even as the seven year deadline approaches.

The Suffering of Okinawan People

The US, Japan and Okinawa each have an enormous interest in the Okinawa base issue, though it can hardly be denied that Okinawa has the most at stake. The Far East is of great strategic interest to the US, and its bases in Okinawa are arguably the most important in the region. For Japan, the presence of US Forces is vital to national security, since the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are limited in their range of activities and capabilities. But for Okinawa, the bases — and the disturbances that come with them — are part of everyday life. Almost every aspect of the lives of people in Okinawa is affected in some way by the US presence in their backyards.

The damage done to the land and people of Okinawa, which takes many different forms, is enormous. Problems that arise because the bases are located in or near densely populated areas, which are exacerbated by the prerogatives enjoyed by the US Forces, include accidents involving US forces, crimes committed by US personnel, noise pollution, and the hindering of economic development.

Accidents involving armed forces and their training are bound to occur, no matter what the circumstances. The problem in Okinawa is that many bases are located close to populated areas, with houses, schools and hospitals sometimes only a few hundred meters away from aircraft runways. In one accident in 1959, for example, a US jet plane crashed into a primary school, which went up in flames; 11 children burned to death, 6 people living in the vicinity were killed, and nearly 200 other persons were injured. Though such tragedies are not deliberate, accidents involving planes during exercises by US forces are an all-too-frequent occurrence, and with neighborhoods around the bases becoming more crowded, there is little margin for avoidance of a disaster if an accident occurs.

Crimes committed by US military personnel are also a major problem; the 1995 case involving the rape of a schoolgirl is only the most infamous and obvious. The abduction and rape of the girl so enraged the people of Okinawa because it did not happen by accident. Such crimes, unfortunately, are not that rare, and attract great publicity in a nation noted for its traditionally low crime rate. Other highly publicized crimes by US military personnel include in 1972, right after Okinawa was returned to Japan, when a women was raped and killed in Ginowan City, and in 1974 when a young man mowing grass on a training site was pursued and deliberately shot (in the arm) US marines on Iejima Island. And in 1995, the year of the schoolgirl rape, a US soldier broke into a woman’s apartment in Ginowan City and beat her to death.

Hit-and-run cases involving US military personnel are also frequent, along with minor traffic accidents (a little more than 1,000 per year) and traffic-related deaths. Until 1996, however, military vehicles were not required to have license plates, making it difficult for civilian victims or witnesses to identify the responsible party. Also, US servicemen in Okinawa often drive with little or no insurance, and US failure to pay a solatium (it is a Japanese custom for the victim or victim’s family to receive compensation) adds to the pproblem.

Noise pollution is another serious problem around US bases in densely populated areas. According to statistics of the Okinawa Prefecture government, some 470,000 people (37% of Okinawa’s population) are disturbed by the noise created at US bases. While noise pollution can be eased somewhat by soundproofing houses, for houses close to runways the problem is so severe that this does not help, and residents living in such areas often cannot get a good night’s sleep. Research conducted in the area of Futenma MCAS in 1995, for example, showed noise disturbances were generated 2,244 times in a one-month period, with 595 (about 26%) of these occurring between 7 pm and 7 am.

Residents and students in areas near US airfields are constantly disturbed by the screaming of jets’ engines. Yara Primary School, located just 800 meters from the runways of Kadena Air Base, for example, recorded an average ten activity-disrupting noises (each lasting at least five seconds) per hour-long lesson in January 1996.

Noise pollution affects the physical health of the residents as well. Among other problems, medical and scientific research has established such noise-related effects as low-weight births, increasing behavioral aberration in infants, and impaired hearing among residents, which is directly related to the US bases being located so closely to densely populated areas in Okinawa.

Though the US bases do provide for some economic benefits for the islands, much damage is also done to the regional economic development of Okinawa due to locations of the bases and the restrictions imposed upon the cities and residents located near these bases. Futenma MCAS is the cardinal example: the base occupies a great area right in the middle of Ginowan city. In order not to obstruct US aircraft using the air station, the height of buildings is restricted in certain areas. (One newly built apartment house was recently ordered demolished because the US objected that it obstructed military aircraft using the base. In addition, roads, waterworks, and sewerage systems must be routed to avoid the base, which creates a major obstacle in improving the city’s infrastructure.

