The Role Of Decision Making In The Pre-Crisis Period Of India (15 March, 1959 – 7
September, 1962) Essay, Research Paper

The Role of Decision Making in the Pre-Crisis Period of India (15 March, 1959 – 7

September, 1962)

Boyko Iaramov

Introduction to International Relations

Professor Bond

More than thirty years have passed since the dramatic cling of arm in

the remote Himalayan region of the Sino-Indian border. This Time gap seems to be

appropriate for a correct reexamination of the conflict. The account of India’s

attempt to find balance with China, ever since the Kongska Pass incident in 1959

until the attack of 1962, is not merely a fact sheet that we can brows and toss

and toss away. In stead we have to link each idea to the event and causes that

might have played a role in the conflict.

Ever since 1959 the border problem between Asia’s biggest two nation-

states has been picking up speed at a threatening speed. The year 1962 was the

unfortunate year for India which knocked out any possibility of understanding

between China and India. Of course, such an act of terror could have not started

without some kind of the reason, whatever it may be. The chronological order of

pre-crisis decisions taken India’s authorities are of great importance.

The role of the decision-makers before the time of the armed conflict

had a big significance for India’s position on political and economic matters in

the continent of Asia. A major figure in India’s decision making was Jawaharlal

Nehru, leader of the Congress Party, head of the Planning Commission and chief

spokesman of the government in Parliament. These titles not only made him an

important nationalistic figure but also Gandhi’s appointed heir and a “major

architect of India’s political institutions” (Brecher, 1959). Krishna Menon,

“the controversial defense minister consulted in almost every issue” along with

Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant was also a figure of great importance (Langyel, 1962).

This importance was mainly derived from the fact that both shared the same

overall world view of Nehru. However, in order to understand the cruicial

importance of decision-makers, we shall looked seperately at each of India’s top

men.

Menon was highly important and useful to Nehru in the essence that the

latter helped Nehru convey his thought and policies to the outside world in a

forceful and organized manner (Brecher, 1959). But as Rajani Palme Dutt said in

his book “The problem of India,” foreign policy was exercised “more behind the

scenes than in meetings of the committee.” Both Menon and Nehru acted to the

desire of Nehru. It was often when the Foreign secretary would take to Pant

drafts of diplomatic correspondence and get the reaction which was usually at

Nehru’s request (Hoffmann,1990).

Foreign policy makers Nehru, Menon and Pant shared a common world view

which clearly showed their psychological predisposition, drawn from the sources

of their personality, idiosyncrasy, ideology, tradition, culture and history. As

we shall see further down, in the mainstream of common ideas and beliefs, they

indeed had some differences. But all these men used the “attitudinal prism”

(Hoffmann, 1990), the lens through which they filtered and structured the

information thus perceiving the world. One set of Indian beliefs referred to the

role India should play world. This role was supposed to reflect the fact that

India was a considerably new nation-state.

India also had to preserve her independence of action. It didn’t simply

fight for independence simply to become a camp follower of any of the Cold War

Power blocs. The restrictions and limitations that such a position imply would

be against India’s national interest. And it was exactly this nonalignment

policy of Nehru between the two sides of the Cold War which was the projection

of Indian nationalism into world affairs (Maxwell, 1970). Nehru also expressed

the idea that India was an Asian power that should not be overlooked at. He

demonstrated that “in regard to any major problem of a country or a group of

countries of Asia, India has to be considered” (Gopal, 1980).

During the 1950’s and 1960’s Nehru and his advisors realized that India

was playing a far more than neutral role in the Cold War politics. She was a

very important player on the world stage, where questions of war and peace were

decided. He recognized that in s bipolar world, in which relations between the

superpowers were based mainly on “balance-of-power calculations” (Hoffmann,

1990), a nuclear holocaust, for example, had become highly likely. He sought

that India should stay out of the superpowers’ way in the nuclear arms race and

at the same time work to the reduction of superpower confrontation by “fostering

communication, engaging in constructive diplomacy and public judging each action

of the United States and the former Soviet Union on its merits” (Brecher, 1959).

Nehru strongly believed that this trend will only act to the good of India, for

it was “economic development that was the countries primary goal” (Hoffmann,

1990). So the act of nonalignment was an act of peace and not hostility. A

nonalignment trend will also allow India to receive development aid from “as

many countries as could be persuaded to contribute” (Hoffmann, 1990), whatever

their Cold War leanings. India’s prime minister was well aware that at the

present state the country could not spent considerable amount of resources for a

large defense establishment. An India aligned with no Cold War Power bloc would

help avoid alienating nations like former Soviet Union and China, which were of

great importance to India’s security. Nehru himself realized that a hostile

frontier with China, for example, would mean an expenditure of all Indian

resources just to defend it (Gopal, 1980).

