The Errs Of Dworkin Essay, Research Paper

For many years, preferential treatment has been used to try to make up for

past wrong-doings to minorities. There have been many cases tried over

racial discrimination, with verdicts of both innocent and guilty. Ronald

Dworkin attempts to argue that preferential treatment is socially useful

and at the same time does not violate people’s rights. This is wrong for

many reasons; here I shall illustrate how preferential treatment hinders

racial equality, violates people’s rights, and can lead to a lower opinion

toward a particular race.

Dworkin believes that continuing preferential treatment will decrease

racial consciousness and the importance of race. This is the total

opposite of what truly happens. If a person were to consider America’s

past, as an example, he would see how racially diverse people were. Now

look around. Just walking across any given area, groups of people of the

same race are seen walking together. Most people do not notice this, but

very rarely are groups of ethnically diverse people seen. Although there

are no longer any laws stating that there must be a separation between

different races, people still practice it unconsciously. Dworkin states

that the long-term goal of preferential treatment "is to reduce the degree

to which American society is overall a racially conscious society (294)."

Preferential treatment does nothing of the sort. It was used widely in the

past and still exists in some areas today. It has not reduced racial

consciousness, but increased it by making people think more about how many

spaces are reserved for their particular race. Instead, people should

think of what their chances are of getting something on account of their

personal knowledge over someone else?s, not even considering their race as

a factor. This is evident in a black’s point of view of getting into the

medical school of the University of California at Davis. Sixteen places

are set aside just for blacks and other minorities, no matter how low their

test scores are. That way, minorities don’t even have to worry about

competing with whites for a position. This does not, in any way, reduce

racial consciousness by setting two tracks for admission to medical school,

one for the minorities, and one for the majority.

Mr. Dworkin supports the idea that preferential treatment does not violate

people’s rights. His argument is weak here because he attempts to prove

this by saying that if two things do not violate people?s rights, then

neither does a third. The two things that supposedly do not violate rights

are the denial of someone to medical school because of their age and

because their test scores are just below the cutoff line of admission. He

then assumes that because these two do not violate rights, then neither

does denying an applicant because he will not reduce racial consciousness

as much as an individual of another race would. By taking this argument

apart piece by piece, it is evident that all three parts of his argument

violate rights.

Preferential treatment violates a person’s right to be "judged on merit and

merit alone(299)." Dworkin says that another definition for merit is

qualification, and for some jobs, race can be a qualification. Given a

specific job, certain human characteristics are more desirable than others.

People with these preferred characteristics are more likely to get this

job. For example, a desirable quality for a surgeon is steady hands;

therefore, a person with steady hands is more likely to get this position

than a person with shaky hands. Using race in a similar example,

preferential treatment would be just if there were a job where one race is

more qualified than another. The problem with this is that there are no

such jobs. Dworkin says that denying a person admission because of his age

does not violate that person?s rights, but then, is the individual being

judged on his merit and merit alone? No. It is therefore wrong to

discriminate against someone because of their age because it violates his

rights.

A second objection to Dworkin’s belief that preferential treatment does

not violate people’s rights is that people have the right to be judged as

an individual. Preferential treatment supports grouping people together

according to race and then judging them as a whole. Dworkin agrees with

Colvin when he says that people have the right not to be disadvantaged

because of one’s race alone. Many colleges set cutoff limits to the

applicants? scores that they admit. Some applicants that barely fall below

the line have much more dedication and enthusiasm than those above the

line, and would make better students by these attributes. Unfortunately,

these students are not even considered because they are not looked at as an

individual, but judged solely by their scores. Now imagine a situation

similar to this where race is the determinant of whether a person is

accepted or not. If a person were to be turned down from a college because

of his skin color before he was given a chance to be interviewed, the

college may loose a very smart student. Skin color should not be used to

group people because within one skin color, many different kinds of people

can be grouped together. A possible alternative to this approach is

similar to it, but with one slight change?create a range around the cutoff

line where the students are considered on an individual basis. Those

inside this zone with admirable qualities are accepted and those without

are rejected.

The third objection that preferential treatment does not violate people’s

rights is that a person has the right not to be excluded, disadvantaged, or

denied some good because of race alone. In Bakki?s case, Dworkin agrees

that he would have been accepted had he been a minority, but says that he

was not disadvantaged because of his race. He says that Bakki would also

have been accepted had he gotten better test scores or had been younger, so

his color is not the only thing that kept him from being accepted. Here,

Dworkin is comparing apples and oranges. A person?s color is no

determinant of whether he should be suitable for a job, and neither should

his age (although I will not discuss this here). His knowledge is what is

important. A doctor should not be turned away because of his race or

because he may be a few years older than another, but he may very well be

turned away because he is not performing his job to the necessary degree

because he lacks the needed knowledge. A person?s color or age has nothing

to do with his intelligence. This is yet another weak argument given by

Dworkin.

One more disadvantage to preferential treatment is how people feel when

they work with people who have been helped by preferential treatment. If a

black man were to apply to medical school and be accepted only because of

his skin color, what kind of business would he run if he were to make it

out of medical school for the same reasons? There would be a great

disadvantage to giving him a little extra leeway because of his race.

During college, he might not try as hard on his studies because he knows he

will make it by and therefore not gain all the necessary information to be

a good doctor. Then, after he graduates and works with other doctors, he

may not only give his race a bad name by not knowing what he should have

learned in college, but he may also lose patients from being misdiagnosed.

It is clear that giving racial preferences can lead to great problems in

the future, and should therefore not be used.

Many people have explained both advantages and disadvantages to

preferential treatment since the racial injustice campaign began in 1954.

One of whom is Ronald Dworkin, who spoke on the side for preferential

treatment. He argued that while decreasing racial consciousness, it does

not violate anyone?s rights. When trying to prove his side, he uses

examples that are uncharacteristic to racial preferences such as race being

a qualification for a job. Although Dworkin argues his point well, he uses

examples that just do not back up his beliefs as well as they should and do

not draw a distinct line of why preferential treatment should be used.