Chatan Town, the location of Kadena Air Base and other US military installations, has 56% of its town area occupied by bases. A lack of space makes it difficult for the town to build facilities, and has forced some town primary schools and kindergartens to be relocated to neighboring Okinawa city. The town has been forced to reclaim some water areas, at enormous expense, to acquire the land it needs.

US bases are the cause of still further hindrances. Railroads destroyed during the war were expropriated after the war by US forces to construct military bases. Their continued presence has, to this day, prevented the relaying of railroad tracks to connect the north and south of the island. And in some areas of Onna Village and Kin Town, the local source of water supply is on the US bases, forcing the local governments to seek permission from the US forces just to cleaning their water source.

Although Okinawa’s economy improved during the 1990s, it is still the poorest prefecture in Japan, with an unemployment rate twice as high as the national average. While the US bases do support some economic activity, economist and editor of the newspaper Ryukyuanist states that, “According to the best estimates, the incomes generated directly or indirectly by the bases are only five percent of the gross domestic product,” which supports the view that the US bases have proved to be much more harmful than helpful to the economy of Okinawa.

In addition to the problems arising from the location of the US bases, the many vested prerogatives of US military forces further the pains of the Okinawan people. These prerogatives include US control over Okinawan air traffic, the irreproachable environmental pollution by the US bases, and the extraterritoriality status of US personnel.

No country in the world surrenders its air traffic control to foreign military forces as Japan does in Okinawa. In the air space of Okinawa’s main island, the US Forces control air traffic up to an altitude of 6,000 meters. Not only planes using the US military bases but also commercial flights entering that air space must seek permission from US Kadena Air Base. Also, some 92,000 square kilometers of air space around Okinawa, about 40 times the size of the land area of Okinawa prefecture, is reserved exclusively for the US Forces.

Making matters worse, US air traffic control gives priority to the US military. Commercial flights using Naha Airport are forced to fly at an altitude of 300 meters for dozens of kilometers to avoid getting in the way of US military aircraft using Kadena Air Base. Also, while civilian airports are normally equipped with a backup radar system to be used in case the main radar system breaks down, Kadena Air Base has no backup radar system since US military aircraft can perform visual takeoffs and landings. When the base radar broke down in November 1999, commercial aircraft were forced to fly without radar control for more than a day.

The beautiful tropical Okinawan environment is also subject to the exploitation of the US Forces. US Forces have exclusive rights to administer their bases; not only do Japanese national laws not apply in these areas, but US federal laws are also irrelevant. Where US Forces carry out live-fire exercises regularly, fires at the impact areas are common, and the faces of some mountains are ruthlessly being laid bare.

Toxins, such as polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), are also a serious problem. In the past, PCB was found piled up out in the open in truckloads on Kadena Air Base. When the Onna Communication Site was returned in 1995, PCB was detected in the soil; though the contaminated soil was removed in containers, when and where the 20 tons of toxic soil finally ended up is not known. And when part of the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area was returned in June 1999, the landowner was informed (on the day of the return) that toxic substances including hexavalent chromium and lead were present in excess of environmental standards.

The US Forces Northern Training Area, meanwhile, is home to many rare animals and plants. Neither the national government nor the relevant municipalities, however, have the right to inspect the area, so there is no way of knowing whether the natural resources are being properly protected.

The proposed site in Nago city for the new military base that would replace the Futenma MCAS facilities is also an area given priority for conservation. The sea area, maintaining an ecosystem with coral reefs, tideland and seaweed grounds, is also within the northern habitable limit of dugongs, an internationally protected animal. And the northern woods near the site is a habitat of more than 1,300 species, of which 66 live only in that area. Construction of the new base in this area would surely have serious effects on the endangered species that live there.

Last, but not least, the extraterritoriality status of US personnel (meaning that Japan has little or no jurisdiction over US personnel who commit a crime) causes much pain for the Okinawan people. Article 17, Clause 5(c) of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) allows American soldiers accused of crimes in Japan to be held by US military police; they will be handed over to Japanese authorities only after they are indicted.

The situation in Japan is very different from the rest of the world. Of 45,000-plus recorded crimes and accidents involving US military personnel, among them 512 deaths, none have been tried by court-martial. The US Forces regularly absolves personnel that commit traffic violations by stating that they were “on duty.” And in cases where the soldiers commit crimes when off duty, it is common worldwide for the primary jurisdiction to belong to the host nation, though in special cases the host nation can abandon its jurisdiction. In Japan, the trend has been to abandon jurisdiction far more than in other host nations. According to one source, Japan exercises its jurisdiction in only 3% of cases, compared to the worldwide average of 28%.