Another standard belief that Nehru and the rest of his associates

developed in India’s foreign policy affairs was the so called image making

(Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru developed the complex “images” of nations, governments,

international trends and situations. Of course, as later will be shown, they

were subject to change, but not that easily. So in the way of image making,

Nehru had made it a fundamental view of Indian foreign policy to treat former

Soviet Union and China as separate powers, passing two different sets of

problems. So, right now, there was no reason for him not to forge the

friendliest possible relationship with former Soviet Union.

The image that Nehru set for the United States was one of more

persistent work. The anti-communism phobia that was shaking the United States at

the time, made it very hard for Indian authority to set its right relations with

the U.S. But still, according to Nehru, relations could be kept constructive and

could be improved once the U.S. overcame their suspicion of nonalignment.

Another reason for the obstruction of Indo-American relations was the U.S.

policy toward arming Pakistan military, thereby threatening India military.

As the result of this momentous post independence decision of India’s

authority, once again primarily Nehru and Krishna Menon, the country had

accepted membership in the remains of the British Empire – the Commonwealth

(Hoffmann, 1990). This important tie assured India, that despite of nonalignment

it would never be completely isolated. It would be granted communication with

the West and other Third World countries, members once again in the Commonwealth,

and as a result Indian diplomatic influence would be enhanced. It was both the

importance of a continued British supply of military equipment and the

possibility of trade and economic assistance that made this membership so

valuable.

China, however, was the biggest element of concern. Nehru never had the

element of doubt that China’s position in the communist world will constitute a

problem to India (Gopal, 1980). His largeness of mind led him to the hope that

the tradition of nearly two thousand years of peace could continue in an era of

Indian and Chinese national reassertion. He was determined to prevent the

former Soviet Union and China from combining powers against India. But he also

knew that the Chinese as well as the Russians were acting on the strength of

their own national foreign policy interests and imperatives.

In the 1950’s Nehru realized, as he carried out in a letter to a member

of the Chinese authority, that India very well understood the problems China was

facing after the prolong suffer and struggle against Japan. He also understood

that the successful communist revolution in China added new feeling to the

political palette of China. Thus he perceived it as a “mixture of bitterness,

elation and vaunting confidence to which the traditional xenophobia and

present day isolation from outside contacts have added suspicion of the motives

of other powers” (Brecher, 1959). For two years he elaborated on these points,

when describing China as on object of study by India’s Intelligence Bureau. In a

briefing he told IB officers that during centuries Indian and Chinese cultures

had contested for supremacy in Central Asia and Tibet, as well as in Burma and

other places in Southeast Asia. Thus, conflict between India and China had never

been direct, but there had been intense indirect competition, which was

continuing (Hoffmann, 1990).

Furthermore, China had shown the tendency to be “aggressive” (Maxwell,

1970).

On the coarse of logic, it was expected that once China had achieved a

certain political and economic stability, it would seek some form of supremacy,

and influence or even supremacy in Asia. And what lay in the path of the

realization of this idea was India. Nehru was afraid that to achieve their ends,

the Chinese might attempt to prove their superiority over India in the sphere of

political and economic might or even occupy some Southeast Asian countries. A

tool that the Chinese might have used, according to Nehru, was the strong lobby

of the Communist party which could stand up and support the Chinese cause in any

dispute with India’s government (Maxwell, 1970).

From Nehru’s standpoint, China’s emergence from the bonds of Western

imperialism could release negative political and character traits. India would

have to be alert, especially on the northern frontier. In 1952 China had no

immediate intention to recognize the India-Tibet border formally. He expected

China to extend its influence over frontier territory once the Chinese position

in Tibet had been consolidated. And as a contra action of that he developed

India’s frontier administration (Maxwell, 1970).

Throughout most of the 1950’s, however, other beliefs received more

emphasis both ion the public and the private spheres. Nehru along with Menon and

other high officials that a friendly relationship between China and India could

be established, if Tibet was removed as an irritant and China was brought out of

isolation into a world of emerging or reemerging nation (Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru

knew that the outcome of such a relationship will bring much to do peace in Asia

and that is the reason he considered it to outweigh his concerns about Tibet.

The founding belief of Nehru was that Tibet was a part of China, “although it

should be allowed as much autonomy as possible” (Hoffmann, 1990). India had

formally recognized China’s right on Tibet and after 1954 was bound to do so

with a the Sino-Indian trade agreement.

After Nehru returned from a visit to China in 1954 he spoke of the great

Chinese achievements in both the economic and social spheres. But even before

that trip Nehru has sought to follow the Chinese steps of progress; that is,

“India should regard China as a standard of comparison not as open rival”

(Hoffmann, 1990). India would follow its own unique strategy of economic

development. That particular strategy called for “government-directed economic

planning, a government-controlled public sector of utilities and industries, and

a cooperative but independent private sector” (Hoffmann, 1990).