The Triangular Relationship

The Okinawa problem arises because the triangular relationship that exists between the three parties involved — Okinawa, Japan, and the US — is not equilateral. Okinawa is not a sovereign nation and cannot stand on an equal footing with Japan or the US. The relations between Tokyo and Okinawa are principally vertical, and Okinawa’s ties with the US are remote compared to its ties to Japan. This causes the triangle to be inverted, with Tokyo and the US on the top, and Okinawa on the bottom.

Developments since the 1995 rape case have helped to equalize the sides of the triangle. Ties between Okinawa and the US have tightened, and Tokyo has realized its need to pay more attention to Okinawa. Yet the triangle is far from an equilateral one. A look at each party’s perspective on the gOkinawa problem h and their interests will provide a better picture of the situation.

The Okinawan perspective is mixed, with one side wishing to continue to host US Forces on the islands and another side wishing to eliminate all bases. The fact remains, though, that Okinawa is dealing with two parties, the US and Japan, each trying to exploit the prefecture for its own purposes. Whether the US Forces are to remain or to go, the Okinawans want more cooperation from both governments in dealing with the base problem in their prefecture.

Indeed, not all Okinawans want to be rid of the US Forces. Some Okinawans depend on the profit that comes from the US Forces’ presence, such as ground rents, bar sales, and retail income. Another reason for wanting the US Forces to remain is the fear that subsidies provided by the national government would be reduced. The Japanese government has invested over 5 trillion yen in long-term economic promotion programs in the 25 years since the prefecture’s return to Japan. Though these subsidies are not officially called “compensation,” it is not hard to imagine that they would be terminated or reduced drastically were Okinawa to stop hosting the US Forces.

Some Okinawans, though, want US Forces out of their prefecture completely. Former Governor Ota campaigned on the platform of getting the American bases removed from the islands, and worked towards this goal throughout his career. In Ota fs view, the only way to achieve economic redevelopment of Okinawa was for the US forces to leave the islands completely, thus ending Okinawa’s dependence on bases. Current Okinawa Governor Inamine tried to attach a 15-year time limit on operations of the new base to replace Futenma MCAS, but the US flatly rejected the request, thus deadlocking the issue.

Regardless of whether the US Forces remain in Okinawa or not, Okinawans want more cooperation from both the US and Japan in dealing with the base problems. As for Japan, though the government has shown more effort in dealing with the problem since the 1995 rape case, it is still reluctant to recognize the prefecture’s rights when its interests are in conflict with the security treaty. A good example is the law that the government passed giving it control of any land under dispute when an Okinawan landowner refuses to renew the contracts for US military use and the Okinawa governor refuses to sign the lease by proxy as well.

Though the US publicly recognizes the problem, it has failed to make any considerable concessions to Okinawa. Reluctant to let go of privileges and their special status, the US has refused to revise the SOFA, which is highly unpopular in Okinawa. In addition, the issue of the revision of Futenma MCAS is still deadlocked due to disagreement between Okinawa and the US on the term of the new base.

Japan’s perspective of the Okinawa problem is that it needs to keep the security treaty with the US intact and functioning, while it deals with the domestic problem of Okinawan discontent. In dealing with Okinawa, Japan’s method has been to quiet the prefecture through economic concessions, and sometimes forcefully. Tokyo’s economic promotion policy towards Okinawa has three aspects. The first is a trend of increasing support, as regular additions have been made to funds for development expenditures in Okinawa; a good example is the awarding of a ten-year national subsidy of 100 million yen to the city of Nago, the proposed site of the new base to replace Futenma MCAS. The second is the promise of more rewards of the sort to continue in the future, with Tokyo’s readiness to implement new promotional measures in exchange for the relocation of Futenma MCAS within the prefecture as a good example. The third is the threat of taking back the rewards; Tokyo resorted to this option in February 1998 in order to try to deal with the uncooperative Ota administration.

In this manner, Tokyo has kept Okinawa on a short leash by using economic incentives. But when economic incentives were not enough to influence Okinawan policy, it has also resorted to forceful measures. The law that transferred control of disputed land not renewed for use by the US Forces to the Japanese government is a good example of this. That law was, in fact, unconstitutional in two respects: it expropriated the land without due process, and it applied only to Okinawa (illegal under Articles 94 and 95 of the Japanese constitution, which states that laws must apply equally nationwide, unless citizens of a region agree otherwise ).

With virtually guaranteed freedom of use of its bases, located on a strategically important position and with generous host nation support, the US perspective on the Okinawa problem is to ensure a stable, continued presence so long as its national security requires it. To accomplish this, the US wants its forces on Okinawa to be seen as welcome guests. Moreover, the US will use Okinawa as leverage to achieve other concessions from Tokyo when necessary.

The Futenma MCAS is a good example of the US perspective and interests. When Hashimoto raised the issue of Futenma MCAS early in 1996, the US agreed to return the base, but only for a price. The return of Futenma was to serve both as a measure to maintain Japanese and Okinawan support for the alliance and bases in the region, as well as to obtain concessions from Tokyo regarding regional security challenges. Tokyo agreed to assist financially and substantively with the realignment of Okinawan bases as well as to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation by signing the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which mandates Japanese logistical support for US forces during peacetime. Bilateral review of the guidelines for US-Japanese defense cooperation was also initiated.

In fact, the return of Futenma MCAS in exchange for a new site is actually not a concession, but is in the US fs interest as well. Replacement of the 50-year-old Futenma MCAS with a state-of-the-art military base will enable the Osprey, a new military aircraft to replace helicopters, to be operational. The Osprey has twice the cruising speed and five to ten times the flying range of the present helicopters, and can conduct horizontal flight as well as vertical landing and take off. But because of these capabilities, the aircraft makes terrible noise and does greater damage to the runway upon takeoff. This, along with the guarantee that US bases would remain in Okinawa, is why the US wants the new base instead of Futenma MCAS. The new base, if constructed, would have a 40-year operational life, with a 200-year fatigue life, allowing use well into the mid-21st century.

The 1995 rape case initiated much more communication between Okinawa and the US and Japan as well as well-due measures for Okinawa’s people. There remains much to be resolved, however. The symbolic Futenma MCAS issue must be resolved, as negotiations are deadlocked over Okinawa’s insisted deadline of 15 years and Washington’s refusal to agree to the time limit. Meanwhile, to the dismay of the Okinawans, crimes continue to be committed by US soldiers.

As the US bases are vital to the security for the US and Japan, those two parties must come up with a solution to the Okinawa problem that is acceptable to all parties, including Okinawa. For, without the consent of the Okinawan people, the bases on the islands can not continue to exist. As former Okinawan Governor Ota put it, “It is unfair and unreasonable to have [Japan's] peace and security at the expense of the people who are in the weaker position.”

Works Cited :

Terri Keeley, “Home Sweet Home? US Troops in Okinawa,” Y&M Magazine (Oct 2000) [online]; available: ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2001.

Ibid.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa,” Japanese Communist Party [online]; available: ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2001.

Etsujiro Miyagi, “Redressing the Okinawan Base Problem,” Japan Quarterly (Jan-Mar 1996): 31.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

Ibid.

George Feifer, “The Rape of Okinawa,” World Policy Journal [online]; available: ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2001.

Miyagi, 30.

Ibid., 27.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

Masaaki Gabe, “Futenma Air Station: The Okinawa Problem in Japan-U.S. Relations,” Japan Echo, Vol.27, No.3 (June 2000) [online]; available: ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2001.

Ibid.

“Okinawan Governor Tired of Playing Host to the U.S. Military,” WWICS: News/Meeting Report [online]; available: ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2001.

Mike M. Mochizuki, “Toward a New Japan-U.S. Alliance,” Japan Quarterly (Jul-Sep 1996), 4, 5.

May Lee and Reuters, “U.S., Japan Settle Okinawa Base Dispute,” CNN interactive (Dec 2, 1996) [online]; available: ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2001.

Ibid.

“Cohen Rejects 15-Year Limit on Okinawa Relocation Facility,” The Hindustan Times Online (March 18, 2000) [online]; available: ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2001.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

Ibid.

Keeley.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

Ibid.

Keeley.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

Keeley.

Ibid.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

Keeley.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

Haruo Shimada, “The Significance of the Okinawa Issue: The Experience of the Okinawa Problem Committee,” in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Stategic and International Studies, 1997), 91.

“Okinawa Governor Tired of Playing Host to the U.S. Military.”

Keeley.

Keeley

Feifer.

Gabe.

Keeley.

Reischauer, 361.

Mochizuki, 6.

“Problems of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.”

“Okinawa Governor Tired of Playing Host to the U.S. Military.”

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