The climax of the conflict, as to Nehru, came in the fall of 1959 when

China’s behavior which through his “attitudinal prism” led him to alter the

previous image of China. The final and most serious border problem completed a

intensifying process where Nehru adopted a new set of beliefs concerning the

Chinese beliefs concerning Chinese motives for starting the border conflict.

Those beliefs were firstly that China was definitely acting “arrogant” and

imbued with feelings of superiority. The second belief was that China was a

revolutionary and unsatisfied power which at the time was in aggressive mood.

Third belief was that China was an expansionist country, which meanwhile was

strong internally. Fourth came the belief that Chinas attempt to influence and

pressure India was due to Communist ideology. The fifth believe was that all

these previously mentioned traits have been strengthened by the recent isolation

imposed on China by the West. Paranoidity and one-track mind was the sixth

believe. And following from the latter believe came idea that China would,

therefore, not be interested in the kind of border settlement that India could

accept (Hoffmann, 1990). Thus Prime Minister Nehru pictured China as a hostile

country predisposed to harm India and the strength of deep-seated emotions.

The Sino-Indian border problem seen through the “attitudinal prism” of

Defense Minister Krishna Menon was different from Nehru’s view. Even though

Menon and Nehru were on the same side of the battle, they indeed shared some

differences. While Nehru was following the concepts of Marxism and Leninism,

Menon pursued “Laski’s neo-Marxism” of the 1930’s (Langyel, 1962). In that way

he retained a basic acceptance of the Leninist theory of imperialism which

according to Menon outgrew capitalism. The Defense Minister’s images of India’s

neighbors were also strongly influenced by his distrust of imperialism and

capitalism. The “central place of Menon’s assault of Imperialism in the 1950’s

and 1960’s was prescribed to the United States, which in the eyes of Menon was

the major Western power which was inclined to intervene in the affairs of the

non-Western world” (Langyel, 1962). Due to that he considered not China, but

Pakistan to be the main threat to India’s security. For Pakistan, after

independence, ha d become tied up to the new American imperialist system through

a treaty and the acceptance of military aid. As an American client Pakistan

weakened the area of peace and served the instrument with which imperialism

could threat India’s security.

In contrast to Nehru’s vision of China, Krishna Menon had a very

positive image it. Although he rejected totalitarian methods anywhere he viewed

China as a progressive, modern and socialist state. The Defense Minister also

felt a kind of “spiritual kinship” with China (Langyel, 1962). And even when the

India-China relations edged in 1959 Menon still regarded China as all but an

enemy. In stead he argued that the boarder incidents rose from the fact that

China considered that the Tibetan refugees in India might return to Tibet and

start a rebellion. Other Chinese motives underlying the border problem,

according to Menon, were firstly that a certain Chinese “despondency” over

internal economic problems existed and secondly the youthful, aggressive passion

of the Chinese revolution (Langyel, 1962). All through the pre-crisis period

Krishna Menon believed that frustration caused by the international isolation

imposed on communist China was the factor which aided and guided the formation

of the Japanese attitudes.

Throughout the whole conflict he remained certain that China had taken

India mistakenly as representing threat from the imperialist West.

On the question how to deal with the Sino-Indian conflict, Menon became

the leading defender of a new school of thought. To that school the territorial

disagreement between China and India was genuine, and not a reflection of deeper

Chinese hostility.

According to the school a political settlement with the Chinese could be

reached and might also include territorial compromise (Langyel, 1962).

In the political battle between India and China a lot of hard decisions

had to be made. The authority of decision-making, as we saw, laid mainly in the

hands of a few people in the high levels of the Indian authority building.

Their appropriate actions in the Sino-Chinese border problem were of crucial

importance. Some of them were hard to be taken, others were voted secretly and

even some decisions were left undecided. India’s correct evaluation of its

conflict with China enabled her to act accordingly and carry out its plans in

such a chronological order that would be best for its national security. The

importance of correct decision-making and the ability to choose right from wrong

is the single most important feature each political leader should try to control

to the rate of perfection.

Sources of Information:

Brecher, Michael. (1959). Nehru: A Political Bibliography. Oxford University

Press: London.

Dutt, Rajani Palme. (1943). The Problem of India. International Publishers: New

York

Gopal, Sarvepolli. (1980). Jawaharlal Nehru. Oxford University Press: Delhi.

Hoffmann, Steven. (1990). India & China in Crisis. University of California

Press: London.

Langyel, Emil. (1962). Krishna Menon. Walker & Company: New York

Maxwell, Neville. (1970). India’s China War. Pantheon Books: New York.